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ABSTRACT
This study aims to draw a theoretical discussion on the 
features of the Turkish feminist groups and their contributions 
to the development of civil society in post-1980 Turkey.
It has been reached to the conclusion that Turkish 
feminist groups have created a new set of politics in Turkey 
through the success of changing many vfomen's and men's 
thinking. Through the focus on conciseness raising, on non- 
oppressive relations between man and woman, on creating a 
counter-culture and alternative institutions, Turkish feminist 
groups have represented a new politics in Turkey.
Turkish feminist groups have incorporated into particular 
as well as universal discourses. With respect to their particu­
lar discourses feminist groups serve for the aims of the Turk­
ish state. However, With respect to the common discourses which 
they share with their Western counterparts they constitute a 
substantial element of civil society in Turkey. These dis­
courses are particular to their own interest as well as differ­
entiate feminist women from the "man-like" generation of the 
women who once served for the aims of the Republican Turkey.
ÖZET
Bu çalışmanın amacı 1980 sonrası Türkiye'de ortaya çıkan 
feminist hareketin Türk sivil toplum gelişimine katkısı üzerine 
teorik bir tartışma açmaktır. Türk feminist gruplarının ve 
söylemlerinin ayırdedici özellikleri ve bunların Türk siyasi 
hayatındaki yeri çalışmanın özünü oluşturmaktadır.
Türk feministleri, kadın ve erkeğin düşünce modüllerini 
değiştirmek suretiyle yeni bir politikaya öncülük etmekte­
dirler. Bilinç yükseltme, kadın erkek arasındaki eşitsizliği 
giderme ve alternatif kültür ve kurumlar geliştirme yönündeki 
söylemleri bu politikaya hizmet etmektedir.
Türk feministleri hem yerel hem de evrensel söylemler
geliştirmektedirler, Yerel söylemleri bağlamında
değerlendirildiğinde Türk feminist grupları, Türk devletinin 
Çağdaş medeniyetler düzeyine ulaşma yönündeki amacına hizmet 
etmektedirler. Fakat Batı feminizmi paylaştıkları söylemleri 
ile sivil toplum gelişimine büyük bir katkı sağlamaktadırlar. 
Bu söylemler Türk tarihinde ilk defa sadece kadınlara ait 
olmakla beraber feminist kadınları bir zamanlar Cumhuriyet 
ideolojisinin öncülüğünü yapan "erkeksi-kadınlar" dan da ayır­
maktadır.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study aims to draw a theoretical discussion on the 
contribution of the feminist movement to the development of the 
civil society in Turkey. Political discourses of the Turkish 
feminist groups, which emerged after 1980, are taken as the 
substantial focus from the vantage point of the theoretical 
discussions on civil society. What is so particular to the 
Turkish feminist groups and discourses and their precise 
implications in the Turkish political context of the 1980s is 
the essential quest of this study. It is assumed that the 
feminist political discourses can successfully be analyzed 
only when they are held up together with the analysis of the 
paramount characteristics of the political context, against 
which feminists are setting up their attack fronts. Therefore, 
the development of the feminist movement from, the post-1980 
will be analyzed together with a thorough analysis of Turkish 
politics within the framework of a historical perspective in 
the following chapters. For now, in this introductory chapter 
the research problem and the research methods will be briefly 
illuminated.
1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM
Starting from 1980 onwards we have begun to hear feminist 
voices in Turkey. The feminist way of thinking has gained a 
substantial ground in Turkish everyday life through informal 
meetings, various demonstrations, and through discussions in 
the daily newspapers and the weekly, bimonthly and monthly 
reviews and magazines. This new issue, in Turkish politics, has 
awaken interest not only among the educated intellectuals but 
also among the young girls, students and ordinary citizens.
Feminism, in Turkey, has created changes so influential 
that they cannot be reversed. It has had a broad and profound 
impact on the Turkish society and in the way people think. 
Moreover, young women have, in the last decades, been 
influenced by feminist writings to support themselves, to 
enhance their self-respect and to raise the consciousness of 
their existence. Moreover, being feminist or thinking in the 
feminist mode, nowadays, yields a substantial amount of respect 
for many women especially for women academicians in 
universities. The impact of feminism on the Turkish cultural 
and intellectual life has been extraordinary. Feminist issues 
are dealt with in books, in magazines, in movies and in such 
type of similar activities. Today, these issues are not only 
being dealt with by those who claim themselves to be 
feminists, but also by those who are not feminists.
This is not the first time that Turkish women have become 
involved in politics. They were first involved in politics 
during the second half of the nineteenth and the early years of 
the twentieth centuries on the basis of a strong challenge to 
their traditional status. Moreover, they took an active role in 
the struggle for national independence during the years 
following the First World War when parts of the country had 
been occupied by foreign armies. Women then participated in a 
series of activities outside their traditional roles: they
organized public meetings, addressed the masses and fought 
actively in the war. Indeed, beginning from the second half of 
the nineteenth century until 1935 (the date of the abolishment 
of the Union of the Turkish Women) women constituted the main 
alternative discourse to the existing authority on the basis of 
their indigenous problems. Once they gained the right to vote 
women gradually began to devote all of their energy to the 
Kemalist reforms until 1980. But beginning from 1980 onwards 
women again became engaged in politics promoting the issues 
and voices supporting their own interest and the values and 
rights that are particular only to women in the post-1980 
period. Women's involvement in politics during the Republican 
period was identical with their self-sacrificing to the 
collective goals of the country. It is an interesting point 
that in those countries that intend to change in the direction 
of the Western institutions, women constitute the main subject 
and even the dynamics of social change. It was the case also in 
Turkey in the beginning years of the Republican period that 
women experienced the excitement of being the pioneers of
modernization.
During the earlier years of the Turkish Republic the
essential contribution expected from women was their having as
many children as they could to compensate for the enormous loss
of man during the war. When women then devoted their full
energy to the development of the country it was the state that
tried to approve the legal arrangements in order to enhance
women's status. Therefore, the government prepared the most
radical reforms ever attempted in any Muslim society. The Civil
Code adopted in 1926, which was translated from the Swiss Civil
Code replaced Islamic law and aimed to give women an equal
status with men. The previous legal status of women was
actually defined by Islamic law, which was supplemented by the
law of the Sultan. This law assumed that women were naturally
dependent on men thereby meaning that since they were not men's
equal they needed the protection of men. This law was radically
removed and women gained a new status by means of the state's 
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hand.
Following the adoption of the Civil Code the government 
enfranchised women for local elections in 1930 and in 1934 
women were given equal political rights with men for national 
elections. This right, in fact, brought to an end the women's 
movement which was developed mainly on the basis of the demands 
for rights concerning their particular status and put women in 
an obligatory position under Kemalist principles. The state's
interference in woman issue in Turkey continued at least until 
the 1980s. This interference prevented the emergence of a 
feminist movement developing outside the corridor of the state 
and also promotion of women's special rights and issues. 
Women's participation in politics between 1934-1980, therefore, 
was hardly more than that of "devoted participation" meaning 
that women devoted their actions to the collective goals, which 
in no way are related to their special conditions.
The years following the 1980s have brought a change for 
women from their previous position and have forced women to 
stand on their own feet. Women, therefore, have begun to push 
for an "interest oriented participation" in politics. Feminist 
theories in different versions have gradually been incorporated 
into the Turkish political context. On the one hand, these 
theories have created substantiell grounds for discussion about 
women's problems, and on the other hand have motivated women to 
create political issues and practices pertaining to their own 
conditions. Feminist groups thereby have been able to grasp the 
political initiative on behalf of their, requirements thus 
asserting certain interests particular to them and they have 
established a significant presence in national policy making. 
It is clear that not only in Turkey, but also in almost all of 
the countries in the world, feminism has developed along with 
various aspects and versions. Feminism is not a unique theory 
but the collaboration of different theories and practices. It 
is only the political aspect of the feminist movement that
interests us in this study. How the feminist political 
discourses produced in the Turkish context can contribute to 
the development of civil society in the post-1980 is the 
essential question of this study.
The main point underlying the basic assumption of my 
thesis is that in all varieties of feminist versions (either 
being egalitarian, radical, socialist or postmodernist) there 
are certain set of discourses and values, each creating a 
contribution to the development of the intermediate components 
of the civil society. Since feminism is not limited to a 
territory it creates discourses on the basis of two levels: the 
universal and the local levels. The universal creation of 
discourses are common to feminists in almost all societies. 
Issues such as the gender differentiation of sexes; the 
subordination of women; the men's domination of women in the 
various spheres (economical, social, educational and cultural); 
and the historical construction of the patriarchy are examples 
of this. Whereas, on the local level each feminist version 
deals with particular problems such as the problems generating 
from sex discrimination under particular cultural impacts, ie., 
the husband as the head of the family, legal provisions against 
women, wife battering, and so forth.
I will not view civil society in the sense that it was 
viewed by the political thinkers of the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel 
and Marx. The definition of civil society was formulated by the
hands of almost all on the basis of the separation of the
3public realm from the private sphere. However, through this
study civil society will be understood as an alternative
4
milieu to the state. The elements of a civil society, 
according to that perspective, create and develop challenges 
through the alternative discourses emphasizing their own 
interests. This definition of the civil society, indeed, is 
more realistic in analyzing a country like Turkey, in which one 
always observes a substantial difference on the basis of the 
norms and values placed between the state and society. 
Therefore, feminism becomes meaningful when it is undertaken as 
an element of the civil society in Turkey more so than the 
Western societies, which experience a relatively greater 
affinity between the state and society.
Since the 1970s the feminist theorists, in general, have 
been examining the familiar texts of political theory. Their 
readings and interpretations have implications not only for 
understanding the political theorists, but also of such central 
political categories as citizenship, equality, freedom, 
justice, the public, the private, democracy and the like. In 
collaboration with all of these studies, the task for feminists 
comes to developing a democratic theory that secures equality 
among the sexes as well as develops the democratic issues 
particular to women. These deniocratic issues clearly constitute 
the elements of a civil society. These feminist issues 
contribute to the development of the civil society in three 
interrelated and substantial aspects.
First of all, feminism constitutes an element of civil 
society as a social movement. It is obvious that each social 
movement proclaims an ideology, that is, a doctrine or a set of 
beliefs, which explains the need for change in the society's 
institutions. Through ideology, a social movement encourages 
its members to develop a group consciousness and prepares 
themselves to mentally challenge the state authority. A set of 
predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional 
procedures comes to existence through the actions of a social 
movement and these operate systematically for the benefit of 
certain groups. Thus, a social movement, feminism in our 
analysis, expands its participation and increases its impact on 
policy. Through different discourses developed by feminists, an
alternative cultural pattern comes into existence and it stands
5
as not being more than an element of civil society.
Secondly, feminism develops a version of civil society on 
the basis of political discourses, which it raises through 
arguments on the public-private distinction. The feminist 
slogan, "the personal is political" denies a social division 
between the public and private spheres with different kinds of 
institutions, activities and human attributes. Mainly, two 
principles follow from this slogan: no social institutions or 
practices should be excluded from public discussion and 
expression and no person's action or aspects of a person's life 
should be forced into privacy. The public life is supposed to 
allow freedom for sex, ethnicity, age and so on, and all of
8
this should enter into the public life and allow for its
discussions on identical terms. In modern political theory
there is a sharp distinction between the public realm of the
state and the private realm of needs and desires. Indeed, the
public realm of the state in modern political theory attains
its generality by the exclusion of particularity and privacy.
Moreover, it establishes its assertions on objectivity common
to all. This understanding of the public in modern political
theory is fundamentally reversed by feminist groups. Feminism
has claimed to develop and foster a distinctive women's
culture, which requires attention in the public to special
needs. Feminism, briefly, attempts to create a public viewpoint
based on difference and particvilarity and thus constitutes a
distinctive element in the public realm which was taken by the
eighteenth century political thinkers as the total identity of
civil society. Not public but publics are salient to feminism.
The plurality of the public means, in that sense, that a
collaboration of alternatives can exist together, not as a
process eroded by the state, but as a milieu which accommodates
6
a harbor of alternatives to the state.
Finally, one can see a contribution to the development of 
civil society in the feminists' right seeking attempts. Modern 
democracy holds, as the basic principle, that the rules and 
policies of the state ought to be blind to race, gender and 
other differences and treat all citizens equally in the same 
way. But the feminists argue that with the achievement of 
equal rights for all groups, the group inequalities never end.
The rights and rules that are universally formulated and thus
are blind to race, culture, gender, age or disability
perpetuate rather than undermine oppression. Therefore, some
feminists insist on special rights which generate from their
special conditions. These special conditions of women in the
workplace, pregnancy, birthing, unpaid household labor are all
considered by feminists as "special" rights. Having a claim on
different rights, indeed, brings and opens up another front in 
7
civil society.
It is a matter of question how feminism can be placed
within the civil societal elements in Turkish politics, which
has a distinct history of its political culture. The history of
the Turkish political culture has a substantial experience of a
strong state tradition. The center of power centered around the
norms and values perpetuated by statesmen. When analyzing the
Ottoman and the Republican Turkish politics therefore it is not
so difficult to find the subsequent contribution of power under
the domination of the state sphere. During the Ottoman Empire
the central power holder was only the Sultan, all of the other
elements, either the religious institutions or the guild
system, or even the millet system were controlled by his power.
The political culture functioned to maintain that structure,
its characteristics being non-individualistic, and being
divided into two different cultures; the central and the
peripheral ones. The peripheral culture could never be able to
develop and grasp a power as an alternative to the central
8
culture in the state sphere.
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However, the center of power holding shifted into the 
state elite with the beginning of the Tanzimat (Reform) period 
(1839-1876). The students educated in the West constituted a 
new phase of the state as soon as they returned to Turkey. 
These intellectual elites later led the Republican revolution 
in Turkey and guided the nation toward the goals formulated by 
their hands. This picture was maintained at least until the 
1950s, when the Democratic Party, the true representative of 
social groups, came into power. Indeed, during the Ottoman 
Empire there was a "particularistic" politics which delivered 
the specificity of each group on the basis of their own 
identity and culture. Through the millet system each minority 
could hold its own particular legal status as well as set up 
its own educational institutions. The Ottoman sultanate, in 
such a structure, allowed the participants especially the women 
participants of different minorities to have their own ethnic 
dress. Although there was an official language each minority 
had the right to be educated in his/her own language. But one 
of the essential breaks of the Republican Turkey from the 
Ottoman-Empire politics was that the latter promoted the 
"universality" of citizenship in the sense that it took 
everyone to be involved and to participate in the public life 
and in the democratic process on the basis of equal treatment. 
The full inclusion and participation of all in the law and in 
the public life was impeded however by the formulation of laws 
and rules in universal terms, that is, they are applied to
11
all citizens in the same way. This, in fact, resulted in a 
process by which some social groups came to be smothered; 
neither women nor any other social group was able to grasp 
power differently. That gap was not closed even during the 
multi-party period which emerged after 1950. Although a slight 
move was experienced on the part of some social groups, in the 
period after the 1950s, the true political conflict was 
gradually channeled into a ’’party centered” political system.
But in the years after 1980, Turkish politics promised a 
new chapter in . state-society relations. The traditional 
vertical relations between the state and society have been, 
slightly, changed to a more horizontal relations not only 
between the state and society but also among different groups: 
feminists, environmentalists, homosexuals, leftist groups, 
religious groups, the groups approving issues of human rights 
and the like. Particularly the feminist case is very 
interesting in the sense that it dissociates itself radically 
from the norms formulated by the state elites. Turkey has 
devoted itself, at least from Tanzimat Period onwards, to 
reaching the level of "contemporary civilization", a project 
for which the greatest political energy of Turkish politicians 
has been spent. But the most outstanding bases of the
contemporary civilization such as "reason", "science", "power", 
"development", "progress" and "universalism" are suspected and 
sometimes strongly criticized by feminists. Especially the 
postmodern feminists who aroused a great suspicious to these 
institutions since they thought that these institutions created
12
a historical process in which women have come to be dominated 
by men in every respect.
It is interesting to place emphasis on Turkish feminism to 
see what kind of discourses it produces and what place these 
discourses occupy in Turkish politics. The paramount question 
is whether or not Turkish feminism has any particular issues 
which are different from the ones developed by other feminist 
groups elsewhere and whether the issues of the Turkish feminist 
groups constitute a contribution to the development of civil 
society in Turkey. Therefore, the 1980s is thoroughly 
analyzed in this, study.
1.2. METHODOLOGY
1.2.1. The Selection of the Research Topic
In this study the role of women in the Turkish political 
system, is examined from the vantage point of the arguments on 
the civil society which emphasizes the essential roles of 
interest groups or social movements as components of a civil 
society. It is our belief that the emerging groups, in Turkish 
politics after the 1980s, under the banner of the feminist 
movement, provide a unique example of political mobilization, 
social group development and political discourse rising. 
Therefore, the examination of the Turkish feminism, as a 
particular case, is important in the sense that it can only be 
seen together by examinâting the civil society.
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Feminist discourses are more radical than the others pro­
duced in Turkey after the 1980s. In arguing that all women, 
potentially at least, are vulnerable to choices and conditions 
regarding them, the feminists take women's direct interests as 
their discursive starting point. A women's choice, therefore, 
has to be final and decisive and cannot not be legally 
interfered with by medical, institutional or political veto. 
The argument of women's choice constitutes an essential element 
of the democratic ideal of liberty.
Moreover, the feminist movement produces and emphasizes 
its discourses not by means of attempting to take a place 
within the political system nor by means of attempting to hold 
power itself, rather by standing outside the system and 
challenging the essential bases of the system. When compared 
with other movements, i.e., the religious, the leftist or the 
ethnic groups, in Turkey we see that it is only the feminist 
movement that sets up, on the basis of civil societal 
discourses, a fundamental alternative to the state authority. 
The religious groups, which are thought as another element of 
civil society, indeed, have not been successful in separating 
themselves from the idea which is based on a strong will to 
attain and hold power. Taking a part in the state, in general, 
is the essential ideal of the religious groups in Turkey. The 
environmentalist, leftist or ethnic groups, which predominated 
the 1980s Turkish politics, are not so far away from the 
ideals shared by the religious groups. They also produce
14
discourses by holding powejr v/ithin the state sphere. For in­
stance, they respond to democracy with another definition of 
democracy. They both have the ideals put forward by the state 
as displayed in "reaching to the level of contemporary
civilizations". Even some environmentalist groups are on the
10
fringe of an auxiliary unit of the state. Furthermore, the 
economic groups in Turkey who place emphasis on special rights, 
i.e., only those rights which they illuminate, do not 
constitute challenges to the political system and culture. 
Rather the economic groups in Turkey have always been a 
component of the state enterprise working within the direction 
of the official ideals. Therefore, it is only the feminist 
movement that takes up challenge from the outside and even 
against the state and produces issues which challenge the 
dominant principles underlined in the state sphere.
One can also see the distinctive characteristics of the 
feminist movement in terms of its being the provocative of a 
particular interest group. While almost all the other groups 
produce more general and total issues, the feminists produce 
issues pertaining only to their own conditions. Whereas all of 
the religious, economic, leftist, ethnic and even the
environmentalist groups are proclaiming then total issues to 
produce whole scale projects for the rest of the country.
One last point underlying the distinctive feature of the 
feminist movement from the others is that of having multidimen­
sional issues. It poses critical points of views to both the 
existing political system and dominant social institutions and
15
emphasizes special rights in different aspects.The Feminist 
groups' insistence on postmodern issues is important in that 
respect. A set of substantial challenges and strong critiques 
to the dominant institutions of "Enlightenment" are developed 
through the discourses of these groups. "Science", the notion 
of "self", of "progress" and the notion of "universalism" all 
have come under a strong attack. Indeed, from the eighteenth 
century onwards these notions have constructed the main ideals 
for almost all the states in the world. The Turkish state too 
has indicated from then on a vigorous effort on these goals. 
Beside these critiques, feminists desire some rights which 
are seen under the guise of free choice for women on issues 
related to their body, sexual freedom, abortion, special rights 
particular to women, etc. In short, all these characteristics 
of the feminist movement make it important for this study.
Through this study mainly four interrelated questions are 
analyzed:
(1) How feminist discourses constitute elements of a civil 
society in general.
(2) What was so particular to civil society and women in 
Turkish politics before 1980.
(3) What is so particular to the discourses undertaken by 
Turkish feminist groups in the post-1980.
(4) What are the general impacts and implications of the 
feminist groups on Turkish politics.
All these questions are viewed v/ithin the framework of a
16
historical perspective. In drawing a historical perspective the 
previous developments must be conducted in relation to both 
the Turkish civil society and Turkish women before 1980. By 
doing this the developments in the post-1980 period are 
understood better.
1.2.2 Data Collection
The range of studies stressing woman issue in Turkey can 
be divided mainly into two: the non-feminists and the femi­
nists. Indeed, there have been a great number of non-feminist 
women's studies beginning in the Republican period and 
continuing through the post-1980 period. These have been 
committed to protecting their present legal and social rights, 
the main basis of which was underlined by the Kemalist reforms. 
Also these non-feminist women have had a variety of 
organizations with certain revenues, membership, meeting places 
and even receiving official state funds. A variety of 
associations can be counted as non-feminist, such as "the 
Association of the Turkish Mothers", "the Foundation For 
Elevating the Turkish Woman", "the Association of University 
Women", etc. Moreover, one can also say that some of the 
religious women's groups are non-feminist. After the 1980s a 
wide range of their activities has been witnessed i.e., 
demanding political and social rights to attend the 
universities with their traditional dress. However, in this 
study only those women who proclaim themselves as being 
feminists are included.
It is too difficult to gather all the feminist groups
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under one banner because we have different version of 
feminism in Turkey. Some feminists articulate for woman's 
rights as individual and woman's opportunities in the work­
force. Others insist on the radical implications of a woman's 
experience in society as a whole while arguing that women have 
a different way of thinking than men and would order the world 
more humanely than men. Still, others point out and criticize 
the various kinds of universal institutions such as science, 
power and history as the basis of patriarchal power, which has 
given opportunity for men to gain domination over women. A 
study projected on feminist groups, should necessarily include 
all branches of that movement in the study. Therefore, the data 
collected then has been drawn from different versions of the 
feminist movement in Turkey.
The data through this study has been collected mainly from 
publications. political actions, associations and interviews. 
The publications which include feminist writings either in the 
form of a book or an article, and specific feminist magazines 
constitute the essential sources of my data. The feminist 
discourses of the post-1980 period have been analyzed on the 
basis of the writings of three magazines in particular: 
Kadinca, Feminist and Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs. All the series 
of the monthly Kadinca in the period between 1978 (the date 
of its initial publication) up to 1992 constitutes the specific 
data for analyzing the discourses of the Turkish liberal 
feminists. Moreover, the writings in irregularly published 
magazines Feminist and Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs (both
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published between 1987-1990) constitute the bases of the data 
for analyzing the discourses of radical and socialist 
feminists. In addition to these magazines all collections of 
the monthly magazines committed to feminist issues like Kim and 
Cagdas Kadin have been thoroughly analyzed to reach a true 
analysis of feminist discourses. Moreover, I have placed 
emphasis on demonstrations and campaigns enacted by feminist 
groups. The issues proclaimed and the slogans raised throughout 
these campaigns are designed to capture the kind of discourses 
feminist groups produce in Turkey. Finally, the institutions 
which have come into existence under the heavy impact of 
feminist groups is of concern in order to analyze the 
feminists' specific implications in Turkish politics.
The information that has been extracted from these 
resources is mainly related to issues which seem to be an 
ingredient of the civil society, such as discussions on women's 
rights in the public-private distinctions and critiques to the 
modern dominant institutioiis. How these issues have contributed 
to the development of civil society are analyzed, in detail, in 
the following chapter. The question, relevant here, is to what 
degree Turkish feminist groups produce specific arguments on 
these issues and what are their implications on Turkish 
politics.
1.2.3. The Design of the Study
This study includes four further chapters, each dealing
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with different but interrelated questions pertaining to the 
study. The following chapter draws a theoretical discussion on 
the civil society, feminism, and the feminist contributions 
to the development of a civil society. In the third chapter the 
condition of the Turkish civil society and of women beginning 
from the Ottoman period until the 1980s is high-ligated within 
its historical perspective. Four main stages are enumerated 
here: the "sultan centered" politics, the "state elite
centered" politics, the "political party centered" politics and 
relatively the recent "social group centered" politics. The 
changing status of women and women's struggle for the adoption 
of new rights, parallel with the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, 
is analyzed in detail in that chapter. In the fourth chapter 
the development of the Turkish feminism is considered with a 
brief analysis of the civil society in the post-1980. In that 
chapter the emergence of feminism in the post-1980 period, the 
feminist discourses, actions, and implications on Turkish 
politics are thoroughly analyzed. Finally, the fifth chapter 
draws a theoretical discussion on the specificity of the 
Turkish feminism and its distinctive politics,in Turkey.
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CHAPTER II
CIVIL SOCIETY AND FEMINISM
This chapter aims to analyze how the arguments on the 
civil society came into being during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries through the theoretical framework of the 
contract theories and the theories formulating the separation 
of the civil society from the state. It then discusses how 
feminist politics contribute to the development of a civil 
society in a version different from the one formulated by well- 
known political thinkers i.e., Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Frederick Hegel and Karl Marx. It pays 
attention to the writings of feminist thinkers on issues such 
as theory and politics; equality and difference; and public 
and private and tries to bring to light how discussions on 
these issues put women at the center of the civil society. 
Women have always been ignored in the theoretical studies of 
the masters of civil society and are formulated as being 
suitable only to the private sphere, that is, the actions done 
within the family. However, some feminists have attempted to 
reverse this definition of civil society through developing one 
which puts women at its center. All of these are the central 
argument of this chapter.
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2.1 CIVIL SOCIETY
The separation of the civil society from the state was an
intellectual effort of the eighteenth century thinkers. Until
the middle of the eighteenth century European political
thinkers used the term "civil society" to describe a type of
political institution which placed its members under the
influence of its laws and thereby ensured a peaceful order and
good government. This term formed a part of an old European
tradition traceable from modern natural law back to the
classical political philosophy, above all, to Aristotle, for
whom civil society (koinOnia politikfe) was that society, the
polis, which contains and dominates all others. In this old
European tradition civil society and the state were
interchangeable terms. To be a member of a civil society was
to be a citizen, a member of the state and thus obliged to
act in accordance with its laws and without engaging in acts
1
harmful to other citizens. But the term civil society gained 
a new meaning in the hands of the political thinkers during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The following two parts 
look at how civil society was formulated during the eighteenth 
century and how a place was assigned to women in it.
2.1.1. Civil Society in Contract Theorists
Civil society is, in its very general sense, identified, 
by contract theorists, to what is called "public", which
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operates on a basis of rules different from that of the 
private domestic life. This distinction, therefore, comes as 
civil society and domestic private life. The fam.ily or 
domestic life, in particular for Hobbes and Locke, was based 
on natural ties of sentiment and blood line while the public 
life was governed by universal, impersonal and the
conventional criteria of achievements, rights, equality and 
property. The most striking assumption about Hobbes' theory is 
that the growth of individualism requires a centralized 
authority, one in which individuals must sacrifice their 
sovereignty when entering society in order to enjoy the 
benefits of peace. However, for Locke, who saw individualism 
as grounded in labor, the sovereignty resided in the individual 
and his property, from which even the government derived its 
authority. Rousseau, urged a further different hypothesis: 
once individuals accept an agreement they lose their 
individuality and should be obliged to obey the rules of the 
common will. As Elizabeth F. Genouese emphasizes that they 
all together assumed that the individual was male and thereby
they then discussed the relationship of the female to that
2
male.
Hobbes' theory is then generally based on the necessity of 
the organization of a society and the establishment of the com­
monwealth so that peace and civilization can be attained. In
the state of nature there is a war among individuals who seek
self- preservation and attainment. Naturally man exists in 
this state of war and has passion and reason. It is, thus.
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man's passions which bring about the state of war. But at the
same time fear of death, the desire of such things as are
necessary to "commodious" living and the hope of obtaining
these things by industry are passions which incline man to seek 
3
peace. Man seeks self-preservation and security, but he is
unable to attain this goal in the natural condition of war.
The laws of nature are unable to achieve the desired end by
themselves alone unless there is a coercive power capable of
4
enforcing their observance by sanctions. This means that a 
plurality of individuals should confer all their power and 
strength upon one man or upon one assembly of man that may 
reduce all their wills by a plurality of voices unto one 
will. This transfer of rights takes place in Hobbes' as 
follows:
...by covenant of every man with every man, in
such manner, as if every man should say to every
man, 1 authorize and give up my Right of Governing
myselfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of man,
on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to
him, and Authorize al1 his Actions in like manner.
This done, the Multitude so united in one Person,
is called a COMMON-WEALTH... This is the Generation
of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more
reverently), of that Mortal God, to which wee owe
5
under the Immortal God, our peace and defence.
The theory of the covenant of man enables Hobbes to make
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the transition from the condition of atomic individualism to 
organized society. Self-interest, according to him, lies at 
the basis of organized society, in which the self-destructive 
attempts are checked by the fear of the sovereign's power. As 
is understood from these one can clearly see that civil 
society, as stated by Hobbes, allows individuals to seek self- 
preservation on the principles of their particular interests. 
This essential unit is, on the contrary, the state or the 
public uniting warring individuals. If men are naturally 
egoistic and always remain so then the only factor which can 
hold them together effectively is a centralized power vested 
in the sovereign.
Now, the question arises as to how women are formulated
by Hobbes in civil society. Hobbes began from the premise
that there is no natural dominion of men over women. In the
state of nature female individuals are as free as, and equal
to, male individuals. Both marriage and family, for Hobbes,
are artificial political institutions rather than natural
forms. The roles given to the members of the family are gained
in civil society. For Hobbes, "A father with his sons and
servants, grown into a civil person by virtue of his paternal
6
jurisdiction is called a family". His families are ruled by 
men not as fathers but as masters. Masters of families rule by 
virtue of contract not by their paternal, procreative 
capacity. Men as masters enter into the original contract that 
constitutes civil society. Women, now in subjection, no 
longer have the necessary standing to take part in creating a
2 5
not natural, rather are created through the original contract
and so are political right. The rights are therefore,
deliberately, created by men who brought civil society into
being. Hobbes states that in civil society the husband has
dominion "because for the most part the commonwealths have been
8
created by the fathers not by the mothers of families."
Matrimonial law takes a patriarchal form because men have
made the original contract. Through the civil institution of
marriage, men can lawfully obtain the familiar "helpmate" and
gain the sexual and domestic services of a wife, whose
permanent servitude is now guaranteed by the lav/ and sword of 
9
Leviathan. Shortly, in Hobbes's political theory all
individuals including women have self-protection rights in the 
state of nature. But in the civil society women as wives who 
have given up their right in favor of the "protection" of their 
husband or husbands, are now protected by the sword of 
Leviathan. The civil society thus comes into being as a
contractual agreement among men on behalf of the representation 
of men and on behalf of the subjection of women.
Locke also extended this definition of civil society. He, 
accordingly, began with the state of nature and resulted with a 
society established by the consent among free individuals. In 
his view all men are naturally in the state of nature and 
remain so until, by their own consent, they make themselves 
members of some political society. Unlike Hobbes, he argues 
that the state of nature is the state of liberty and it has a
new civil society. Thus, for Hobbes, conjugal rights are
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law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone to be equal
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
10
liberty or possessions. To him, God put men under strong 
obligations of necessity, convenience and inclination to force 
him into society. The family as a part of society is natural
to men and civil society is natural in the sense that it 
fulfills human needs. Although, in the state of nature, all 
men enjoy equal rights and are morally bound to respect the 
rights of others, it does not necessarily follow that all men 
actually respect the rights of others. It is in men's 
interest, therefore, to form an organized society for the more 
effectual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates 
which he calls property.
The civil society thereby, came to be closely identical
with the political society, "where-ever...any number of Men are
so united into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive
Power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the publick,
11
there and there only is a Political, or Civil society. '* A
civil society comes into being for Locke "...wher-ever any
number of Men, in the state of Nature, enter into Society to
make one People, one Body Politick, under one Supreme
Government, or else when anyone joyns himself to and
12
incorporates with any Government already made" Men being,
by nature, all free, equal and independent no one can be 
subjected to the political power of another without his own 
consent. Even though civil society, as an historic event,
grev/ out of the family and tribe it is the fact that the
Civil society and government are created on the basis of two
covenants. By the first compact a man becomes a member of a
definite civil or political society and obliges himself to
accept the decisions of the majority, while in the second
compact the majority of the members of the newly-formed society
agree either to carry on the government themselves or to set up
13
an oligarchy or a monarchy, hereditary or elective.
In short, Locke treats civil society as the sum of inde­
pendent moral beings whose rational choices place them in the 
Commonwealth. In other words, it is a voluntary organization 
of individuals set up as the result of the social contract and
centered around moral purposes, to which they desire to give a
14
political dimension in public life. Unlike Hobbes, Locke 
considers individuals and groups as those whose moral convic­
tions give them a strong feeling of autonomy, and independence 
from the official system. The common features of the civil 
society, then, should be understood as such newly arisen
norms and values by which the members of these groups and
15
movements want to replace the official ones. It is
interesting that while Locke placed individuals and groups at
the center of his civil society he excluded women from that
arena and indicated the family as the most suitable place for 
them.
Locke, analyzed the relationship of man and woman, in 
civil society, on the basis of conjugal and political rela-
rational foundation of civil society and government is consent.
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tionships. Both were grounded in consent and existed for the
preservation of property. Yet conjugal society was not a
political society because it conferred no power over the life
and death of its members. Men and women, in the state of
nature, were free to determine the terms of the conjugal
contract. But, in the civil society, these terms could be
16limited or created by the Customs or Laws of the country. He
analyzed several nonpolitical relationships including those of
master-servant, master-slave, parent-child, and husband-
wife. Each of these forms of associations is distinguished
from the political relationship of ruler-subject. The status
of women in Lockean theory was formulated in nonpolitical 
17
relationships. Thus the conjugal society is a natural unit
which is based on a voluntary compact between man and woman. 
Although the conjugal relationship began for the sake of 
procreation it continued for the sake of property.
[Men's power] leaves the wife in the full and free 
possessions of v/hat by Contract is her Peculiar 
Right and gives the Husband no more power over her 
Life, than she has over his. The power of the Hus 
band being so far from that of an absolute monarch 
that the Wife has, in many cases, a Liberty to 
separate from him; where natural Right or their 
Contract allows it, whether that Contract be made 
by themselves in the state of Nature or by the 
Customs or Laws of the Country they live in; and 
the Children upon such Separation fall to the
29
Father or Mother's lot, as such contract does 
18
determine.
Locke distinguished also between the property rights of 
husband and wife. All property in conjugal society was not 
automatically under the husband's control. Because of certain 
inconveniences, men quit the state of nature to form civil 
society through an act of consent. In short, Locke's 
insistence on the relationship between men and women was based 
on that in the state of nature whereby man dominated woman 
since he was naturally the abler and stronger. However, in 
civil society man dominated woman not because he was stronger 
rather on the basis of consent of the two to preserve women's 
right. Thus, Locke, like Hobbes, stated that the civil 
society is an agreement among free men who at the same time, 
represent women whose roles are as the home-maker in the civil 
society.
Rousseau, in relation to the condition of women,
developed the same definition of civil society with Hobbes
and Locke. He also began with the natural state of man.
Natural man, for Rousseau, was somehow a tabula rasa an
awareness of nothing, not a culture gainer and therefore, in
peace with his environment. Since natural men think that
coming together enables them to overcome natural disaster and
to have a more fruitful life, they come together to form
society. But, once society comes into being there starts a
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conflict, a war and a struggle among men. Therefore, they
30
see a need for a government in order to protect their property
on the principle of peace. Civil society, thus, for
Rousseau, came into being on the basis of man's needs and
desires. In that way a social contract enables man to leave
his particular will into the common will. By submitting his
particular will to the Common Will he loses little but gains,
in return, the assurance that he will be protected by the full
force of society against the enrichment of individuals and
groups. He is now a member of a new society of equals in which
he has gained a new form of equality on a higher level than the
20
one he enjoyed in the state of nature.
Rousseau insisted that the inequality of power and wealth
transformed the expression of the drive for self-preservation
into rational egoism. Since all develop different concerns,
different interests are necessarily in constant opposition. It
is, therefore, apparent that Rousseau's views on women create
a response to feminist arguments today and he was a severe
21
critic of particularistic and individualistic thought. For
Rousseau the supreme being as denounced as the "Common Will" 
was the essential unit and woman could take her save under 
such a general will.
The Supreme Being wanted to do honor to the human 
species in everything. While giving man incli 
nations without limit. He gives him at the same time 
the law which regulates them, in order that he may 
be free and in command of himself. While abandoning
31
man to immoderate passions, He joins reason to
these passions in order to govern them. While
abandoning women to unlimited desires, He joins
modesty to these desires in order to constrain 
22
them.
The timidity and weakness of the woman, according to
Rousseau, inspired her to be pleasing to a man. If this is
the case there will be less likeliness for a man to be violent.
To act, to please man, is a quality of woman directly
derivable from her nature. Within the civil society the man
was stronger and dependent on the woman only through desire,
whereas woman depended on man through desire and need. The
habit of living together gave rise to man's conjugal and
paternal love. Within the family, as the little society, women
became more sedentary and grew accustomed to tending the hut
and the children, while the men sought their common23
subsistence.
"Natural" man and "natural" woman implied quite different 
things for Rousseau. Natural man, for him, was a man in the 
original state of nature; one of total independence of his 
fellows, devoid of selfishness, and equal to everyone else. 
Natural woman, however, was defined according to her role in 
the golden age of the patriarchal family: dependent, subordi­
nate and naturally imbued with those qualities of shame and
modesty which served to make her sexually appealing to her 24
husband.
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characterized as closer to "nature" than man. The man could be
transformed and denatux'ed in a good society. As such, women
could form a necessary link between the supreme artifice of the25
good society and nature. Otherwise, if women attempt to act
in a society according to their particular intei*est they will
be oppressed by the men. In civil .society "particular
interest" of women is disastrous, for Rousseau. He proposed
for women a sphere of their true competence; childcare,
household tasks and recreation for men. In a good society,
women should contribute to the development of a patriot notion,
thereby against one's self interest for the civil state. The
love of the self, therefore, should be in turn for the love
of the nation, in other words, for the common will. In short,
like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau formulated a family in which
women were dependent on men in a way that they were devoid from
26
any particular interests and rational egoism.
In conclusion, according to contractarian theorists' 
the civil society is identical, in the last analysis, with 
the public life of the state coming into being on the basis of 
the agreement among individuals, who are assumed to be men. 
The chief principles of the civil society functioned under the 
rule of the male individual. Women, treated as being close to 
nature, were represented in the civil society through their 
husbands, who were recognized in their roles of being masters. 
In a sense women were hidden or were accounted as being absent
The virtues of women in the civil society were
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2.1.2. The Separation of Civil Society From the State
In fact, the distinction between the state and the civil 
society was first made by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right, 
published in 1821. The civil society (bürgerliche 
gesellscraft) in Hegel's philosophy represented a "stage” in 
the dialectical development from the family to the state which 
contradicted the type of ethical life found in the human micro­
community in order to be itself contradicted and overcome by 
the macro-community of the politically independent, sovereign 
nation. While social life typical of civil society was 
different from the ethical world of the family and different 
from the public life of the state it formed a necessary element
within the totality of a rationally structured modern political 
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community. In Hegel, civil society is conceived not as a
natural condition of freedom but as a historically produced
sphere of ethical life "positioned" between the simple world of
the household and the universal state. It includes the market
economy, social classes, corporations and institutions
concerned with the administration of "welfare" (polizei) and
civil law. Civil society was a mosaic of private individuals,
classes, groups and institutions whose transactions are
regulated by civil law and, as such, are not directly
28
dependent upon the political state itself.
For Hegel civil society was an aspect of the modern state 
which emerged in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and
in the civil society.
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became strikingly apparent after the French revolution of 1789. 
It was a specialized and highly complex network of rules, 
institutions, agencies, groups, practices and attitudes 
evolved within the legal and political framework of the nation­
state to satisfy individual needs and safeguard individual 
29
rights. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel subdivides the
sphere of ethical life into family, civil society and the
state. They are "moments” of the ethical order and are the
ethical powers which regulate the life of individual. In the
family as in the Greek polis the individuality of its members
is submerged in a transcendent unity. Ethical duties are
determined by one's place in the family, which ultimately
depends on the natural factors of sex and birth. Love,
altruism and concern for the whole are the dominant features of
ethical dispositions in the family community. In civil society
this type of "natural” ethical unity disintegrates. Men are
primarily concerned with the satisfaction of their private,
individual needs by working, producing and exchanging the
product of their labor in the market. This creates bonds of a
new kind. While individuals behave selfishly and
instrumentally towards each other they can not help satisfying
other men's needs furthering their interests and entering into
30various social relations with them. Hegel points out the 
transition of individual from family to civil society in the 
following way:
Originally the family is the substantive whole
whose function is to provide for the individual on
35
his particular side by giving them either the means 
and the skill necessary to enable him to earn his 
living out of the resources of society, or else 
subsistence and maintenance in the event of his suf­
fering a disability. But civil society tears the 
individual from his family ties, ’estranges the mem 
bers of the family from one another, and recognizes 
them as self- subsistent persons. Further, for 
the paternal soil and the external inorganic 
resources of nature from which the individual 
formerly derived his livelihood, it substitutes 
its own soil and subjects the permanent existence 
of even the entire family to dependence on itself 
and to contingency. Thus the individual becomes a
son of civil society which has as many claims upon
31
his as he has rights against it.
Hegel identifies the system of needs as a distinct level
of experience within civil society. "The concrete person who
is himself an object of his particular aims, is a totality of
wants and mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one
32
principle of civil society." The system of needs is the
complex of reciprocal relationships which promotes the
satisfaction of individual interests; men become dependent
upon one another for mutual satisfaction. The satisfaction of
personal interests involves using others as a means and
33
competing with them. Thus, for Hegel civil society enables 
man to become fully an individual by acting primarily on his
36
personal, subjective opinions and by promoting his private 
34happiness.
Hegel cannot be fairly analyzed without paying enough
attention to his concern on the "state". The state becomes for
Hegel as the final actualization of civil society by which
individuals realize their subjectivity. The state is the
concrete human embodiment of the ethical Idea, of mind "Geist"
developing from a stage of immediate, undifferentiated unity
(the family), through that of explicit difference and
particularity (civil society), to the concrete unity and
synthesis of the particular in the state. "The universal state
conceived by Hegel must be regarded as a secular deity whose
claims upon its male citizens and female and other subjects are
always for their benefit and ultimately unquestionable and 
35
irresistible." Hegel conceives the state as a new moment
which contains, preserves and synthesizes the conflicting
elements of the civil society into a higher ethical entity.
36
The state represents society in its unity. Hegel insists
that "it is within the state that the family is first developed
into civil society and it is the Idea of the state itself
which disrupts itself into these two moments. Through the
development of civil society, the substance of ethical life
acquires its infinite form, which contains in itself these two 
37
moments."
Hegel, thus, puts the state over civil society. The 
relationships between the state and society are based not on a 
"contract" but naturally on the individuals' obligation to
37
accept state authority. The important thing is to realize the
"reason", which is actualized only through the accomplishment
of the state. Since civil society cannot realize its
emancipation due to the contradiction it bears in its
institutions, it must depend on the state. Thus, with joining
38
to the state civil society loses its autonomy. The freedom 
of members of civil society can be guaranteed and synthesized 
with the state's articulation and defence of the universal 
defence. As a concluding remark one can easily say that in 
Hegel's hands the term civil society assumes a less positive 
meaning; it is viewed as a self-crippling entity in constant 
need of state supervision and control.
Hegel's political philosophy developed the concept of the
public realm of the state as expressing impartiality and
universality as against partiality and substance of desire.
For Hegel, as a member of civil society, the individual
pursues private ends for himself and his family. Conceived as
a member of the state, on the other hand, the person is not a
locus of particular desire, but the bearer of universally
articulated rights and responsibilities. The point of view of
the state and law transcends all particular interests to
express the universal and national spirit of humanity. State
laws and action express the general will, the interests of the
39
whole society. It is this particular desire, that Hegel, 
like contract theorists puts woman at its center. Hegel's 
analysis of woman is restricted with the particular world, 
while he puts only male citizens at the center of universal
38
spirit of humanity, or statei. Woman, in short, is 
formulated, in Hegel's political philosophy as the guardian of 
the private realm of need, desire and affectivity.
Women in Hegel are viewed as representing the principles
of particularity, naturalness and substantiality, while men
stand for universality, freedom and subjectivity. Hegel
formulates the nuclear family of Europe as the only one set of
family relations and one particular division of labor between
the sexes as rational and normatively right. It is a family
type in v/hich the women is confined to the private sphere and
the roan to the public. He invokes the superiority of roan to
40
woman.
... one sex is mind its self- diremption into 
explicit self-subsistence and the knowledge and 
volition of free universality, i.e. the self- 
consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition 
of the objective find end. The other sex is mind 
maintaining itself in unity as knowledge and
volition in the form of concrete individuality and 
feeling. In relation to externality, the former is 
powerful and active, the latter passive and
subjective. It follov;s that non has his actual 
substantive life in the state, in learning, and so 
forth, as well as in labor and struggle with the 
external world and with himself so that it is
only out of his diremption that he fights his way to
39
self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family
he has a tranquil intuition of this unity, and
there he lives a subjective ethical life on the
plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, has
her substantive destiny in the family, and to be
imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of 
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mind.
To Hegel men's lives are concerned with the state,
science, and work in the external world. Women's lives, by
contrast, are in the family and in the unity of the private
sphere. They are incapable of the spiritual struggle which
characterizes the lives of men. The man, individuates his
desires and since ”he possesses, as a citizen, the self-
conscious power of universality, he thereby acquires the
rights of desire and, at the same time, preserves his freedom
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in regard to it”.
Geist, in Hegel, as a transindividual principle that 
unfolds in history and whose goal is to make externality into 
its action, externalizes itself in history to make it embody 
its own objectivity, that is, reason and freedom. The 
process through which nature is humanized and history is 
constituted is the activity followed by externalization, that 
is, the objectification of human purposes and institutions. 
Since women cannot overcome unity and emerge out of the life of 
the family, they are excluded from history - constituting 
activity. Their activities in the private sphere such as 
reproduction, the rearing of children, and the satisfaction
40
of the emotional and sexual needs of men, place them outside
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the world of work. This, briefly, means that women can not 
create a history.
Another intellectual separating civil society from the
state was Marx, for whom, civil society was just the reverse
of what Hegel conceived. Marx rejected the view that the state
was an all-inclusive political community with a distinct
ethical character and denied its primacy in social and
historical life. He reversed the Hegelian relation of the two
and made civil society the ground of political life and the
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source of political change. For Marx, the economy as a
context of man's primary interaction with nature, is a
paradigm of all social life and human activity. Religion,
family, state, law, morality, science, etc. all are only
particular modes of production and fall under its general 
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laws. Marx explains the civil society as the following:
Civil society [bürgerliche gesellschraft] comprises
the entire material interaction among individuals at
a particular evolutionary stage of the productive
forces...The term 'civil society' emerged in the
eighteenth century when property relations had
already evolved from the community of antiquity and
medieval times. Civil society as such only develops
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with bourgeoisie.
The state, in Marxian thought, is taken as an
41
institution of the dominant class, instead of being the
expression of a universal and national need. It is both the
repetition and reinforcement of particularistic interests.
Unlike Hegel, he views the state not as the transcendence of
civil society but merely as its reflection: as civil society
is, so is the state. The state incorporates civil society not
in order to transform it into something else but to keep it as
it is. The civil society, which is historically determined,
does not disappear into the state but reappears in the state in
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all its concrete manifestations. For Marx civil society
embraced "...the whole commercial and industrial life of a
given stage and, hence, transcends the state and the 48
nation..." Marx strongly insisted on that legal relationship
as well as forms of state to be grasped neither from themselves
nor from the so-called general development of the human mind,
but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life.
Therefore, to him "...the anatomy of civil society is to be
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sought in political economy." One should bear in mind that 
the arguments about civil society among Marxists in the last 
decades borrow its crucial elements from Gramsci's writings on 
civil society.
Gramsci's theory introduces a profound innovation to whole
Marxist tradition. Civil society in Gramsci does not belong to
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the structural sphere, but to the superstructura!- sphere.
He means, briefly, by civil society the political and
cultural hegemony which a social group exercises over the whole
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of society, as the ethical content of the state. Gramsci
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takes both the civil society and the state as two major 
superstructural levels of the "hegemony”. His argument comes 
like the following:
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two
major superstructura1 'levels'; the one that can be
called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of
organisms commonly called 'private', and that of
'political society' or 'the state'. These two
levels correspond on the one hand to the function
of 'hegemo ny' which the dominant group exercises
throughout society, and, on the other hand, to
that of 'direct domination' or command exercised
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through the state and 'juridical' government.
Gramsci gives a great importance to intellectuals in the
realm of hegemony. Within the realm of the superstructure the
intellectuals perform organizational and connective functions
within both the area of civil society or hegemony and the area
of political society or the state. By intellectuals, it must
be understood that in general the entire social stratum which
exercises as an organizational function in the wide sense
whether in the field of production, in that of culture, or in
that of political administration. The intellectuals have a
role in all levels of society, not merely in spheres which are
explicitly cultural, in the economic base and in both civil
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society and political society in a restricted sense.
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Consequently, one can see obviously that Gramsci attributes 
not a negative meaning to civil society as it was under the 
hands of Hegel and Marx but rather uses it as an explanatory 
category of the term "hegemony.”
The place, Marx attributed to women in civil society
indeed, is nothing different than what Hegel did in his
political philosophy. It should be remembered that the first
class division, for Marx, arose over the struggle for
appropriation of the surplus of food and objects. It is
obvious that the definition of class as such, as was urged by
Linda Nicholson, eliminates from consideration conflicts over
other socially necessary activities such as childbearing and
childrearing. The activities of "reproduction" thus become
nonhistorical aspects of human existence or as by-products of
change in the economy. It is well known that Marx's concept of
class relies on the narrow transition of "production" and
economic activities that concern with the making of food and
objects or goods. The theory accepts the "relation of
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production" as the matter of the historical development. 
Accordingly, this theory too rejects that women can create a 
history.
As a concluding remark one can obviously see that there is 
not so much substantial difference between the contract 
theorists and the theorists who later separated the civil 
society from the state, in respect to the same place they both 
attributed to women in civil society. As aptly argued by 
Carole Patemen and Mary L. Shanley the tradition of Western
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political thought rests on a conception of the "political” that
is constructed through the exclusion of woirien and all that is
represented by femininity and Women's body. They maintain
that "manhood" and "politics" go hand in hand, everything
that stands in contrast to political life and virtues has been
represented by women and the roles fulfilled by their 
55capacities. Moreover, Pateman argues that the early modern
discussion of civil society and the state always supposed the
exclusion of women from civil society and their confinement to
the privacy of the household. She demonstrates that the
political thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
took women and domestic sphere as inferior to the male-
dominated public world of civil society and its culture,
56
property, social power, reason and freedom. In short,
civil society is established after the image, of civilized male 
individual who at the same time was given the role of masters 
for women.
However, in modern society we see clearly that women, as 
a social group v;ith particular values, norms and political 
discourses put their hands strikingly on the fate of civil
society. They demand a civil society which is aware of both
their equality and their difference from men as well as their 
autonomy against the state authority. Therefore, there is a 
substantial need to leave the classical definitions of civil 
society, in order to develop a new definition which considers 
the specificity of social groups, particularly feminism in our
analysis, with their special claims as well as their striking
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influence on the state authority,
2.2. CIVIL SOCIETY AS A MILIEU OF THE ALTERNATIVES
In civil society which was formulated by the political
thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, it
seems clear that women have stood outside the boundaries not
only of the political community but also of civil society
itself. Since the very concept of civil society, for almost
all of them, refers to an association whose members are bound
together by common laws, women in this sense were not properly
citizens. In the eyes of the laws laid down on their
understanding, women, in fact, are not appear independently,
rather are dependent upon others to represent them in voting,
in court, to administer their property and to make decisions57
for their children. However, in modern society there is an
institutional interdependence and a public/private mix rather
than a public private split. Moving from the experience of the
Scandinavian countries, Helga M. Hernes, brilliantly observes
that the state, the market, the public sphere of opinion and
the family are interrelated institutional settings. While
until the 1960s women had mainly been confined to the family,
now they move increasingly among all four settings. Women's
evolving profile of citizenship reflects the institutional
interface between state and family, their employment in public
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sector and their political mobilization.
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Maria Markus, goes further, v;ith relation to women and
civil society, to claim that the elevation of economic
activity into the public sphere and its transformation into an
arena of socially recognized success means the separation of
household and family from being a private sphere which is
assigned naturally to women as the only proper location of
their activities. She goes on to urge that the distribution of
social status and the recognition of success is restricted to
the arena of socially organized work. Therefore, she takes
the programs or attempts for social change promoting the
liberation and social recognition of diverse human
potentialities and ways of life as "the potential civil
society". Modern women's attempts to gain success in public
life places them at the center of the potential civil 
59society.
With the term civil society it will be understood, 
through this study, the existence of social groups having the 
potentialities economically, ideologically and
organizationally to produce alternative structures, meanings, 
definitions, values, programs, and so forth to the state 
authority. Social groups as such will reconstitute, change 
and even restrict, if necessary, the direction of the
authoritative institutions. There are mainly three ultimate 
goals that social groups, at least in the modern world, 
particularly feminist groups, attempt to reach: equality,
difference and autonomy. These terms are taken, in this
study, as the principles of civil society and each of these
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principles results with different implications.
First, consider the "equality principle" among the 
citizens regardless of class, race, religion, ethnicity and 
similar social categories. The equality principle is 
inevitably based on the law. It regards all individuals equal 
in being a member of the political society. This equality does 
not mean to "have equal" what so ever exists, rather it means 
to create the equal chance of opportunity and the possibility, 
legally, for citizens in every respect. The claim on equality 
has an explicit implication: it results with the emergence of 
a "homogeneous" civil society. A homogeneous civil society 
unites society through the claims to make different groups 
equal by erosion or assimilation of less privileged groups into 
the norms and values of the privileged groups and thus emerges 
a "unique" type of society. Therefore, the egalitarian 
feminist groups' insistence on the equality principle, brings 
women, in the last analysis, to be integrated with a cultural 
atmosphere being set up by the norms of men.
Second, the most important principle of civil society 
with respect to a study on feminist groups, is the "difference 
principle". This principle brings under discussion to make law 
recognizes and appoints the difference of the different catego­
ries and assigns the duties and rights under that principle. 
Particularly the demands made by some radical feminists, by 
postmodern feminists, and by the French feminists, to develop 
a different language and discourse bearing meanings particular
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to, and with an advantage to, women, has opened a new phase 
among feminist groups. A set of particular rights and duties 
has come under discussion. The implication of this principle, 
for us is that it leads to the emergence of an "heterogeneous 
civil society", which serves better, in the last analysis, 
to the democratization of the society. An assertion based on 
the difference principle results also in a plurality of legal 
rights.
Finally, think about the "autonomy principle" of
civil society. The autonomy of social elements grips with it
an open way for the emergence of different groups on different
issues and holds to create alternative discourses and values in
the public life to the existing powers, discourses and values.
The critiques raised by Marxist and socialist feminists, on
the one hand, and the total demands of radical feminists, on
the other hand, are essential to create such alternative
discourses. The implication of the autonomy principles,
results for us, with an "autonomous civil society". As David
Held brilliantly emphasized this arises out of two
interdependent processes: the expansion of social autonomy and
the restructuring and democratization of the state
institutions. State and civil society in that sense must
become the condition for each others democratization. State
institutions must be viewed as necessary devices for enacting
legislation, promulgating new policies, setting down conflicts
between particular interests and preventing civil society from
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falling victim to a new form of tyranny. Civil society, on
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the other hand, must be perceived as a social body regulating 
the mis-order of the state, checking their functionality, di­
recting their policies in behalf of their particular interest 
(when conceived as harmful to civil society) and preventing 
any authoritative decision.
In conclusion, civil society must be understood to mean 
those individuals and groups whose moral convictions gives them 
a strong feeling of autonomy, independence, and difference 
from the official system. The common features of civil society 
understood as such arises discourses, structures, meanings, 
values and norms through the members of different social 
groups. This allows social groups to include within civil 
society various groups regardless of the number of their 
members, the extent of their demands for change and the 
character of their activity. Feminism, indeed, is the most 
outstanding example of these groups. Therefore, feminism will 
be analyzed within the fram.ework of the vantage point of these 
principles of civil society, both in the following part and in 
the remaining chapters concentrating mainly on the case of 
Turkish feminism.
2.3. FEMINISM
Feminism is a political movement directed at changing 
existing power relations between men and women. These power 
relationships structures all areas of life: the family, 
education and welfare; the worlds of work and politics; and 
culture and history. Feminism is a politics whose basic goal
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is to remove the discrimination and degradation of women and to 
break down the male dominance of society.
In a very general sense feminism can be divided into two
major branches: "the women's rights" movement and "the women's
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liberation" movement. Women's rights movement works predomi­
nantly for political reforms by means of traditional pressure 
group tactics. It becomes an aim to be acknowledged and to be 
respected by the political establishment. It embraces the 
primacy of a companionate, non-hierarchical, male-female 
couple as the basic unit of society. This kind of feminism has 
long historical roots going back to the suffrage movement of 
the nineteenth century and the successful campaigns for women's 
access to education, to qualified work and to legal majority. 
The aim of new wave feminism which has emerged basically since 
the 1960s, however, is a completely different kind of
feminism usually labeled as the "women's liberation movement". 
These were radical, left-wing and postmodern feminists who 
rejected the idea of equality with men, instead they advocated 
the emancipation of women from the aggression of a patriarchal 
society. The new wave feminism celebrated the quest for women's 
independence in all aspects of life, dismissed as significant 
all socially defined roles and minimized discussion of sex- 
linked qualities which included childbearing and its attendant 
responsibilities. The main activities of the women's 
liberation movement consist of consciousness-raising
activities, experimentation, in new way life-style, creation 
of a counter culture and feminist literature (feminist
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theater, music bands, women's festival etc.) and the 
formation of alternative institutions (crisis centers, women's 
centers, self-help clinics, etc.). All of these aspects of 
feminist groups is analyzed in this part with a vantage point 
of their contribution to the development of civil society. It 
is analyzed mainly as to how feminism constitutes a political 
body, what feminist groups' claims on equality are, how they 
stress on concept of difference and how an autonomy is 
idealized by them.
2.3.1. From Feminist Theory to Feminist Politics
Juliet Mitchell argues that feminism arose in England in 
the seventeenth century as a series of demands by women who saw 
themselves as a sociological group that was completely excluded 
from the principles of new society. She claims that the seven­
teenth century feminists were mainly middle-class women who 
wanted to take part in a changed society which came about with 
the end of feudalism and the beginning of capitalism. As the
new bourgeois argued for freedom and equality, these women
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wondered why they were being left out. As it is well-known 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular 
after the French revolution, a new understanding of man, 
civil society, political society and so forth were
institutionalized. In political theories v/omen were 
appropriated as being identical with private household. 
However, households were no longer a safe place for them.
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since the industrialization particularly in Britain brought a 
substantial change in the role they traditionally had. With 
the industrialization the forces of industrial capitalism 
began to draw labor out of the private home and into the public 
workplace. This process of industrialization indicated its 
first impact on the married bourgeois women. These women,
indeed, were the first to find themselves at home with little63
productive, or little income-generating work. Therefore,
many of these women attempted to gain a proper place in the new 
public and its workplace.
The first feminist demand was to get the vote. Therefore, 
the first wave of feminism is best known for the suffrage cam­
paign. Indeed, women's suffrage movement's aim was only to 
get admission to citizenship and through this the admission to 
the public sphere. Ellen Dubois perceptively observed that 
nineteenth century suffragist women accepted the suitability of 
women to domestic activities and their responsibility for the
private sphere and did not project a recognition of the
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division of labor within the home. Antoinette B. Blackwell,
one of the pioneer suffragists and a minister, sad that "the
paramount social duties of women are household duties,
avocations arising from their relations as wives and 
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mothers." A striking shift in feminist politics appeared
with the second wave which immediately followed the suffragist 
movement. Drude Dahlerup brilliantly emphasized that the 
second wave feminism simply indicated a new impetus to this
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movement which experienced periods of bloom, strength and
visibility alternating with periods of more quiet dogged
struggles to better women's position in a male-dominated
society. The women's movement as a collective activity, she
asserts, by women to better women's position and change the
male dominance of society started in the USA in the 1840s, in
England in the 1850s, in France and Germany in the 1860s and
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in the Scandinavian countries in the 1870s.
The most striking shift in feminist politics was observed
in the 1960s. This time marks the beginning of the third wave
in feminism, better known as the new feminism. Since then,
the new feminist movement has grown rapidly in the number of
members, the range of goals, and most strikingly in the
number of organizations. Indeed, the present day feminist
movement consists of thousands of interrelated but essentially
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independent groups. The issue of abortion on demand was at
the center of political protests and campaigns of the feminist
groups of the 1970s and the issue of gender analysis was at
stake in feminist theoretical studies. Free abortion on demand
became a symbol of women's fight against the patriarchal
society and its institutions. Moreover, it was, for women,
the means by which can be gained legislatively the right of
decision and control over their own bodies. Another important
issue at the center of feminist groups was the analysis of the
gender issue. Simon de Beauvoir's assertion on gender gained a
motivation to feminist thinkers. She asserted that "one is not
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born a woman, but, rather, becomes one." Feminist theory
54
took gender relations as its central issue to analyze how
gender relations are constituted and experienced and how we
think or, equally important, do not think about them. To
adopt "gender'· as an analytical category means to focus on the
social and cultural construction of sexual difference among
humans. It means that every culture, society and historical
epoch constitutes and interprets sexual difference in a certain
way and very often in more ways than one, which may
69themselves be contradictory. It is assumed, by gender
analysis, that men and women are behaviorally and
psychologically different and the causes of these differences
can be found in their growing process. The psychological
factors of growing leads to a comprehensive development of
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gender differences and even gender identity.
Feminists, "have gone further and identified the 'gender 
subtext', in visions of the political subject, in the defini­
tion of the political realm and in the logic of terms like
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'participation', 'autonomy', 'consent' and 'rights'." Femi­
nists, in the last decade have shifted their attention from 
social analysis to discourse analysis, from power itself to 
the politics of its representation. In short, one of the most 
important results of the third wave of feminism is its success 
in changing many women's and men's way of thinking about women. 
Moreover, through the focus on conciseness-raising, on 
experiments in different ways of living, on non-oppressive 
relations between men and women c'.t home and in society, and
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creating a counter-culture and alternative institutions, 
feminists as a paramount m.odern social group have attempted to 
develop new ways of doing politics.
Now, the question concerning this study is that of what
place feminism constitutes as a social movement between the
state and civil society. Indeed, social movements, feminism
in our analysis, raises important questions about the
distribution and legitimacy of macro power relations.
Moreover, it challenges the deep-rooted codes of social
interactions within civil society and puts new forms in their
place. The main task of a social movement is to raise
collective activity in order to promote social change thus
representing a protest against the established power structure
and against the dominant norms and values. As Paul Wilkinson
brilliantly emphasized "a social movement's commitment to
change and the raison d'etre of its organization are founded
upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the
movement's aims or beliefs, and active participation on the
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part of the followers or members.'· In the collective action
of women, in the last decades, the issues of "gender",
"rights", "inequality", "exclusion" and "liberation"
constitute a large part of the mobilization process. What
women, along with other contemporary collective actors, have
achieved is, above all,to practice alternative definitions of
sense. In other words, they have created meanings and
definitions of identity which contrast with the increasing
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determination of individual and collective life. Feminism as
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a social moveinfint contributes to the development and 
consolidation of civil society at least upon three interrelated 
grounds. First, it brings about an issue as in the case of 
abortion from the back streets into the open and raises it to 
public discussion. Second, it redefines the deep-rooted codes 
of social institutions as in the case of gender analysis and 
replaces them with new meanings. Its largest impact, in that 
sense, is on the grass roots structures or in the socio­
cultural field. Finally, feminism as a social movement puts
pressure on the political parties and the governments to take a
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stand in Europe to pass new abortion laws after the 1970s,
2.3.2. P'eminist Claim on Equality
Egalitarian feminists attempt to develop a democratic
theoi'y based on civil equality that undermines the differences
between the sexes so that full citizenship for women can be
secured. They aim'to achieve full equality of opportunity in
all spheres of life witho\it radically transforming the present
social and political system. The realization of its aim means
the transfox'mation of the sexiial division of labor and norms
of femininity and masculinity, in particular for contemporary
75
egalitarian feminists.
Egalitarian feminism received its classic formulation in 
liberal feminist Mary 'Atallst.onecraft''s A Vindication of the 
Rights of Women (1792). Egalitarian feminists^ main emphasis.
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still shared by contemporary liberal feminists, is that female 
subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal con­
straints that prevent women's entrance in the public sphere. 
Since society has the false belief that women are, by nature, 
less intellectual and less capable physically than men, it 
excludes women from the academy, the forum, and the market­
place. As a result of this policy of exclusion, the true 
potential of many women goes unfulfilled. If v/omen and men are 
given the same educational opportunities, and given equal
civil rights they will overcome their subordination in the 
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society.
In the book A Vindic£\t Lor, of the Rights of VJomen
Wallstonecraft presented an argument for the Enlightenment's
understanding of human nature, that is she insisted that women
shared the same nature with men, as having the same reason.
The distinction betv.'een the sexes is entirely social thereby
all other human activities should be governed by the pi'inciples
of reason v/hich are the same in all. Women can be dutiful or
rational only when they are treated v/ith the same dignity and
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allowed to share the same privileges as men. She claimed
that the perfection of our nature and capability of happiness
must be estimated by the degree of reason, virtue and
knowledge. From the exercise of knowledge and virtue which
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naturally flows, the sexes should be equally undeniable.
Moreover, she insisted on freedom for women and claimed that
when you make women free "they will quickly become wise and
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virtuous as men become more so." In short, Wallstonecraft
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denied that v/omen, v;ere by nature, more pleasure seeking and 
pleasure giving then men. She wanted women to be treated as 
autonomous decision-m.akers. An equal education and equal 
opportunity for entrance into citizenship will allow a woman to 
assume responsibility for her own development and growth and 
will give her chance to have the same virtue with man.
John S. Mill, accordingly, in The Subjection of Women
(1869), insisted that women should have equal educational and
economic opportunities as well as the same civil rights with
men. It is his liberal idea that the ordinary way is to
maximize aggregate utility (happiness or pleasure) and to
permit individuals to pursue whatever they desire. The only
way for women to maximize their pleasure is to have the same
rights with men in civil society. But he argues that sexual
division of labor v/ithin the family is made by consent and he
defends this as the most suitable division of labor between the
two. When a woman marries it might be understood that she
like a man chooses a profession, she makes a choice of the
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management of a household. Mill believed that even given
the same education, economic opportunities, and civil
liberties as men women will still choose marriage and
motherhood over other competing occupations. In short,
although he regards women as having the same natural endowments
with men he accepts that the most suitable occupation for women
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is their natural duties as homemakex-s and mothers.
The contemporary liberal feminists have gone further to 
say on equality. One of the prominent forerunners of the
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twentieth century liberal feminists, Betty Friedan, insists in
her book The Feminine Mystique (1963) that woman can find
satisfaction exclusively in the traditional role of wife and
mother which has left modern woman feeling empty and miserable.
Therefore, even if, she proposes, contemporary liberated
women want to stay at home with their husbands and children
they should not be allowed to do so. Otherwise not only they
will lose their productive capacity, they will also lead their
children, in particular the sons to grow up passive and 
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immature. But she in her later book The Second Stage
changed her view in a radical shift. In that book she argues
that women should have the right to be either in the market or
to choose motherhood. She attempts to create a liberal
condition which makes it possible for women to be able to work
and have equality with men and choose, if they so desire, to 
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have children.
Contemporary liberal feminists have maintained their posi­
tion at the center of the same issue formulated by Friedan's 
first book. Their common argument is that the most important 
goal of women is sexual equality. They aim to free women from 
oppressive gender roles which prevent women form taking a place 
in the academy, in the forum and in the marketplace. 
Contemporary liberal feminists argue that patriarchal society 
thinks women are ideally suited only for certain occupations 
such as teaching, nurturing, caring and cleaning and are 
largely incapable of other tasks such as ruling, preaching and
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investing. Egalitarian feminist Zillah R. Eisenstein
fights to guarantee equal sexual relations between men and
women. This, for her, does not mean that men and women are
pressured to be the same sexually, rather it means they are
politically the same by guaranteeing that sexual difference has
nothing to do with how much sexual freedom, economic
independence, radical equality and intellectual opportunity
one has. Sexual egalitarianism, for Eisenstein, can be
achieved only under the condition that sexual difference is no85
longer the basis of her secondary political status.
In short, egalitarian feminists drive toward liberty,
equality and fairness for women. The implication of equality
for them will morally transform not only those who have been
deprived of their rights but also those who have held rights on
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the basis of might. Feminist writer Catherine A. Mackinnon 
emphasizes the result if there could be sexual equality for 
women in the following terms:
If the sexes were equal, women would not be 
sexually subjected. Sexual force would be 
exceptional, consent to sex could be commonly real 
and sexually violated women would be believed. If
the sexes were equal, women would not be
economically subjected, their desperation and 
marginality cultivated, their enforced dependency 
exploited sexually or economically. Women would 
have speech, privacy, authority, respect, and
84
61
more resources than they have now.
The root meaning of equality formulated here is negative
egalitarianism, an abolitionist politics in its origins. Its
aim is to eliminate both differences between categories and to
88restrict the authoritative oppression. It holds as the basic 
principle that the rules and policies of the state, and rules 
of private institutions ought to be blind to race, gender, 
and other group differences. The public realm of the state and 
law should express its rules in general terms that abstract 
from the particularities of individual and groups, needs and 
situations and should recognize all persons equally and treat 
all citizens in the same way. Equality as such, obviously, 
is blind to group differences and blind to differences of race, 
culture, gender, age or disability. Moreover, women who 
formulate equality in this way are serving to privilege the 
male standards. Equality as such embraces the principle of 
sameness with men due to the fact that the present norms of 
the patriarchal state or the principles of patriarchal culture 
are institutionalized on the terrain of male-centered values. 
Such an equality, in the last analysis, integrate women with 
the world of men.
It is clear that such an integration serves to the 
development of civil society as well. But it will contribute 
to the emergence of a civil society principled one
dimensionally, that is it will leads to a homogenization in 
the civil society. It contributes to civil society in the 
sense that men's values are restricted to be the only source of
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virtue at the same time it adjusts the mis-ordered norms of the 
men-centered culture.
2.3.3. Feminist Politics of Difference
In feminist thought a shift has emerged from the "politics 
of equality" to the "politics of difference" which, in the 
last analysis, leads to the idea of an heterogeneity. Many 
feminists, in the last decades, have began to assert a 
positiveness and pride in group specificity against ideals of 
assimilation which is idealized by egalitarian feminists. They 
have questioned whether justice always means that law and 
policy should enforce equal treatment for all groups. Feminist 
groups as such bring a concept of differentiated citizenship as 
the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of 
every one in full citizenship.
It became increasingly clear, among feminists, that it
was not possible simply to include women in patriarchal
discourses, laid down particularly by the masters of the
theory of civil society, from which women have been excluded.
For Elizabeth Gross, an advocate of the idea of the politics
of difference among feminists, many patriarchal discourses
were incapable of being broadened or extended to include women
without radical upheavals and change. There is no space, to
her, within these discourses to accommodate women's inclusion
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and equal participation. Therefore, the political,
ontological and epistemological commitments underlying
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patriarchal discourses should be re-evaluated from the feminist
perspective for such an integration to be realized. It is
argued by her, otherwise, that the a priori assumptions of
sameness or interchangeability, sexual neutrality or
indifference, the complete neglect of women's specificities
and differences could not be accommodated in traditional
theoretical terms. Gross maintained that the whole social,
political, scientific and metaphysical underpinning of
90patriarchal theoretical systems needed to be shaken up.
Feminists, proclaiming difference, raise a strong critique
to the universal aspect of modern law and modern political
thought. It is to this distinct feature of modern law that it
applies uniform standards to different individuals in different
situations. Ursula Vogel urges that if we believe that women
have interests and needs significantly different from those of
men and, furthermore, that these constitute not disabilities
but sources of identity and strength, then the construction of
a uniform genderless agent and the central premise of modern
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legal thinking must become significantly problematic. 
Another feminist writer, Beverly Thiele goes'further to argue 
that the concept of citizenship in the modern political thought 
gives everyone the same status in the public life. However, 
to her, the values and norms of citizenship as such are 
structured in the concern of "male-stream" conception. She 
maintains that women are hidden in male-stream" conceptions 
through mechanisms such as decontextualism, which implies the
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distance of female from their actual being; universalism,
rejecting the particularity of sexes; naturalism, which is
based on men's nature; dualism, which takes the dualities as
its essence; and appropriation, by which each sex is
appropriated to certain roles framed through male-stream 
92
values. Masculine experiences, which are the mainstream of
the modern state and its public realm, are labeled by
feminists as militarist norms of honor, competition and
bargaining among independent agents. Thus, it is claimed by
some feminists, that modern man, by extolling to the virtue
of universal public realm, fails to recognize the sexual
difference, another kind of existence that they could not
93entirely understand and the morality that women represent.
Feminist theorist, Iris M. Young, argues that there are
often group-based differences between men and v;omen, whites
and blacks, able-bodied and disabled people, therefore, any
equal treatment puts these groups in a disadvantageous
position. The generalized equal treatment usually
disadvantages these groups in their opportunity to develop
their capacities thus giving them particular experiences and
knowledge. Thereby, where there are group differences in
capacities, socialization, values and cognitive and cultural
styles, only attending to such differences can enable the
inclusion and participation of all groups in political and
economic institutions. Therefore, instead of right and rules
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in universal terms, some groups deserve special rights. 
For instance, the issue of a right to pregnancy and maternity
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leave and the right to special treatment for nurturing mothers 
is highly fashionable among this group of feminists.
In respect to the issue of difference there are mainly two
approaches in feminist thought. In the first, it is considered
that the differences from men leads to the inferiority of women
and keep them relatively powerless and means inequality and
continued oppression for women. Therefore, some feminist
writers insist hat arguments on difference should be left in
feminist literature. A prominent feminist of that viewpoint,
Shulamit Firestone, stresses the chief difference between men
and women as pregnancy or a woman's childbearing activity.
She holds that women will never entirely be the equals of men
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until they are able to get rid of that activity. Likewise,
Zillah R. Eisenstein claims that the issue of sexual difference
has been used to reject woman's notion of freedom and equality.
Man and woman are sexually different from each other, but,
she claims, they are not as much as man claims that they are
different. Eisenstein maintains in her book Feminism and
Sexual Equality (1984) that woman's different potential of
childbearing constitutes the basis of the institution of
motherhood, of the woman's economic dependence on man, of her
secondary wage-earner status, of the system of heterosexual
controls and of restrictive notions of sexuality. Difference,
as such, she asserts, constitutes the basis of secondary
position for women in every respect and therefore should
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immediately be left by women.
However, another, and importantly increasing number of
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the privileges of women and thus, they argue, these
differences strengthen the status of women. Moreover, there
has been a tremendous growth of interest in a separate
"women's culture" in the sense having to create artistic,
literal, philosophical and spiritual forms of self-
consciousness created by women warning from a sense of
difference, not taking women as men's equivalent but different
97than men in a plurality of meaning. A prominent of that view
Joan W. Scott puts it very clear: "Feminists cannot give up
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'difference'; it has been our most creative analytic tool."
Furthermore, Caroline Ramazanoglu insists that if they reject
the positive aspects of womanhood then women's liberation has
much to lose. Women, she maintains, should have special
claims on nurturing, co-operation, caring, creativity, and
99
closeness to nature. Another advocate of that view Gerda 
Lerner tried to show that women have been thought to be nurtur­
ing, affiliative and cooperative, the treats of which would
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be endowed with more truly human qualities than men.
Adrienne Rich took a further look at the positive side of
motherhood. Arguing against Firestone she proclaims that a
feminist revolution would not liberate women from motherhood,
on the contrary, would liberate women into a truly nurturing
motherhood. Briefly Rich saw female physiology as a source of 
101
strength.
A psychoanalytic feminist Carol Gilligan pays attention 
to the knowledge and behavior that are constructed differently
feminist women are emphasizing the differentiation of women as
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in men and women. Time, space, self, and other such concepts
all arise out of the active interchange between the individual
and the physical and social world in which he or she lives.
Moving from this Kantian assertion, she develops an idea that
women develop a living experience and thus a morality different 
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from men. The separation and autonomy in men's lives often
leads them to focus the discussion of morality around issues of
justice, fairness, rules and rights, whereas the family
lives lead women to emphasize people's wants, needs,
103interests and aspirations. The male reason is taken, by
the advocate of that viev;, as instrumental, and women's
knowledge as intuitive, emotional, engaged and caring, and
they claim that only these features of women can save humanity
from the dangers of unconstrained masculinism. In short they
indicate that much of women's history has been concerned with
private matters: the bearing and raising of children, the
cooking of food, the carrying of water, the tilling of the
soil etc. This leads one to conclude that women should, in a
democratic society, gain not rights on the principles of
neutral and universal citizenship, rather on the principle of
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women's deep experience.
Feminists have opened a new epoch in arguments on
difference by articulating postmodern concepts to the feminist
thought. As it is well known postmodernism embraces a
skepticism regarding generalizable and universal claims of any 
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sort. Postmodern feminists, similarly, have begun to
suspect that all transcendental claims of Enlightenment reflect
68
and reify the experience cf a few persons mostly white
western males in the name of universality. Therefore, they
have tried to formulate the notions such as self, knowledge
and truth differently than those that were done by
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Enlightenment thinkers. They, like postmodernists, have
criticized modern moral and political theories, exposing the
contingent, the partial and the historically situated character
of what has passed in the mainstream for necessary, universal
and historical truth. They have called into question the
dominant philosophical project of seeking objectivity which
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transcends any situation or perspective. Postmodern
feminists developed the recognition that to live in Western
culture resulted with the fact that one always finds oneself
located within structures of dominance and subordination.
Dominance and subordination are structured through the
construction of a hierarchical duality of social construction
and one of these polarity of duality has been given the values
of domination. The duality of male/female is a discursive
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formation which results with women's subordination.
Therefore, postmodern feminists are seeking how it could be
possible to create a different discourse or culture based on
particular experience and which does not bring the
109subordination of a partner.
2.3.3.1. Politics of Difference In French Version
French feminism has been highlighted mainly through the
110
studies of Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous
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which promise a great revolt against the institutions of 
patriarchy which are reconstructed in the language. The term 
"difference” in the work of French feminist writers has a 
revolutionary meaning that is, the goal of a feminist 
enterprise is not to chieve socioeconomic equality with men but 
to disrupt and subvert Western patriarchal language and thought 
themselves.
French feminists have made us read language as a dense web
of metaphors, displacements and silence as the embodiment of
difference and the source of meaning, at the same time, a
source of women's subordination. Kristeva, Irigaray and
Cixous aptly argue that women's oppression does not merely
exist in the concrete organization of economic, political or
social structures. It is embedded in the very foundation of
Logos, in the linguistic and logical process through which
meaning itself is produced. What we perceive as the real,
they maintain, is a manifestation of the symbolic order as
has been constituted by men. Thus only by exposing this
phallocentrism, by deconstructing it can we transform the
real and thus subvert the subordination of women in any
112
fundamental way. They point to the problems involved in
women's struggles for equality to men. They both assert that 
there is an irreducible difference between masculine and 
feminine and then, an equality can only be postulated by the 
reduction of one, subordinating one to the other. Therefore, 
they strongly nominate in contrast to feminists proclaiming the
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of specificities, a politics involving the recognition of the
113differences between men and women. For both sets of
feminists the act of speaking and of writing as a female
represents a fundamental revolt in the traditional systems of
not only its material, economic, social and political
manifestations, but the generative system which determines the
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production of meaning. This is why they have equated the
recognition of the specificity of female unconscious with the
free access to a specific discourse in the feminine mode and
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have defined this as the central focus of their struggle.
All of the feminist v;riters Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous
are under the influence of two intellectual backgrounds; that
is they bring together Freudian psychoanalytic account of
psychic and Lacanian social production of subjectivity with a
post-structural analysis of sexual or discursive production.
Kristeva places a human infantile into two different phases:
Semiotic and Symbolic order. The semiotic is equated with the
energetic, rhythmic, bodily contributions of the pre-social
individual. The symbolic, by contrast, i,s the domain of
definite positions and propositions, the social side for the
creation of unified texts, discourses and knowledges subsuming
116
individual energies into collective social forms. The
semiotic order derives its energy from the realm of the 
preodipal and it first occurs in the infant's attachment to 
the mother's body. However, the symbolic order plays the 
role of Logos, it is initiated in the "minor" stage, with
sameness or equality, a feminism or a politics of difference,
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infant's need to deal with abstraction, that is, with the
uses of language. She considers the pre-oedipal or Semiotic
phase as feminine and maternal. It is dominated by the
mother's body, it is pre-phallic, pre-paternal, existing
before the father, and is regarded as the symbolic source of 117
authority. Women in their experience are not be able to
articulate the semiotic forces into the symbolic context. Men 
alone can represent, speak and symbolize the subversive
underside of social unities. Poems, artists, theorists, 
avant-gardists, the transgressor of social, artistic and
representational norms are necessarily male. Men alone, to
her, occupy the position of speaking subjects.
Therefore, she argues that no sociopolitical
transformation is possible which does not constitute a 
transformation of subjects. Subject for her is the postulation 
of a female principle, which she calls the Semiotic. Kristeva 
insists that only the eruption of the semiotic into the
symbolic can give reign to difference, to heterogeneous
119meaning and thus subvert the existing system of language.
The historical work for her involves the analysis of the work
of language. This theoretical work can be looked at from the
120
point of view of its ideological representation in writing.
She maintains that women are, in language, something that
cannot be represented, something that is not said, something
above and beyond ideologies. Then, she advises women to go
121
beyond the male-centered language of Western culture. In
Western societies, Kristeva asserts, sexual pleasure is
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granted to women. It is the fact, for her, a speaking or a
writing subject cannot depart himself or herself from the
meaning of text he or she is using. If women have a role in
this ongoing process it is only in assuming a negative
function: reject everything finite, definite, structured,
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looked with meaning in the existing state of society. The
following passage indicates what is found at the center of her
message: "Woman is here to shake up, to disturb, to deflate
masculine values, and not to espouse them. Her role is to
maintain differences by pointing to them, by giving them life,
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by putting them into play against one another.” In short,
only such an attitudes can place women on the side of the 
explosion of social codes with revolutionary moments.
Irigaray pays attention, like Kristeva, to the situation
of women in Western culture. Influenced by Lacan she
differentiates female imaginary from male imaginary. What we,
imaginarily, know about woman including her sexual desire has
been told to us from a male point of view. The only women
type we know is the "masculine feminine”. There may be,
however, a "feminine feminine”, a non-phallic feminine type.
Moreover there may be a way to bring women to selfhood and
language that does not have to be mediated in any way through 
124
men. Woman, for her, is seen in Western philosophy as an
opposite to man, as man's other, as the negative of the
positiveness in the polarity of masculine/feminine 
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dichotomy. Since women are marked phallically by their
fathers, husbands and procures, woman then is never anything
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more than the scene of more or less a rivalry of exchange126between two men. Women, signs, goods, currency, all
pass from one man to another. The genealogy of patriarchal
power, its laws, its discourse, its sociality is
institutionalized in father-son relations. These relations
which are operative everywhere can neither be disappeared in
the abolition of the family, nor of monogamie reproduction,127
but only with a transition in language.
To Irigaray the phallocentric discourses and practices
have been appropriated by men universally. But men are unable
to represent themselves, as completely universal, therefore,
women are seen to compensate for the absences of what in the
male body. They are considered the corporeal, badly material
the substratum supporting male intellect, reason, theoretical
structures that is male immateriality. Moreover, woman
functions to complete man's fantasies. The pleasure that she
lives is not her own and it leaves her in her well-known state
of dependency. Women's pleasure, for her, is denied by
Western civilization that give privileges to phallomorphism,
a culture in which woman represents the cheapest of
everything, she has no proper name. She is taken as the
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negative, the opposite and reverse of what man is. 
Moreover, she maintains that it is man who has been the
subject of discourse, whether in the field of theory, 
morality or politics. Discourse is always paternal and 
masculine in the West. For women, however, there remain the 
so-called minor art-forms: cooking, knitting, sewing and so
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forth,
Therefore, Irigaray attempts to clear a space within lan­
guage for another voice, body, pleasure, other forms of sex­
uality and desire, other forms of discourse and other forms 
of reason. As Elizabeth Gross aptly puts, "she desires to 
create discourses and representations of women and femininity
that may positively inscribe the female body as an autonomous130
concrete materiality." Irigaray emphasizes the need for a
language which asserts positive meaning to femininity. She
states, as a concluding remark, her desire like the
following: "For the work of sexual difference to take place,
a revolution in thoughts and an ethics is needed. We must
reinterpret the whole relationship between the subject and
discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the
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cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic." It is only
possible in this way to her that the male discourses are 
reinserted back and femininity and women may be able to
establish a discursive space or position which is their own.
A further analysis of women's relation to language was put 
forth by Cixous who argues that everything is word, that
culture is grasped by the word. She claims that as soon as we 
are born into language it dictates us with its laws.
Traditionally, throughout the history of Western thought, the 
logos has been founded on the structure of the binary
oppositions such as Sun/Moon, Nature/History, Passion/Action, 
High/Low, and so forth. For her, everything said;
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everything organized as discourse such as art, religion,
family, language, are organized on the basis of hierarchical
132oppositions which come back to the opposition man/woman.
All these dichotomies, for Cixous, associate man with all
that is positive and women with all that is generally negative.
Thus woman exists in man's world on his terms, she is either
the other for man or she is unthought. The phallocentrism is
to her the origin of all kinds of power: property, masculine
domination, the constitution of the state, the ideological
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apparatuses and the like. Therefore, Cixous emphasizes on
the need for a transformation that emerges and invents a new
history, which is opposite to the phallocentrism. For her the
categories of "man" and "woman" are nothing more than the
imaginary order coming into existence in the multiplications of
representations, images, reflections, myths and
identifications. Then a transformation is identical with the
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deforming of that imaginary order. Moreover, she gives
importance to women's writing as a device to put themselves
into the text as well as into the history. She maintains that
women should write about femininity, about their sexuality,
about their erotization, about the adventure of their drives
135and about everything belonging to women. An alternative,
she insists, propound by women would constitute the movement 
of a transformation of social and cultural structures. Cixous 
urges that "it is by writing, from and toward women and by 
taking up the challenge of speech which has been governed by 
the phallus, that women will confirm women in a place other
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than that which is reserved in and by the Symbolic, that is,
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in a place other than silence." In, short, like Kristeva
and Irigaray, Cixous too argues for a particular perspective 
and culture coming to terms through appropriation of a 
different meaning system that is language, particular only to 
women.
Now, it is the central concern of that part to analyze 
what implications are observed in arguments pertaining to the 
principles of civil society by having a review of arguments on 
the politics of difference. Indeed, concentrating on the 
difference seems to get feminists in a pendulum swing between 
the "same as" and "different from". It is the first concept 
which, in the last analysis, brings all of those who require 
equality along the same line with men. However, the second 
one differentiates women from men and creates an area of 
heterogeneity and multiplicity enhanced by women's experience 
and values. It proposes a kind of "separation" which implies 
that it separates women from men and from institutions, 
roles and activities which are male-defined and male dominated 
exclusively operating for male privilege. This separationist 
attempt brings one to observe a kind of plurality in the public 
life. Seen as such we can claim that feminists, by appealing 
to the notion of multiplicity, are creating an increasingly 
different epoch in civil society, which at the same time, 
creates a challenge to the dominant Unitarian power. In other 
words it serves to break down the "Unitarian type" of any 
society coming into being as an outcome of Unitarian meaning
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systems. Moreov'er feminists by embracing the concept of 
difference serve to create a need for a justice which is 
sensitive to variations of gender, race, class and other 
sociological categories. Such a justice, clearly, will 
foster a conception of the public which in principle excludes 
no Person, no aspect of a person's lives, nor topic of 
discussion and which encourages aesthetical as well as 
discursive expression.
To conclude one should bear in mind that different social 
groups have different needs, cultures, histories, 
experiences and perception of social relations, all of which 
influence their interpretation of the meaning and the 
consequences of policy proposals as well as the forum of their 
political reasoning. The participation of citizens in the 
political system over the principles of their particular 
interests also create a richness in political system which 
might be accounted as a functional contribution to the 
development of civil society. Indeed, this is the most 
important feminist contribution to civil society.
2.3.4. Feminist Autonomy In the Public Life
The distinction between public and private life has gained 
strong attacks by many feminists in last decades. They sought 
to indicate that the distinction traditionally made between 
public and private life brings nothing more than the oppression 
of women in the household. The household as the chief sphere
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of private life is accepted by some feminists as the extension 
of the political sphere of public life. This opened a new 
epoch on the terrain of these concepts.
What we traditionally know about the public and the
private is their having different modes of functioning and
their being governed by different rules. The private sphere is
known as the world of particularism, subjection, inequality,
natural emotions, love and partiality; where as, the public
sphere is known as the world of universalism, independence,137
equality, reason, rationality and impartiality. However,
feminists have objected that the distinction and the argument
that the concept of privacy, as such, has created a place of
battery, marital rape and women's exploited domestic labor.
It has preserved the control and self-definition. Catherine
A. MacKinnon asserts that when women are segregated in private
they are isolated from each other and from the public
resources. Therefore, she claims that the distinction between
the public and the private, embraced particularly in liberal
thought, is an ideological division that mystifies the unity
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among women and assures women's subjection within it. An
advocate of that view, Carole Pateman, raises strong
criticism to the liberals, particularly to Locke, who 
formulates civil society on the basis of public life, a domain 
of the male individual. She argues that Locke conceptualizes 
civil society in abstraction from ascriptive domestic life, 
and, therefore, women are forgotten in his theoretical 
discussion. The separation betv/een public and private is
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represented as a division within the world of men, within
civil society. The separation is then expressed as "society
and state", or "economy and politics", or "social and
political". Domestic life has tended to fall outside both
139
state and civil society.
Radical feminists raise an argument about the roots
behind the division between the public and the private realm.
Many radical feminists argue that it is the patriarchal system
that creates such a distinction in order to oppress women. It
is the patriarchal system that brings power, dominance,
hierarchy, and competition. They claim that the natural order
attributed to women is nothing more than a patriarchal trap
giving men and women naturally different personhood,
characteristics and attitudes. Kate Millet is one of the
prominent radical feminist who thinks that the roots of women's
oppression are hidden in patriarchy's sex/gender system. She
argues that sex is political because the male-female
relationship is the paradigm for all power relationships.
Patriarchal ideology makes it certain that men always control
the public and private worlds and makes men to always have the
dominant or masculine roles and that women always have the
subordinate or feminine ones. It produces that ideology
through the academy, the church and the family each of which
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justifies and reinforces women's subordination to men. 
Michelle Z. Rosaldo observed that common to all known societies 
was some type of separation between a domestic sphere and a
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public sphere, the former associated with women, the latter
with men, therefore, women's power is always viewed, in many
societies, as illegitimate, disruptive and without 141
authority. Moreover, radical feminist Mary O'Brien
attempts to indicate that patriarchy in all parts of the world
has divided up men's work and women's work along evaluative
lines with works done in separate places. Men, she maintains,
make history in public, women are the handmaidens of nature in
private, men achieve, women serve, and women's work takes
place under the supervision of men. To her, the private is not
private, it is institutionalized and has an elaborate set of
myths, ideologies and practices to prepare a set which is
called patriarchy. In short, the private for her is the locus
of power for every man and the locus of patriarchy which is a
142crude form of biological determinism.
Radical feminists give ansv/er to the division between the 
public and the private with the slogan "the personal is politi­
cal". The earlier claim that the personal is political came 
from those radical feminists of the 1960s and 1970s who argued
that since the family was at the root of women's oppression
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it must be abolished. Indeed, that the "personal is
political" has become much more than a slogan for recent
feminists, the personal is epistemologically political, which
means that philosophy, poetry, language, science and
144
all scholarly inquiries are political. That the personal is
political challenges the separation of the public and the 
private spheres and also challenges their identification with
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men and women, which is so fundamental to liberal political
thought. It implies an emancipationist demands for a progress
145of women into the public sphere. It imagines taking the
form of a demand for the inclusion of women in the category of
the individual which has traditionally been esteemed in the
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formulation of civil society. Since, feminists think that
the private sphere is a common ground of women's inequality,
they do not keep it out of the state intervention for the
safety of individual liberty, rather they politicize it. As
MacKinnon aptly states the politization of the private is
nothing more than producing a public not isolated from
difference, but consisting of the ingredients of diverse modes 147
of living. In short, feminists insist that the separate
liberal worlds of private and public life are actually
interrelated and connected by a patriarchal structure. The
family, as a social unit of civil society, for feminists, is
regulated politically by the state through legislation
concerning marriage, sexuality and so forth. The family, as
such, contributes to the justification of the state's and the148
court's growing role in private relations. Therefore, to
include women alongside men in the public life, according to
feminists, implies that the traditional genderic division of
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patriarchal society should be diminished.
In order to take a full part in public life women should 
escape from the roles assigned to them as childbearer and as 
childrearer. An advocate of that view, Ann Oakley, argues 
that motherhood is a myth produced within the patriarchal
8 2
discourses to institutionalize the oppression of women. Girls,
she claims, are not naturally positioned to be mothers,
rather women are socially and culturally conditioned to be 
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mothers. Another radical feminist Firestone strongly
argues that women's liberation requires a biological revolution
by which women seize control of reproduction in order to
overcome the sexual class system. She claims that when there
is no distinction between the productive and reproductive roles
for men and women it will be possible to overcome all of the
relationships, structures and ideas that have always divided
the human community: oppressing /oppressed, exploiting /
151exploited, master / slave and so on. In short she proposes
a new technique of reproduction which is only under the control 
of women, a technique like a test tube baby, which will stop 
women from being the only center of childbearing.
Another way radical feminists propose to take a place thus
a female autonomy in the public life is that to sexually depart
themselves from men. For these radicals it is the lesbian
sexuality that serves as a paradigm for women to depart from
men. Lesbianism, for radical feminists is not a personal
choice, rather it is the symbol of patriarchal rejection. For
instance, radical feminist Charlotte Bunch argues that sex is
not a private matter it is a political matter of oppression,
domination and power. Therefore, lesbianism, for her, is
the only way for women to challenge the ideological, political
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and economic basis of male supremacy. Moreover, radical
feminist Marilyn French develops the image of community which
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has androgynous values. She argues that men traditionally have
the ideology of "power-over", however, women have the
concept of "pleasure with". This "pleasure with" is the most
humanly way of living and this is only possible in an
153androgynous culture. In short, for radical feminists, the
only way in which women can assert their autonomy from men in 
the public life and recover their true and natural femininity 
is to separate from men and the patriarchal structures of 
society.
Another project to include women in public life has been 
produced by Marxist and socialist feminists. Beginning with 
Frederich Engels, Marxist feminists have claimed that women's 
oppression has been originated by the introduction of private 
property. Private ownership of the means of production by rela­
tively few persons, originally all male, created a closed 
system whose contemporary manifestations are imperialism and 
capitalism. Based on that state of affair they claim that 
capitalism itself is the cause of women's oppression. In order 
for women to be liberated, the capitalist system must be
replaced by a socialist system in which no one would be
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economically dependent on anyone else. Contemporary marxist
feminist Margaret Benston calls attention to the economic 
situations of men and women in industrialized capitalist 
society. She claims that women are primarily producers of 
single-values in those activities associated with the home and 
family, however men are the producers of essential products 
associated with the factory and thepublic. Therefore, she
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claims that unless a woman is freed from her heavy domestic
duties, including child care, her entrance into public work
will not remove her from liberation. Not only an equal
entrance to the public work is necessary for women, but also
the socialization of the domestic labor. As long as work in
the home remains a matter of private production and is the
responsibility of women they will never achieve a 
155
liberation.
Socialist feminists attempt to link the radical feminists' 
concept of "patriarchy” and marxist feminists' concept of "pro­
duction" by paying attention to the material base of patriarchy 
which brings men's control over women's labor power. That con­
trol is maintained, for socialist feminists, by excluding
women from access to necessary economically productive156
resources and by restricting women's sexuality. Juliet
Michell's Woman's Estate is one of the prominent studies in
the socialist feminist framework. She argues that women's
condition is overdetermined by the structures of production,
reproduction, sexuality and the socialization of children.
Woman's status and function in all of these structures must
change if she is to achieve full liberation in the public 
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life. In fact, one can easily see that both the marxist
and socialist feminists, like the radical feminists, see the 
liberation of women by the abolition of the private sphere and 
in women's taking an appropriate part in the public life.
One can see that as an extension of the politics of
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difference the feminists' demand to take part in the public on 
the basis of female oriented modes of political behavior, 
communication and decision - making styles will lead them to 
create an autonomy in the public life. The feminists' claim on 
an autonomous body in the public life will lead to the 
emergence of an autonomous public which rejects the creation of 
a unified public realm in which citizens leave behind their 
particular group affiliations, histories and needs to discuss 
a general interest or common good. An autonomous public 
assigns difference positive meanings and acknowledges them as 
necessary ingredients of the civil society. In such a public 
it is more likely that different groups will have communication 
among themselves and this will likely create an equilibrium 
among groups. An autonomization in civil society leads to at 
least three implications: first, it contributes to self­
organization of group members who are aware of their identity, 
collective interest and group consciousness. Second, it 
protects the individual by appealing to its norms against the 
oppression of the authority. Finally, it develops a veto 
power regarding specific policies which threaten the group 
interest about special issues. The feminists' demand to 
develop and foster a distinctively women's culture and women's 
specific needs both opens in the public life a special place 
and contributes to strengthen the position of women. Moreover, 
it subverts the universal public project of the modern 
political thought excluding particularity, desire, feeling 
and those aspects of life associated with the body.
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In conclusion, one can clearly see that feminist politics 
of equality, difference and autonomy is in a way that each is 
interrelated with one another and they complete each other. It 
is only on the basis of equality that a location can be opened 
for the demands of difference in civil society. As long as the 
principle of equality is institutionalized legally, 
politically and economically no segment of different 
categories can find a chance to maintain its existence within a 
civil society. Therefore, feminists contribute to the 
development of civil society firstly by their claim on 
equality, secondly their commitment to difference and finally 
by their idealization of an autonomy in the public life. 
Equality opens the way; the difference functions to 
institutionalize the existence of different groups; and the 
autonomy functions to stay against authority on behalf of the 
members of the social groups. It should be remem.bered that the 
feminists' commitment to the concept of autonomy contributes 
also to the autonomy of other groups in civil society.
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CHAPTER III
CIVIL SOCIETY AND WOMEN IN TURKISH POLITICS
The basic aim of this chapter is to analyze the condition 
of civil society and women in Turkish politics. It begins with 
an analysis of the earlier period of the Ottoman-Turkish poli­
tics and then, through the reforms of the Republican Turkish 
period up to the 1980s, it then seeks to bring to light the 
place of civil society in Turkish politics and the particular 
role of Turkish women. The point of departure is that beginning 
from the Ottoman times to the 1980s Turkish politics 
experienced the tradition of a strong state and a relatively 
weak civil society. Either in the name of the Sultan or of the 
intellectual-bureaucratic elite one always sees a strong center 
at the focus of Turkish politics. In this political tradition, 
women were seen almost as the first potential element of civil 
society during the last half of the nineteenth century when 
statesmen were raising demands for the modernization of the 
Ottoman state. Later, when the intellectual-bureaucratic elite 
occupied the center of politics, women were once again 
smothered under the heavy impact of the aims put forward by 
the state elites. The following part concentrates on a detailed 
analysis of that argument.
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3.1. THE EARLIER OTTOMAN HERITAGE
3.1.1. The Condition of Civil Society
The Ottoman state is well known as a kind of imperial
bureaucratic regime with its characteristics indicating a
cultural rift between the center and the periphery. The
distinctness and autonomy of the center gave way to its ability
to develop and maintain its own specific symbols and criteria
1
of recruitment and organization. Thus, it lacked the basic
intermediate structural component that Hegel termed "civil-
society", a part of society that could operate independently of
2
the central government and was based on property rights. The
Ottomans opted for a central government staffed by loyal
slaves, who were socialized to the secular and state-oriented3
norms of the center. Therefore, the traditional distance
between the state and society created a relation based on the
4
domination of social groups by the state.
In the Ottoman Empire initially the state was governed by
one ruler and the others were hi.s servants. The power was held
by the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire, v;ho was the ultimate
power, appointed by God to hold together the parts of society,
the "zillullahi fil alem" (shadow of God in the world) in
5
popular literature- Indeed, neither the Sultan nor his 
administrators constituted a class in the process of
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production, but rather were consumers of products. The status,
role, and appointment of the administrators under the Sultan
were fulfilled not according to their functionality in special
roles but according to their loyalty to the Sultan, a process
6which genuinely strengthened the Sultan's post. In the
classical period (from the establishment of the Empire until
sixteenth century) the person of the Sultan was identical with
the state. However, in later centuries, particularly after the
sixteenth century, when the Sultan became a puppet in the hands
of the military, civil and religious bureaucracies and various
cliques in the palace, he lost his charisma; this was then
gradually attributed to the state. Thus, the Sultan could now
be deposed in the name of the state, which was seen as the
7
provider of order. In the Ottoman Empire, after the sixteenth
century, power gradually came to be wielded by four major
groups: military, bureaucracy, religious institutions and the
palace. All of these groups or institutions reflected the state
in various aspects. Indeed, no bourgeoisie, hereditary landed
aristocracy or non-governmental clergy existed as an
8
independent source of power. In short, the domination of the 
Sultan, and of a strong state, constituted the essential obsta­
cles to the development of the autonomous social classes which 
constitute the basic component of civil society.
These features of the Ottoman-Turkish culture were also 
incongruent on the grounds by which the civil societal elements 
are furnished. The notion of opposition in the Ottoman-Turkish
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culture was deeply repugnant. A predilection has been shown for
the organic theories of the state and society and solidarist
doctrines which found easy acceptance in the Turkish culture
throughout its history. "Thus it appears that the notion of a
loyal and legitimate opposition has not been fully9
institutionalized at the cultural level." A further related
tendency in the Ottoman-Turkish culture was that, primacy was
not given to the individual but to the collectivity, be it the
nation, the state or one of its sub-units. Individuality came
10
to be attributed as a deviance and was to be punished. In
the case of collectivity the Ottoman culture was under the
impact of eastern thought which elevates the collectivity over
individuality. The Ottoman subjects were termed as "reaya",
11
which meant those people looked after by a herder. The folk
literature of Ottoman culture is full of stories referring to
12
grand sultans or states, not individuals. The upshot was that
in the Ottoman-Turkish culture individuality and 'being
different' were identified with deviant behavior, while the
13state was accepted as the highest prosperity granted by God. 
This is why Metin Heper finds the typology of liberalism and 
authoritarianism less satisfactory in analyzing Ottoman 
politics. Rather he describes Ottoman politics as tran­
scendentalism, which meaning by state elites to transcend
14
particularistic interests. One should be av/are that in folk
culture the state is termed as "father state", a term referring
to respect. Perhaps this is the reason, as perceptively
observed by Heper, why Turkish politics is not hostile to 
15
the state. The political culture as such predominantly
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prevented the development of intermediate structures 
engaging in particular interests, vis-a-vis the collective 
one.
The three potential elements of civil society in Ottoman-
Turkish politics might be described as the millet system, the
guilds, and the religious institution. However, each of these
institutions overwhelmingly depended on the state. Non-Muslim
groups were organized under the millet system, which functioned
as a component of the state rather than of civil society. The
religious heads of these communities worked closely with the
Ottoman government as partners in the administration of their
respective ethno-communal system. Although they were
economically powerful they were weak politically, and they were
16
completely dependent on the state. The guilds also
constituted an administrative link between the ruling
institutions and the town population. The state controls over
the price and quality of goods were fulfilled by means of the 
17
guilds. The chief officer of the guilds (known either as
kethuda or kahya) was elected by the artisan members of the
guild, but the genuine acceptance of any candidate as the
chief officer depended on the "berat-i serif” (Imperial
18
license) given by the central administration. The guilds
administered various branches of the crafts, provided raw
materials to the artisans and controlled whether or not they
followed the essential rules; they even educated the artisans,
19
giving them certificates as well as collecting taxes. These 
functions of the guilds led the Ottoman merchants to represent
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the state rather than a particular interest.
The religious institution, in Ottoman society, also de­
pended on the state. Islam, in theory, enjoys the unity of the
state and the community. Islam and the state are, therefore,
20
considered one and the same entity. The religious members
were appointed by the Sultan and could be easily dismissed, on
any occasion, by him. The top of the religious institution,
the "Şeyhülislam, completely depended on the Sultan and had no
right to interfere directly in the government or the legal
21
administration. The fact that their attainments were made by
the state generated a source of loyalty to the state among the
22
ulema (Islamic theologians). The ulema were also managers of
the "vaqfs" (religious foundations) and assisted the Ottoman
regime in taxation and the performance of complex
administrative and juridical tasks, at the same time as
23
educating the Ottoman subjects through these foundations. 
Religion, thus, through the functional actions of the ulema and 
the vaqfs constituted an administrative link between the state 
and the Ottoman subjects, and was, at the last analysis, an 
administrative component of the state rather than an element 
of civil society.
Like the ulema, the local notables in the Ottoman society 
could not constitute an element of civil society. The ayan 
(local notables) were, at least before the sixteenth century, 
simply influential local residents who served as intermediaries
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between the local populace and the government. Following
changes in the sixteenth century, the word ayan, was used to
refer to groups that were tax farmers, holders, and eventually24
de facto land owners.
In short, with the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and an
aristocracy, the components of civil society could not develop
25
in the Ottoman-Turkish context. It is clear that the existing 
potential civil societal elements in Ottoman politics, as 
analyzed above, fulfilled an administrative function rather 
than producing alternative norms, meanings, values and 
discourses to those developed by the state.
3.1.2. Women in Ottoman Society
The Ottoman law regulating basic institutions was obvious­
ly based on Islamic principles. Islam divides society basically 
into two sub-universes: the universe of men and the universe of 
women. Fatima Mernissi emphasizes the dual world that exists in 
Islamic society. She argues that the social division according 
to sex reflects the division between those who hold authority 
and those who do not, those who hold spiritual powers and those 
who do not. This division is based on the physical separation 
of the public sphere from the domestic universe. While the 
members of the public are umma (men) the members of the 
domestic sphere are women. Mernissi claims that the regulation 
between its members is based on these principles: in the public 
sphere the principles of equality, reciprocity, unity.
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aggregation, brotherhood, love, trust and the like exist.
However, in the domestic sphere the principles of inequality,
lack of reciprocity, segregation, separation, subordination,
26
and mistrust exist.
Indeed, Islam gave women very radical rights compared to
its contemporaries, making them equal with men in various re- 
27
spects. The condition of woman in the Ottoman-Turkish
politics was previously so good that woman was free and had the
same rights as man, at least until the sixteenth century. Women
were free in the clothing they wore, went to war with men, rode
horses, worked on the land and participated in the decision28
making process.
However, following the development of the Ottoman state
into a near theocratic state after the sixteenth century (and
especially after the conquest of Byzantivim which brought the
Ottomans into close contact with the structures of the
Byzantine state) women's place in society changed
29
drastically. The Byzantine experience was particularly
influential on the Ottomans. The Byzantine empire was a class 
society made up of slaves working on the land and the ruling 
classes. Those women belonged to the ruling classes and lived 
in the cities were secluded in the harem, a practice already 
observed in the Muslim Ummayad and Abbasian empires as well as 
the non-Muslim Persian state and later adopted by the Ottoman 
ruling classes. In the Ottoman harem there existed polygamy.
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and women lived among themselves and came into contact only
with the male members of their family. Their social life was
limited to reproduction and domestic labor. After the
sixteenth century, with the emergence of a strong state in
Ottoman politics, the Saray (Palace) and the ulema began to
interpret the Muslim religion in such a way that it justified
30
the complete exclusion of women's social and economic life.
One should be aware of the fact that the harem life of the
Ottoman-Turkish was restricted to Istanbul. In the rural part
of Ottoman-Turkish society, no experience of harem was felt and
man and woman worked side by side in the fields. The woman was
31
a producer and a helper to her husband.
It was after the sixteenth century that we see a large 
number of fermans (imperial edicts) limiting women's social and 
economic life. Since the impacts of edicts are important in the 
Ottoman-Turkish women's life it is necessary to emphasize 
these in more detail. Imperial edicts restricted women's life 
mainly in three areas: the clothes they wore, their appearance 
in public and their relations with men in their social life. 
The manner of dress of Ottoman-Turkish women was specified 
through the imperial edicts. One published in 1725 was worded 
in the following manner:
...certain brazen women have begun to be seen in the 
streets dressed in finery, affecting all kinds of 
innovations in their garments and giving strange 
bizarre shapes to their headdress in imitation of
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shameless women, in order to corrupt the population.
Their audacity in lifting the veil of virtue in
defiance of decrees to the contrary: their
improvisation of modes of dress which violate all
notions of propriety; and appearance in diverse
unseemly costumes, has reached the stage where even
women of virtue have begun to fall under their
influence. These outlandish clothes are
prohibited... If any women is seen out in the
streets or in excursion places wearing one of these
newfangled feraje with a white collar, the collar
will be cut there and then in public, and if any
person persists in wearing them and offends for a
second or third time, they will be exiled to the 
32
provinces.
The imperial edicts also dealt with the places that women
could go for amusement. When the Sultan was informed that some
women were meeting with men in distant places of Istanbul like
Kisikli, Akbaba and Bulgurlu he forbade women from going to
these places. The edict related to that prohibition is worded
as follows: "From now on, women are prohibited to go to distant
amusement places in carriages. Those women who go to these
places, despite the prohibition, and those men who take them
33
with their cabs will be exiled from Istanbul." Furthermore, 
excursions of young women together with young men in boats were 
prohibited. An edict of the Sultan to the boat officer of 
Istanbul declared that "as denounced before, confine the
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excursion of young women together with boys in boats and34
proclaim this edict to all the boatmen."
This issuing of so many imperial edicts followed the
close contact of the Ottoman population with Western products.
After the sixteenth century the Ottoman empire constituted an
attractive market for western products, particularly for
textiles. Ottoman women had an imprudent desire to follow the
35current fashion and try new costumes. One needs to remember
that religion in Ottoman politics was absorbed into the state
institutions, importantly, more than that was individually
felt. This is why the imperial edicts were reinforced and
justified through the religious doctrines and why they were
unsuccessful in persuading the women who behaved with their36
individual initiatives. Perhaps another reason why the
imperial edicts failed to overcome the situation was that
beside the Muslim population there were a large number of
women from non-Muslim communities (Jews, Greek and Armenian
Christians) who were excluded from these edicts and remained
free in their style of life. They then had a greater impact on
the surface of the streets of Istanbul as well as influencing
37the Muslim women, particularly with their styles of clothing.
The Ottoman women were also limited in their education. 
They were educated only up to the age of 11 or so, in subyans 
(primary schools) which were found only in the large cities. 
These Female students were given mainly a religious education.
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receiving only a small amount of the science of their time.They
were educated together with male students or separately in
38
schools particular to females.
Despite all of these restrictions one can encounter in
history a large number of famous Ottoman women who were
writers, poets, calligraphers and so forth. Another area v/here
they v/ere prominent was in the founding of religious
institutions beginninq from the earlier years of the Ottoman
39
empire vip to the last decades. In Istanbul six libraries
were founded by Ottoman v^ omen, in Tarsus one and in Baghdad
4 0
three between 1583-1871. In Istanbul alone v/omen endowed 69
schools, and 13 medreses (religious schools) between the years 
411667-1882. They also founded about 1533 religious
42
foundations in Istanbul, dealing with various social issues.
Ottoman women brought into being similar foundations in other
Anatolian cities as well. Halit Organ found that 43 of the
total 151 foundations, founded in Ankara between 1585 and 1924
43
were endowed by women. Finally, one can see from the imperial
edicts that Ottoman women were also active in merchant life.
They had shops and were active in the exchange of goods and 
44
slaves.
In conclusion, one needs to remember that women in 
Ottoman-Turkish politics did not organize against the state 
authority. Nevertheless, at least from the sixteenth century 
onward, women as a social category gradually occupied the 
chief attention of the state authority. Based on external
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relations (trade with West),internal dynamics (non-Muslim 
estates) and their own choice they frequently reversed the 
values the government tried to impose upon them. From time to 
time they ignored the governmental prohibitions and replaced 
them with habits of their own. This aspect of women as well as 
the aspect that they were active in various parts of the social 
life is significant when analyzing the role of women in civil 
society. Their conditions lead us to reach the conclusion that 
although a strong civil societal element was not seen through 
women they, in fact, stood always as an hidden potential 
element in the earlier period of the Ottoman-Turkish political 
context.
3.2. WOMEN AS A LINK TO THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION
The nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire was ranked by
the dynamic effort of state elites to turn the face of the
Empire toward Western institutions. The Ottomans, for a long
time, were aware of their backwardness versus the rapid
developments accomplished in various aspects in Western
societies. In order to overcome that backwardness, there was
felt a need for a change in the military , administrative,
45legal and educational institutions.
As we have seen, the early Ottoman Sultans pursued 
vigorously to keep society together. However, from the
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nineteenth century onwards the bureaucratic elite acted in the
belief that they were the only ones responsible for modernizing
46
and developing their country. Indeed, modernization during
the nineteenth century was taken synonymously with
Westernization, which was perceived from the perspective of the
Enlightenment tradition. The state's salvation was the main
target pursed by the intellectual-bureaucrats and the
substitution of reason for religion was regarded as the central
47
premises for public policy making. The vanguard of the
modernization effort was rooted in the state layer, far more
than the civil societal elements. The state, in fact, as of the
nineteenth century, turned into an agent of change. The state-
48
whoever resisted it was labeled as opposed to progress.
Three main aspects of modernization during the nineteenth 
century were the emergence of a constitutional government, the 
emergence of an intellectual-bureaucratic elite and the impor­
tance granted to women's education. These efforts resulted in 
a progress towards a constitutional government in the Ottoman 
polity. The Sened-i Ittifak (Deed of Alliance) of 1808, the 
Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu (Imperial Rescript of Gulhane) of 1839, 
the Islahat Fermani (Reform Edict) of 1856, the creation of 
central and provincial assemblies and councils throughout the 
Tanzimat Period of 1839-1876, and the establishment of the
first Ottoman parliament in 1877, are taken as the major
49
developments of the nineteenth century. A second layer of 
modernization was the importance of the new roles given to 
journalists and intellectuals by the Young Ottomans who would
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later constitute an element of elite politics in Turkey. The
third and no less important aspect of modernization, in the
last period of the Ottoman empire, was the attention given to
woman issue by the political elite: the efforts of the
government to create new institutions with the aim of educating
women, and the roles given to women in modernization of the
Ottoman society. Indeed, regarding women as a link to Western
civilization was not an attitude practiced only by the Ottomans
but rather, as Leila Ahmed correctly argues, a common attitude
in Middle Eastern societies. Since the late nineteenth century,
when feminist ideas first began to develop in Middle Eastern
societies, "a Middle Eastern society's formal stand on the
position of women has often been perhaps the most sensitive
index of the society's attitude to the West -its openness to,
51
or its rejection of Western civilization." To assure women's 
education, their being integrated into social life and their 
visibility in the streets was accepted by the intellectuals of 
the time as a symbolic link to contact with Western civiliza­
tion and to overcome the cultural problems of the Empire. The 
woman issue was, in fact, the focus of the arguments between 
two predominant sections: the Westernizers and the
traditionalists. A Turkish student of political science. 
Nilüfer Gole, puts it very aptly by saying that during the 
Tanzimat Period the woman issue coincided with the 
distinctions between the public and private spheres. While the 
Westernizers associated social corruption with the non­
education of women, the traditionalists stressed that a new
50
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corruption would come if they destroyed the secret life
surrounding women. The education of women and their
participation in the public life was regarded as having a
52
corrupting effect on Ottoman society. Traditionalist-
religious thinkers like Mahmud Esad argued that if the Ottomans
turned the face of society back to the Asr-i Saadet (the
'Golden Age' in Islamic society during the Prophet's lifetime)
53
it would be possible to 'save' society. However, prominent
thinkers of the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) like Namik Kemal,
Semseddin Sami, Fatma Aliye and Ahmet Mithat, advocated women's54
education and their equality with men in public life. The
basic theme of Semseddin Sami's book '*Kadinlarimiz" (Our Women)
is that happiness and the progress of family life and
civilization are dependent on women. Therefore, women should be
given as much education as men if Ottoman society was to reach55
a genuine civilization. Ahmet Mithat, meanwhile, "accounted
the ideal of an educated girl as a genuine indicator of56
modernization."
With the advent of the Tanzimat Period women's status in
Ottoman society drastically changed. The Islahat Fermani of
1856 announced that no one could be dominated sexually by 
57
anybody else. Two new regulations beginning from that time 
were particularly important to women: the "Arazi Kanunu" (Land 
Code) of 1858 and the "Sicill-i Nufus Nizamnamesi" (Regulation 
of Population Register) of 1881. With the Land Code the 
previous regulation concerning heritage, that in cases where a 
male heir existed the female could not benefit from the
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heritage of her parents, was abolished and female heirs were
58given the same right as male. Moreover, based on the 
Population Regulation the state began to interfere with the 
marriage institution for the first time in Ottoman history. 
Before this law, marriage among the Ottoman subjects was 
regulated by imams (prayer leaders men) independent of the 
state. But now, the Regulation enforced the spouses to receive
legal permission for marriage, and it cast an official role to
59
the religious men in the marriage.
Indeed, education was the most important means by which
the Ottoman women managed to break away from their traditional
role. The Tanzimat Period was the first in which women v/ere
educated by the government in different areas. Midwifery
education for women was provided for in medical schools in the 
60year 1842. This was followed immediately by the "Kiz
Rüştiyeleri'· (Secondary Schools For Females) in 1858, and by
industrial schools for females in 1869 opened to train the
female population for industry, and by the "Dar-ul Muallimat"
(Teacher's School for Females) in 1870. Students who graduated
from these schools were sent by the government to different
parts of the country to educate the rest of the Ottoman 
61
women. With the edict of the "Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi"
(Regulation of Public Education) in 1868 the government
required the entire Ottoman population to send female children
62
aged between 6-11 to primary schools.
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Later the ”Kanun-i Esasl” (Constitution) of 1876 directed
that "all the Ottoman population would compulsorily receive
63
prim.ary education." When coming to the year 1905 we see that
in the Ottoman Empire there existed 3,621 primary schools for
64
female students. In 1909 with the addition of 84 secondary
schools approximately 10,000 female students were being 
65educated. All these developments motivated the intellectuals
of the time to pay more attention to women's present status.
The "Terakki", the first newspaper published in the Ottoman
Empire in 1868, dealt with woman issue and later published a
66
separate paper, "Muhadderat", for women in 1888. A series of
new papers and magazines followed in the following years.
Sefika Kurnaz lists 13 magazines pertaining to woman issue
67being published in the Ottoman society between 1868 and 1900. 
The basic themes of these magazines brought to light the 
importance of women's education in the development of the 
country. By attacking the institution of polygamy which was 
widespread among the ruling class and by calling for equality 
between men and women these magazines defended women's rights. 
The struggle for a new role in the society for women was worded 
in Sukufezar, one of the prominent women's magazines, in the 
following way: "We have been accepted for a long time as 'long­
haired, short-witted' by men. We will indicate that the reverse
is correct, without preferring womanhood to man or the reverse,
68
we will be in a path of a hard study. These women, thus, 
tended to reverse the values traditionally attributed to them 
and to take a place in the social life equally with men. Many 
women's magazines of the time were published by men. However,
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the Hanimlara Mahsus Gazete (Paper Belonging to Women) was
completely written by famous women writers including Fatma
Aliye, Sair Nigar and Makbule Leman. Many women were taught by
this magazine how to write, to learn how to look after children
and were mobilized to go to schools. Its three basic principles
were to train women to be a good mother, a good wife and a good 
69
Muslim. Nora Seni has analyzed the themes stressed through
caricatures in these and the later magazines and found that
three important issues were commonly emphasized: women's
70clothing, polygamy and the education of young females. 
Indeed, the ideas formulated by intellectual men were 
immediately shared by women; they required these rights not 
only for themselves but for the development of the country.
As it was previously mentioned the Ottoman-Turkish women
worked on the land but were not employed in civil service
until the Tanzimat Period. A woman was appointed first in 1873
and ten years later, in 1883, some other women were appointed71
to schools as officiaries. Moreover, during the same time
women began to participate in factory work. In 1897, 121 of 201
workers in a match factory of Istanbul were women. In another
Ottoman city, Bursa, hundreds of women began to work in
72
different private businesses.
During the same period that Ottoman intellectuals were 
challenging the traditional status of Turkish women there was a 
strong feminist movement in Europe demanding the right of
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enfranchisement. It is obvious that the Western feminist 
movement influenced the Turkish male elite, who in turn 
influenced Ottoman women. In short, two basic agents of 
Westernization or modernization in Ottoman-Turkish politics 
during the second half of the nineteenth century were first, 
the adoption of new institutions in the military and the 
bureaucracy, second, the attempt to educate women and change 
their traditional roles.
3.3. WOMEN AS A POTENTIAL ELEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
When coming to 1908 the ”Ikinci Meşrutiyet" (Second Consti­
tutional Period) was proclaimed under the enforcement of the 
Young Turks. The first parliament was prorogued by Abdulhamid 
II because of the war with Russia immediately following his 
coming to power in 1876. The term Meşrutiyet was regarded as
being synonymous with the declaration of freedom, particularly
73
freedom for women by the generation of the time. As soon as
the Meşrutiyet was proclaimed women (particularly in Istanbul)
74
abandoned their veils and went into the streets. Bernard
Caporal talks about women's reaction to the Meşrutiyet in the
following terms: "After the proclamation of the Meşrutiyet
women took red-white flags and pennants and marched into the
streets of Istanbul shouting 'long live the country', 'long
75
live freedom', and 'long live the nation'." The Young Turks 
gave stronger emphasis to the woman issue. As described by
Tarik Z. Tunaya they "took the woman issue as an economic and
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cultural issue of the nation.” With the " Ittihat ve Terakki” 
(Union and Progress) government of the Young Turks a new phase 
was opened in the Ottoman-Turkish politics.
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3.3.1. The Guidance Role of Intellectuals
Following the Ittihat-Terakki governments Turkish
intellectuals began to hold the center of politics. They were
mainly educated in the West and they imported Western ideas
into the Ottoman empire. Three main measures taken to solve the
problems of the Empire were importing technical experts from
the West, educating Turkish students in the technical
universities of Western counties and establishing a variety of
educational institutions training students in the direction of77
Western technical knowledge. As soon as Turkish students
returned to the country they constituted a strong power
against the government from the Tanzimat period on; coming to
power, with the proclamation of the Meşrutiyet, they introduced
projects to save the state from collapse. They regarded
themselves not only as the symbol and agent of change but as
its beneficiaries. They dominated all the social and political
organizations and considered the state as a private institution 
78of their own. The intellectuals' often-used idea of populism, 
despite its democratic connotation, did not go beyond being an 
ideology of mobilizing the society towards the ''ideal society” 
they had in mind, which can be described as being Westernized. 
These intellectuals took women as the instrument of their ideal 
society and created a large number of arguments concerning the
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status of Turkish women.
Arguments over the condition of woman during the meşrutiyet
period can be organized under three different perspectives.
Westernism, Turkism and Islamism. The three paramount names
among the Turkist intellectuals were Ziya Gokalp, Halide Edip
and Ahmet Agaoglu. They presented new projects concerning woman
issue to the government. Gokalp paid a great attention to woman
issue in his different writings and poems. For him, the old
Turkic style of life should be taken as the basic criteria for
understanding the existing condition of woman in Turkish
politics. He urged that there was a feminist tendency in the
old Turkish nomads and women were completely equal with men. To
him the corruption in the social life of the Turkish women
began immediately after the Turkish nomads migrated to Anatolia
under the impact of Arabian and Persian cultures. He attacked
the existing Islamic law and denounced that it be replaced with
79a completely new one giving equality to women. He idealized a
future in which Turkish ethics would be founded upon democracy
and feminism as well as nationalism, patriotism, work and the80
strength of the family. According to Gokalp there are three 
basic elements of the society: the family, the state and the 
nation. He argues that the center of the family is woman, that 
of the state man, while the creation of the nation is the work 
of both men and women. He emphasized the basic place occupied 
by women in society in the following terms:
Since in our society woman obtain no good education, 
the family does not develop. When the family does
109
not develop, the nation automatically begins to go
backward. Then the first step of advancement lies in
girls being well educated and women being trained.
Well schooling of females might suddenly revive a
nation because a good woman brings about a good
family, and a good nation comes into being on the
81basis of a good family.
For Gokalp, "woman's duty was not to educate only their
children but also to educate the nation, and it is their duty
82
as well to lead men in the true direction." One should 
remember that Gokalp had similar views with Hegel in imposing 
the basic familial roles on woman, but he extends Hegel's ideas 
by supporting woman's taking new roles in public life.
Halide Edip, another extreme exponent of the Turkic
perspective, raised four features as being basic
characteristics of the new Turkish woman: she should be
intelligent, nationalist, and patriotic; she should be
conscious of her political rights and her liberty; she should
be well educated, having the right to equal education with man;
83and she should be a Muslim and a modern woman. Similarly with 
Gokalp, she regarded woman as the basic element of society and 
the improvement of her status must necessarily precede the 
progress of the country. She urged that " the right of the 
country is a thousand times higher and more esteemed than that 
of a woman; when a woman requires new rights she should
110
remember that this is not for herself but for the children that84
she will produce for the country." Compared to Gokalp she was
more passionate in connecting woman's interests with the
national interests. Another Turkish thinker, Ahmet Agaoglu,
also perceived the traditional role of woman as the genuine
reason for the backwardness of the Ottoman society. To him two
basic problems of the Ottoman society were the need for the
adoption of a Latin alphabet and the need to change woman's
traditional status. Only with reforms in these two fields could
the Ottoman society solve its problems and take a proper place
85
among the developed nations. In short, the woman issue for
Turkish intellectuals meant not just women's particular
interests but the country's advancement.
The Westernizers went further on this issue. They were 
obviously under the impact of the Western feminists. Tevfik 
Fikret, the most famous poet of the time, used poetry to
convey the com.mon idea of the VJesternizer intellectuals in 
regard to the status of woman. The following part of one of his 
poem was the common idea of the Westernizer intellectuals:
The destiny of womanhood is certainly not 
humiliation
When woman becomes miserable the humanity will
86
certainly subside."
Abdullah Cevdet, an extrem.e Westernizer, strongly attacked 
the veiling of Ottoman women. His famous slogan was "open Koran 
and recover the woman", at the same time this was the slogan
111
of his family law proposal. Cevdet was strongly in favor of
the adoption of Western institutions and a lover of Western
civilization, going so far as to propose the "importation of
stud men from West for the purpose of reviving and
88
strengthening the new Turkish generation." His basic ideas
might be summed up as follows: the Sultan should have only one
wife, monogamy should be accepted legally as a basic principle
of family law; women should be free of state intervention in
their clothing; woman should be accepted as the paramount
virtue of the country and man should consider them according to
that virtue; woman shoxild be freely schooled in every field;
and the existing family law should be replaced with a Western 
89civil code. To Cevdet "there is no second civilization meant
European civilization, and it must be imported with both its
90
roses and its thorns."
Another consistent exponent of that idea, Ahmet Muhtar
wrote in 1912 that "either we Westernize, or we are
91
destroyed". Still another strong advocate of this view,
Selahaddin Asira, fundamentally rejected all Islamic principles
concerning the family and woman. According to him the main
reasons behind the inferior status of women were mainly Islamic
principles concerned with such issues as polygamy, wedding,
marriage, heritage, equality and veiling. The only way to
92
emancipate women was to give up all these principles. Even 
the right to vote for women was demanded by Westernizers during 
that time which might be regarded as too extreme in a society
87
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in which women still did not have the right to appear freely in
the public realm. The right of enfranchisement was first
demanded by Halil Hamit, a Westernizer thinker. He wrote in his
book, Islamda Feminizm (Feminism in Islam) the following: "Your
sons should support the emancipation of women and your
daughters should not only know their rights but also have
enough courage to put them into practice, that is, to use their93
rights politically" Humanity was identical for him with
women's equality with men a principle which would immediately 
incorporated her into the Ottoman-Turkish society.
Moderate Westernizers raised arguments on woman issue.
Intellectuals like Celal Nuri and Riza Tevfik took religion as
the basis and argued for the adoption of the technical side of
Western civilization. To them the inferior condition of women
originated not from Islam but from the present conditions of
the Ottoman society; therefore, by the adoption of the
technical aspects of Western civilization they would be able to
94
overcome the problem.
Another perspective, during the Meşrutiyet Period was 
raised by some religious intellectuals like Mustafa Sabri, Musa 
Kazim, Said Halim Pasa, Mehmet Akif, and Hamdi Akseki who 
embraced a conservative point of view. The basic tenets of 
their argument might be summed up as follows: society should
immediately return to the Şeriat (Islamic Law) and the family 
law should be regulated according to the tenets of the 
Islamic religion. The education of women must not serve for
113
their being articulated into public life but rather for raising
more religious generations in the home. Therefore, they
supported the restriction of women in the private sphere, as
95the central keeper of the secret life of the family.
In conclusion, one can obviously see that the basic tenets 
pertaining to the status of women in the Ottoman-Turkish 
society were laid down by the intellectuals of the Meşrutiyet 
period, particularly, by the exponents of the view which 
stressed the adoption of Western institutions. The Westernizer 
intellectuals in particular opened the door of Turkish society 
to the Viestern institutions and by doing so created the ground 
for women to raise arguments on their status. The path opened 
up by the Westernizer elites allowed the Western feminist point 
of view to be incorporated into the Ottoman-Tui'kish context. 
The feminist point of view was immediately taken up by a large 
number of women in major Ottoman cities leading to the 
emergence of a women's movement raising issues regarding to 
their particular conditions.
3.3.2. The Emergence of an Indigenous Feminism
Beginning with the arguments raised by the intellectuals 
and with the atmosphere of relative freedom created by the 
revolution of 1908, the first feminist women entered the scene 
in the Ottoman-Turkish context. Educated woman from the 
intellectual circles of the big cities, like Istanbul, Salónica
114
and Izmir started to publish magazines and express their 
reaction against the deep oppression of women. They founded the 
first woman's association, increased the number of magazines 
and protested against the existing status of women through 
panels and meetings. This created an alternative ground for the 
government that the Ottoman-Turkish context had never 
experienced.
After the revolution of 1908 women were permitted to found96
associations pertaining to their own interests. Serpil Cakir 
observed that eight different types of associations were estab­
lished by women from 1908 up to the proclamation of the 
Republic in 1923. She divides these associations into the 
following categories: associations for aid, for education, for 
culture, for solving national problems, for political aims, for 
patriotic actions, associations as branches of political 
parties and associations for stressing feminist issues. There
were about 40 of these associations, not including branches in97
the rural areas. The actions of those associations founded
with the purpose of aid, education and culture might be summed
up as the collection of money and its distribution to the
needed people, the opening up of new schools, the financing of
poor students and the training of women through seminars,
98
panels, and conferences for new roles in social life.
Associations devoted to the national problems encouraged,
among others, the Ottoman population to buy the national
99
products in order to develop the Ottoman economy. The Union 
and Progress Party also encouraged the establishment of woman's
115
associations in order to educate and socialize women as well
100
as to increase the number of its defenders.
The patriotic associations occupied an important role 
during the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. 
They were established either voluntarily by women or were sup­
ported by the government. One prominent group was the "Ottoman 
Association for Running the Women to Work" which was 
established by the prime minister, Enver Pasha, in 1916. Its 
aim was to push women to work as well as promote the young to
marry properly in order to overcome the moral disease
101
following the wars the Ottomans had experienced. In the
following years after its establishment it helped to put about
102
7,000 women into work in the manufacturing sector. This
association motivated women also to join the military service.
With that aim it formed a woman's labor battalion, which
enabled some women to obtain the status of sergeant and
sergeant-major. The "Birinci Kadin Isci Taburu" (First Woman
Labor Battalion) recruited women aged between 18-30, years,
some who were employed as the official staff, others as
laborers and some were temporarily employed. This battalion, as
a component of the military, gave important background service
103especially during the Balkan War.
Women also took an important role during the War of Inde­
pendence (1918-1923). They were the major participants in
marches in big cities as well as taking part during the war on
116
different fronts. In Istanbul alone 10 of the 50 associations
104founded as national fronts by 1918 belonged to women. A
large number of meetings and demonstrations against the
occupation of the country by Western armies were enhanced by
women in Istanbul. They were also active in the Anatolian
cities. The first organized women's revolutionary movement in
Anatolian took place in Erzurum. After a gathering in a mosque,
telegrams were sent to the government in Istanbul, to the
United State Senate, and to the Allied powers, protesting
105
against the occupation. The second mass movement of women in
Anatolia was seen in their effort to found the "Anadolu
Kadinlari Mudafa-i Vatan Cemiyetleri” (Anatolian Women's
Association for Patriotic Defense) first in Sivas province and
106then in 14 other Anatolian cities. In addition to these
activities, women founded a large number of similar107
associations in different cities. They also participated in108
the war together with men. Indeed, woman in the Turkish
War of Independence "became the symbol of the Turkish nation's
109ideal of liberty... she did this as a patriotic duty." One
might remember that the consistent leaders in this movement 
were the known feminists; the foremost example was Halide Edip, 
a feminist writer who went to Anatolia from Istanbul and took 
part in the war.
Beginning from 1908 up to the formation years of the 
Turkish Republic, which was established in 1923 in Ankara, 
Turkish women constituted a significant political movement of 
their own. The paramount characteristic of their movement as
117
distinct from the feminists movement in the European countries
was their emphasis on their indigenous problems. Turkish
feminists founded the ”Osmanli Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan
Cemiyeti” (Ottoman Association for Defense of Women's Rights)
in 1913 and published the magazine ”Kadinlar Dunyasi” (Women's
World) which circulated until 1921. Kadinlar Dunyasi sought to
reform existing family law with the aim of creating an
egalitarian family. Members of the association stressed their
indigenous problems and attacked the traditional privileges
given to men in such areas as marriage and divorce and
particularly the practice of polygamy. They also attacked the
obstacles preventing women from participating in public 
110life. Their demands were expressed in the following manner:
”We want progress, to become greater, we want to be happy. We
want to see and understand everything. We want to convert our
life to a civilized one and to revive our inertion into an
action. This is possible only through our participation in the
111
public life, by means of having equal rights with men.” They
also rejected men's contribution to their struggle, arguing
that they were unable to conceive of woman's internal world and
112
their genuine problems. The most revealing message of their 
proclamation is seen in the following passage:
...on July 10 [the date of the proclamation of the 
Meşrutiyet) the men of our society took the right of 
sovereignty, of a civilization of their own, and the 
right of their humanity... O womanhood, do you still
118
stay in obscurity?... The freedom was not given to
our men, they took it by force... The right is not
given, but it is actually taken. Let we demand our
natural rights and civilization. If we are not given
113
our right let take it by force.
Gaining a place in the public work for women was regarded
as being identical to gaining their liberty. A rich member of
the association, Bedr Osman Hanim applied to the Telephone
Company in Istanbul to be employed. When her application was
rejected Kadinlar Dunyasi launched a campaign against the
company, resulting in her being given work together with a
114
large number of women. Another member of the association,
Belkis Şevket Hanim, decided to fly over Istanbul. The
association lobbied on her behalf: the government approved her
demand even providing an aircraft. She flew over Istanbul in
1914, was officially honored and her picture was hung in the
115
military museum. Women also demanded, for the first time,
the right of enfranchisement. According to the Kadinlar
Dunyasi ”as we see woman laborers, woman office staff, woman
artists, and woman merchants we will certainly see woman
deputies in the near future, talking in parliament on issues
regarding the universe. This, will definitely be realized as a 
116
right." Indeed, these demands by women were revolutionary in 
the Ottoman society.
Women also published a large number of magazines and books 
between 1908 and 1920. Kurnaz lists 27 magazines published
119
either by men or women, which deal with female issues.
Although these magazines dealt with different aspects of woman
issue they all stressed the idea of equality between men and
118
women in all fields of social life. As a result of these
efforts women experienced drastic changes in their life in
terms of legal regulations, education, and employment. Women
also benefited from a new family law governing the family life
of Muslim as well as the non-Muslim Ottoman minorities. The
*'Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi” (Family Law Decree) was prepared and
approved by the government in 1917. It brought new rights to
women, which can be summed up in the following way: the wedding
was taken as a legal procedure, the age of marriage 18 for men
and 17 for women, marriage was controlled by the state through
a proper staff and two witnesses, polygamy was restricted and
women were given (like men) the right to divorce on 
119
occasion. But this law was abolished two years later since
it was perceived as being too radical by the religious
intellectuals as well as unsatisfactory by the Westernizers. It
was applied in Syria and in Iraq until recently and is still in
120
use in Lebanon.
The other area where women gained ground was in education.
The previous secondary schools were followed in 1911 by a great
number of the **Idadis" (High Schools) , later (in 1913) to
become lycee. The high schools were immediately followed by the
"Inas Darulfununu·' (University for Women), established in
121
Istanbul in 1914. After 1908 the number of private schools, 
founded either by Ottoman Muslims, Ottoman minorities, or
117
120
foreigners such as the British, French or Americans rapidly
increased. Bayram Kodaman has successfully observed that in
1910 the Armenians, the Jews and the Protestant Christians
created 406 private schools throughout the empire; 140 were
122
created by foreigners, and only 65 by Muslims.
After 1908 a large number of veiled women entered public
life. A law was prepared by the Ottoman Ministry of Trade in
1231915 which allowed the creation of a female labor force.
Women were thereafter employed in the food industry, in the
tobacco industry, the clothing industry, in the chemical and
in the print industry. The British Oriental Manufacturers
employed 60 thousand women in Anatolian cities alone in 
124
1913. Sehmus Guzel found that in Sivas alone approximately
10 thousand female were employed in workshops belonging to
foreign companies. In addition the majority of the workers on125
industrial machines were women. Guzel also brought to light
the fact that in Bursa in 1908 20,000 women were employed in126
165 spinning mills. Guzel claims that during that year women
constituted thirty percent of the industrial labor force in
127
major Ottoman cities. Fusun Tayanc also found the same
128
percentage of woman laborers in Ottoman industry in 1915.
Also, women were employed largely in agriculture, particularly
in the area of tobacco grov/ing, grape and fig cultivation and
cotton production around Izmir, Adana, Aydin and other 129
cities.
One should bear in mind the effect of European industries
121
on both the Turkish government and Turkish women's associa­
tions. They sometimes supported the associations financially in 
order to motivate them by stressing more strongly the cause of 
women's employment. Indeed, the Ottoman authorities permitted 
British companies to build their industries freely in Ottoman
territory under the Trade Agreement of 1839 between the Ottoman
130and British governments. The British companies established
in the Ottoman territory were mostly textile industries in
131
which women were paid only half of the salary of men. This
is the reason for a number of strikes by women. According to
Guzel between July 24 and October 31, 1908, in the major
cities of the Empire i.e., as Istanbul, Salónica, Izmir,
Beirut, Konya and Adana some 40 different strikes were
132recorded in industries where women were employed.
In fact, there were mainly two forces which stood behind
the women's movement: foreign industrial companies and the
newly rising native bourgeoisie. The aim of the first was to
create a cheaper labor force while the second might be
ascribed to the fact that they wished to produce a new social
class of woman who demanded their products. That is, the
products of the time were mainly those consumed in the family
and more specifically by women. If women had more economic
133
power to buy the bourgeoisie would likely gain more.
Either for this or that reason, indeed, one can see 
clearly that after the proclamation of the Meşrutiyet Period a
122
strong women's movement emerged in the Ottoman- Turkish 
context. The movement can be termed as "indigenous" feminism 
because women of that time stressed explicitly their specific 
problems. They emphasized, in particular, two issues related to 
their status: the right to take part in public life through 
education and work; and equal rights with men in the family 
life, particularly marriage and divorce. These rights had been 
gained by women in European societies a long time before, 
following the industrial revolution. Therefore, a more 
extended right was explicitly demanded by these women: the 
right to vote. One should appreciate that in a society where 
women had no public life it is too fantastic to stress the 
right to vote. Contrary to the European societies the family 
was maintained in the Ottoman society with all of its strong 
traditional dynamics. This is why the Ottoman women so strongly 
stressed the need to take an equal part in the public life and 
to gain new roles in the family. These issues were, definitely, 
as important for Turkish feminists as the vote was for Western 
feminists.
In conclusion, woman issue was the central issue of the 
Ottoman-Turkish politics from 1908 until the establishment of 
the Republican Turkey. The discourses of opposition were 
organized according to the discourses virtually affiliated 
with the values directly concerning women. Another related fact 
is that they were only the women who created alternative 
meanings, values and discourses to the official ones. Either by 
male or female intellectuals the alternative discourses were
123
developed mainly in relation with woman issue. No other issue 
occupied the political context so long as women issue took 
part. Accordingly, to shape a new society it was thought to 
model according to the roles women would play in the public 
life. The distinction between the public and private spheres 
was associated with the women's going out of the home or stay 
at home. The central point of the argument was whether the 
public life would come to exist or not for women. This meant 
that the sacredness of the family life would be violated. This 
sacredness, in fact was the basic style of life of the Ottoman 
society. In short, this is why v;e accepted women as the basic 
element of civil society of that time. The ground of liberty 
created during the Meşrutiyet Period was made primarily for 
women to be the beneficiary. But as soon as the Republic was 
proclaimed in Turkey the phase of elite politics once again 
revived and these politics created a new tendency in the condi­
tion of women.
3.4. WOMEN AS A SYMBOL OF THE REPUBLICAN TURKEY
With the establishment of the Republic in 1923 a concern 
began to develop in creating a nation with a new culture and 
values alongside the state. At the beginning of the Republic 
state elites (the military the bureaucratic and the 
intellectual elites) stressed such issues as the formation of 
the nation, the integration and the identity and loyalty to the 
new government. The military, the bureaucrats, the
124
intelligentsia and the women were regarded in this phase as the
134chief groups performing key political roles. As previously
mentioned in the last period of the Ottoman empire mainly three
problems were raised: finding an appropriate national identity,
determining a viable political structure and resolving the
issue of modernization. These were solved altogether with the
establishment of the Republic. The national identity was
conceived as Anatolian Turkish, the political structure was
accepted as republican secular and democratic, and the
commitment to modernization at least for the elites was 
135
realized.
The state, not civil society, maintained its higher
position in political culture. The political culture of that
time was described by Arnold Toynbee in the following manner:
"The political idea on which the Turkish state is constructed
derives from a conception of a nationally homogeneous,
administratively centralized, absolutely sovereign state which
must be served by its citizen as a Jealous God intolerant of136
variety and autonomy in any form." It was the essential part
of the elites' mentality that the state came first then came
society and society was to follow the path of state elites.
Despite their success in changing bureaucratic and
administrative institutions the leaders of the Republic were,
in fact, the successor of the Ottoman imperial bureaucratic 
137
tradition. The ideal of the supremacy of the state was
138
similar to the values of state tradition in Ottoman empire.
125
The Turkish revolution always remained as a political
rather than a social revolution; it did not produce a
139horizontal line among different identifiable interests. As
soon as the revolution succeeded Republican leaders began to
move against the religious institutions, which were widely
diffused throughout society. Religion began to be gradually
replaced by Kemalism, the outstanding ideology of the early
years of the Republic. Popular Islam lost the whole of its
institutional foundations through the banning of the tarikats
(Islamic brotherhood), the closing down of secret tombs, and
the prescription of traditional dress. Secularism was taken as
the major project of the new state. But as Cağlar Keyder put
it secularism "came to signify the political control over the
religious life by the bureaucrats, rather than the separation140
of church and state, as the term usually implies." Religion,
thus, as one of the chief elements of civil society, came under
the control of the state. Reforms concerning woman issue were
taken as an important attempt to replace religion. The main
project of the new government was to create a fundamental break
from the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and direct the nation toward
the aims displayed as if to "reach to the level of the
contemporary civilization". New regulations concerning women's
rights were taken as a symbol of being Westernized and as an
141
indicator of a radical break from the traditional life. 
Gole argues that women were taken by Kemalists as an agent to 
reach to the Western civilization. Her argument is worded in 
the following terms:
126
with the purpose to change the civilization
Kemalists made women gain a 'social visibility'. In
other words, women's participation into the public
life and their appearance in social life signified
the replacement of the civilization. Women's
separation from their domestic life and the
abolition of the previous sexual boundaries meant
that the life which was regulated by Islam began to
142come under the influence of the Western values.
It is evident that the newly established states make
reforms concerning woman's rights in order to take a place in
the international platform as well as to achieve a break from
the old traditions. It is a common attitude in the Third World
Countries that the individual rights and the rights of social
groups are substantially given by the state with the aim to
remove social groups from their ethnic, social, or sexual
communities and direct their attention towards the ideal of143
"common interests."
The Kemalist woman's identity was composed, in general, as
a synthesis of the ideas of the Westernizer and Turkist
thinkers. The basic tenets of that identity was laid down
specifically by Ziya Gokalp, the ideologist of the newly
established Republican Turkey, as "educated-professional" 
144
woman. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic,
127
pronounced that women should have equal rights with men in
every respects. He declared that they should include Turkish
women as a component of their struggle during the early years
of the Republic. Atatürk proclaimed that "there are more
honorable paths for us to follow. We have to take the great
Turkish woman and walk with her in the social, moral, economic145
and scientific fields." But later, he paid attention to the 
issue particularly in the line that women would constitute a 
great contribution to the development of the country:
Is it possible that one half of the nation can be
developed and the other half neglected if we are to
have a truly developed country? Is it possible that
one half of the nation can be uplifted while the
other half remains on the ground? No doubt, as I
said, the development steps follow the equality of
the two sexes in the development and in the 
146
renovation.
The central message of this passage is clearly that woman 
should be given equal rights for the purpose of developing the 
country. It was thought that women would constitute the needed 
potential for the development of the country, projected by the 
revolution with a different set of symbolic resemblances.
Women, in fact, were seen as the most important element for
achieving this aim. Therefore, the revolution was immediately 
regarded as being the main supporter of women, therefore new 
regulations were enacted within this new political strategy.
128
3.4.1, Reforms Related to Woman Issue
With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish women
gained rights mainly in two areas: new rights coming with the
adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and women's being enfranchised
and allowed to stand as candidates . Following the abolishment
of the caliphate on March 3, 1924, the Swiss Civil Code was
immediately accepted by the government in February 17, 1926 as
the most suitable sort of bill tor the secularism as well as
the transformation of Turkey into a modern social system. The
adoption of this Civil Code was for Atatürk and his supporters
"a symbol to the world that the new Turkey was adamant about147
'reaching the level of contemporary civilization'." This was
beneficiary mostly for the elite to indicate to the West that
replacement of the Islamic legal system with a Western one
thereby Turkey's transfer to a new civilization. Being
Westernized was not only symbolized with the attribution of new
rights to women but also with changes in the dress of men. It
was even before the adoption of the Civil Code (in 1925) that
Turkish men were obliged to wear hats on their heads. The
reason for this was explained in the following terms: "In
fact, the hat is virtually not so important, but it has a
special importance for Turkey which idealizes to enter the
148
family of contemporary societies." This rule indicates more 
thoroughly the importance of dress for the rulers as a symbolic 
instrument during the earlier years of the Republican period.
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The new rights given to women through the adoption of
the Civil Code might be summed up as the following: the
polygamy was abolished, the women also gained the right to
divorce, they were given the right of equal inheritance with
men, the age of marriage was set at 18 for men and 14 for
women, the wedding was legalized by the state by an official
who presided over marriage contract and woman was given equal149
right with man in court.
Indeed, some of these rights were already obtained by the 
Turkish women through previous regulations during the Ottoman 
time, in the areas like the age of marriage, equal share of 
inheritance and the state control over marriage. The most 
important characteristic of the Civil Code was in its principle 
that of preventing polygamy, assessing woman as equal to man in 
court and giving her the right to apply to the court to obtain 
a divorce.
The Civil Code, in fact, did not create an absolute
equality between man and woman in the family. The following
articles are still disadvantageous to woman: the husband alone
is entitled to choose a domicile and the wife must follow him
(Art.152.II). The wife is stated as responsible for the family
150
and for the care of children (Art.153/2). The husband is the 
head of the family and he represents the marital union 
(Art.154). If the wife wants to assume profession or work 
outside the household she must obtain her husband's approval 
(Art.155). In the case of a conflict between spouses the
130
children are left to the father (Art.160. II). The wife is
required to participate in the expense of the household by
contributing financially or by assuming tasks in the household 
151
(Art.190).
The most revealing message of the Civil Code was to see
woman as a wife and a housewife. Indeed, the Swiss Civil Code
was too far from the reality of the Turkish society then as it
did not properly solve the problems of Turkish women. On the
contrary, it contradicted with some rights previously given to 
152women. One should remember that women were, for a long time,
politically in a secondary position in Switzerland. They were153
given the right to vote as later as 1973. Even nowadays in
Swiss cantons women have no right to vote, only men can
154participate in the voting in relating to the local issues.
One should appreciate that a regulation borrowed from a country 
like that would not be accounted as democratic in essence nor 
would it create equal conditions between men and women.
Inequality for women remains also in the Turkish Penal
Code. When a prostitute is raped and kidnaped a sentence is
applied which reduces the penalty by two-thirds (Art.138).
Moreover, for a married man to be legally charged with
adultery he must be caught in his own home. However, for a
woman to be charged with adultery she can be caught 
155
anywhere.
Another important right given by Republican leaders to the
131
Turkish women was the right to be enfranchised and being
allowed to stay as candidates. They were given this right
locally with the approval of the Local Government Law in the
parliament in 1930, which assumed only being Turkish was enough
156for voting and being voted for at the local level. Some
years later (in 1934) women were given the right to vote and
157to stand as a candidate in the general elections. In the
following election of 1930 18 women, amounting to 4,5 percent,
were elected to the parliament. The Prime Minister Ismet Inonu
stressed the importance of this right as follows: "The
paramount characteristics of our revolution is hidden in our
attempt endowing a high status to women and accepting their
rights... Whenever the Turkish revolution is mentioned it will
be regarded as being identical with the revolution of women's 
158
emancipation."
Women's rights according to the ideologists of Kemalisra
also included feminism or womanism. Then, there was no need for
159
another agent to emphasize woman issue. This is why many
women articulate the view that the Republican leaders (during
160
the 1930s) represented the voice of a state feminism. State
feminism means nothing more than the "result of negotiations
and 'contracts' between the state and women; it represents the
161
result of an alliance between women and the state." However, 
there was no natural negotiation between state and women on 
behalf of women. Women were, in reverse, taken as an instrument 
which enabled the government to reach the aims put forward by 
the state elite. Despite the fact that the upshot of the
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reforms was beneficial mostly to women it was also beneficial
to the state elites. Another point taken by those who
attributed Turkish reforms as state feminism is that time that
women were enfranchised in Turkey. It is also argued that
Turkish women were enfranchised so early that many European162
countries did not give their women such a right. However, it
becomes increasingly clear that this is not true. Women in
many European countries were given this right earlier than
Turkey except for France and Italy; already in the last one
there was a fascist government in power. Even in several non-
Western countries the voting right was given to women before
1935. Needles to say 1935 was not an early time for Turkish
women when the existence of the previous Turkish indigenous
163feminism is taken into consideration.
Indeed, Republican leaders sought to demonstrate that
they were democratic with women's enfranchisement. As Sirin
Tekeli argues, at the beginning of the 1930s the Republican
People's Party was the single party in power. Critics of that
regime both from within and from abroad were accusing Atatürk
of becoming a "dictator." Moreover, at that time fascist
parties were coming to power in Europe. Therefore, it was
possible through women's enfranchisement to indicate to the
European countries that the Turkish single party regime was
164
typically a democratic regime. This is why "women's
political rights played an important symbolic role. They 
symbolized the fact that the Turkish Republic was a democratic 
regime, or at least, one that was evolving in that
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direction.” One further fact, in that respect, is that two 
different revolutions in the world were previously experienced: 
the French revolution of the peasants and the Bolshevik 
revolution of the working class. Both were devoted to social 
classes. The Turkish Revolution, on the other hand, was the 
revolution from upside of mainly the military elite and 
intellectual-bureaucrats. Therefore, there was a substantial 
need to take the support of a social class in order to survive 
the revolution. It was not possible to take the support of the 
working class because of the absence of a powerful working 
class which was able to undertake a revolution. Moreover, 
Turkish politicians were anxious to remove themselves from 
being represented as a revolution of the working class. The 
peasants were also not suitable to undertake the revolution 
since the Kemalists attributed the Turkish peasant as ignorant 
and a section which needed to be educated through the 
principles of the revolution.
Women were the proper social section for Kemalists to 
undertake the revolution for two reasons: they were firstly, 
the chief opposite group to the previous goveirnment (because of 
their seclusion from society for centuries) and secondly, they 
were politically and organizationally (inherited from their 
previous experiences) the group of most conscious of their own 
rights and interests. Perhaps this is the most plausible reason 
why the Kemalists sought to entrust the revolution to women; 
indeed, women have, since then, been the most loyal group to
165
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the Kemalist principles. One should explicitly remember that it 
is the most important characteristic of newly established 
governments, immediately after a revolution, to suppress all 
possible centers of opposition based on either communal, 
religious, ethnic, or sexual emotions. By giving women new 
rights the Turkish government broke women's resistance on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, strengthened the control of 
the state upon society.
3.4.2. Women's Struggle For the Vote
At the beginning of the Republican regime some women
defined the enfranchisement right as the central focus of their
struggle just as it was in some European societies. This active
role of women was always ignored by the analysts of the time,
in particular, by the female generation which had loyalty to166
the Kemalist principles. Women, in fact, were so active in
Turkish politics during the early years of the Republic that
they helped to establish the first political party in
Republican Turkey. Those women who were the active participant
of the first feminist movement during the Meşrutiyet period
came together immediately after the War of Independence and
established the "Kadinlar Halk Firkasi'* (Women's People Party)
on June 16, 1923. It aimed to "struggle for women's rights in
social, economic and political fields and motivate women to be
167
conscious of these rights." But the party was officially not 
permitted. Therefore, the members of the party prepared a new.
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relatively moderate, regulation to found an union substituting
for the party. Thus, they, established the "Turk Kadinlar
168Birliği" (Union of Turkish Women) on February 7, 1924.
Nezihe Muhittin, the founder of the Party and the new chairman
of the Union, attacked the government for women's being refused
the right to vote in the following terms: "Is it possible that
a right given to those men who spend their time crazily in the
corner of the coffee-houses be denied to women having a true
169self-consciousness and having been perfectly educated?" The
demand for the enfranchisement right was strongly emphasized by 
association through meetings, congresses and panels.
The Union of Turkish Women held a congress in Istanbul in
March 1927, in order to make a radical change in its regulation
with the aim of giving more emphasis on the right to vote. The
chairman of the Union pronounced a radical speech in congress:
"Revolutions are created through struggles and efforts. We too
will struggle from election to election up to the day we gain
our rights like every citizens. Laws should be adopted to the
170
requirements of the existing conditions." The members of the 
Union sent a message to the parliament that they require the 
right to vote but the parliament rejected their demand. The 
decision of the parliament was strongly protested by the Union 
through the following statement:
We will never renounce our ideal to get the vote. If 
we renounce this there will be no true reason why 
our union exists. We will study for the victory of
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our claim for the rest of our lives. If our life is
not enough for that we will at least have changed
the present conditions for the coming 171generations.
The Union's demand was attributed to be radical and was
criticized strongly by the press. According to Cumhuriyet, the
prominent newspaper representing the official ideology, the
Union's demand was so extreme that it would never be accepted.
The demands of the Union disturbed both the government and the
press. Therefore, a relatively moderate group was supported by
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the government to come to power in the Union. The new
leaders of the Union also maintained their work for the vote
but unlike the previous leaders through face to face contact
with the government, iffet H. Oruz, one of the leaders of the
Union, said that they visited Atatürk in 1930 and wanted him to
give women the enfranchisement right. But Atatürk advised them
to educate the peasant women. Atatürk told them that the
village men are educated when they come to the military,
however, the government cannot reach the, village women.
Therefore, duty of such voluntarily established unions should
173
be to carry out that burden. This indicates that the
Republican leaders did not want to give women the right to vote 
at least until 1930.
The actions of the Union of Turkish Women influenced other 
existing association to demand this right. The prominent 
association of the time was the "Turk Ocaklari" (Turkish
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Hearts), which had various branches in different cities.
Süreyya Hulusi, a member of the Trabzon Branch of the Turkish
Heart Club, denounced in a conference held in 1926 in Trabzon
that they require the enfranchisement rights for women. She
argued that "everyone agrees that women are second to none in
patriotism. So why should they be ignored when the government174
and the future of our country is concerned?" Affet inan,
one of the prominent women of the Republican regime, also 
advocated the issue through various conferences she held. She 
announced in a conference held in Turkish Hearts in 1930 that 
they should immediately be given this right:
Women can feel themselves free only on the occasion
when they are given their political rights. This is
also a basic principle of democracy. Turkish women,
in fact, have deserved the enfranchisement right for
a long time; but it was not expected from a
monarchist government to entitle that right. we
hope that it would not take too much longer for
women to be given this right by the honorable
175,
democratic Republican Turkey.
A march by women for enfranchisement right in 1934 was 
reported by Burhan Göksel. He said that in 1934 a large number 
of leading women meet at the Ankara Branch of the Turkish Heart 
and held various impassioned speeches. After this meeting they 
marched to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. When Atatürk 
heard their slogans and learned about their demands he agreed
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that the women were right. Immediately after that demonstration
Atatürk recommended to his close friends to make a study on a
bill concerning the voting system; thus, one year later women176
were given the enfranchisement right.
In 1935, when women gained the right of vote some leaders
of the Union of Turkish Women decided to abolish the union
because they thought that there was no further need for its
existence. However, others opposed it and tried to demand
further rights. An international congress was organized by the
Union in Istanbul on April 18, 1935. About 40 countries were177
represented in the congress. Two different groups came 
against each other during this congress: those who were in 
sympathy to the Kemalist principles and who came to the 
congress to abolish the Union and make women devote their 
energy to the Kemalist principles, and those who found the 
given rights less satisfactory and demanded further rights. 
Since the former group was attractive to the government it 
gained official support. Just during this time the "Halk Ev­
leri" (People's Houses) were established by the government to 
undertake the Kemalist reforms known as republicanism, secular­
ism, populism, nationalism, reformism, and statism. The
Kemalist leaders advised women to go under the banner of 
People's Houses and to devote their energy to the defense of 
the Kemalist principles. They advised women that "there should 
not be any more need to such issues of men and women, there
should only be a tendency towards reforms, you should come to
178the People's Houses and undertake the Republican reforms."
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The majority of the leaders of the Union decided to abolish the
union and to follow their male fellows' advice. Thus the Union
was abolished and women in favor of Kemalist principles began
to serve Kemalism. Oruz, an extreme exponent of that idea
stated her feelings later in the following terms: "The
People's Houses were established. There men and women would
hold together the social and cultural issues and then we would
179go hand in hand follow our beloved Ataturk's way." Thus an 
opposition and a potential element of civil society was 
destroyed, from then on only Kemalist principles have remained 
and have constituted the chief element of the official 
ideology.
From 1935 onwards women carried out the services of the
new regime through new missions given to them by the state
elite. While the Ottoman debates constituted women primarily as
wives and mothers in need of an education, the Republican
debates on women issue constituted them as patriotic citizens.
The new patriotic woman was still a wife and a mother but also
she had another mission, that of educating the nation. In fact,
the "muallime hanimlar" (teacher ladies), as the most
privileged group of the time, became an important symbol for180
the Turkish Republic. The privilege was given primarily to 
professional women particularly to women teachers. The female 
students in schools were the most privileged group since they 
were the coming teachers of the Republican regime. A woman of 
the first generation, Hamide Topcuoglu, offered her notions as 
follows:
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We were really 'privileged' and had an extra
prestige as female students. All elder men showed
us so much extreme esteem that they had never shown
to the male students. We were the genuine pioneers
of the Republic which aimed at encouraging women's
participation into the public life with a full and a181
free competency and personality."
She maintains that they were not differentiated as men or
women rather together they carried out the burden of the
Republic. Gaining a profession v/as not only the aim to earning
their living but also for the aim to carry out a mission, that
is to serve the goals of the Republic. She says that "being
employed, and gaining a profession was not just for getting
182
bread rather it was for serving the country." Women
contributed to the new nation also to advance its economy.
During the 1930s the government motivated citizens to use only
national products. Women took the burden in that respect and
motivated citizens toward that aim through seminars, panels and 
183conferences. One should remember that the genuine
beneficiaries of the Republican time were a minor group, the 
previously educated women the metropolitan centers. The rest 
of the women particularly those living in the rural areas even 
until 1980s have not been beneficiaries of these rights.
From the 1930s to 1950 the nation was taken as a cohesive 
unity through bureaucracy. Then, at that time, no burden was 
loaded onto the social groups and no particular interest was
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allowed; the state institutions were taken as the center of all
institutions. As an extension that project during the years
1930-1946 a variety of direct and indirect efforts were spent
by the government to "tutor" the nation towards the goals
formulated by the state elite, the modernization if mentioned.
Atatürk said that "I will lead my people by the hand until
their feet are sure and then they know the way. Then they can184
choose for themselves [and] then my work will be done." His
basic aim was to create a modern and democratic society.
However, after his death (in 1938) the state elite took
Ataturkian thought as a closed system of thought and saw
themselves as the only guardians of the ideology in
185question. The goals put by Atatürk himself, as reaching to
the level of the contemporary civilization, were changed in a 
different direction. While Atatürk pointed to the need to rise 
to the level of contemporary civilizations and pointed to the 
West as being its most advanced end, the West was taken as a 
model to be imitated without qualification by the state elite. 
In short. The attempts of the state elite came to be completely 
departed from the reality of the society after Atatürk's death. 
An ideal society was formulated in the state elite's mind; from 
then onwards women have been taken as the chief agent of that 
ideal.
3.5. WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE POST-1950
The period 1950-1980 promised, in Turkish politics, a 
shift in the center of power holding. The center of power
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shifted to the political parties from its traditional usage in 
the hand of state elite. The emergence of the Demokrat Parti 
(Democratic Party) with the support of various social groups 
created a challenge to the traditional position of the state 
elite. Moreover, a variety of social groups with interest of 
their own came to play a significant role in Turkish politics. 
The politics of that period changed the conditions of Turkish 
women. They gained a greater extent of improvement in their 
social and educational conditions on the one hand, and lost 
their previous symbolic role in politics and thus numbered 
gradually less in politics, on the other hand. The following 
part analyzes the role of social groups and that of women in 
Turkish politics in period betv/een 1950-1980.
3.5.1. Politics of Social Groups
Turkey realized a transition to the multi-party politics
in the late 1940s. With the election of 1950 the earlier
bureaucratic-intellectual cadre of the Republican People's
Party was replaced by a new political elite of the Democratic
Party which was supported by business groups, local notables186
and liberal intellectuals. The Democratic Party reflected
the anger of various groups, either economic or ideological, to
the center. Even the illegal Communist Party actively supported
187
the Democratic Party in the 1950 election. It received 53
percent of the vote and 408 of 487 seats and thus, governed
188
the country until 1960. The Democratic party represented
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those groups whose direct influence in the government had been 
negligible until 1950, such as religious groups, business 
groups, landowners, peasants and workers. Since the Democratic 
Party opened a new phase in Turkish politics a great attention
has been paid to it through the studies of Turkish political
189science. After 1950 the political elite came to substitute a 
"party-centered" polity for a "state-centered" polity. A party- 
centered polity refers, as put brilliantly by Heper, to "a
party system functioning largely autonomously from social
190groups." The political elite of the Democratic Party were
autonomous to the social groups and constituted a bridge 
between social groups and the traditional state elite through 
representing the interest of the former group in front of the 
latter. The Democratic Party appropriated the fundamental 
populist themes in defense of a platform of economic incorpora­
tion of the peasantry. Populism as such, was a major factor 
fascinating the political history of the 1950-1980 period. In­
deed, it was used as an outstanding means by which the 
political elite contacted with the people in Turkey, a country
with no genuine political impact of social groups on political
191
parties. The Democratic Party was dismissed from politics by
192the military elite by a coup in 1960. But some years later 
the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party), the follower of the 
Democratic Party, came to power, thus, Turkish politics after 
1960 experienced once more the populist discourse.
The liberal politics created by the Democratic Party led
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to the emergence of a large number of social groups having
interest of their own. The Turkish society after 1950 was
constituted not as a harmonious whole held together by common
values, as Ottoman and the early period of Republic, but one193
that had its share of a relative conflict. As it is pointed
out by Kemal Karpat the statist and economic groups with
different cultural backgrounds determined Turkey's politics
after 1950 and especially after I960. The statist group was
composed of mainly the military, the intellectual and the
bureaucratic elites, performed the traditional symbolic role
of modernity. However, the economic groups which composed most
of the commercial, agrarian, entrepreneurial and labor groups
194were strongly in favor of a more liberal social environment.
The Conservative and the religious groups also played a
significant role in Turkish politics in the post-1950 period.
The two pillars of the opposition platform were, in fact, the
economic and the religious freedoms, which upheld the market
against the statist intervention and the local traditions over
195
the political and ideological oppression of the center. Fur­
thermore, there existed a great number of voluntary 
associations. While numbering 1,300 in 1946, they increased
tremendously to reach to 37,806 in 1968, under the impact of
196
the multi-party politics. Besides, with the passage of the 
Trade Unions Act of 1947, the workers gained the right to 
unionize without realizing any strike. Under that condition 
they could not flourish well, at least, until 1970. They were 
given the right of strike after I960, but they could not act as 
they saw necessary. Strikes, however, continued to be illegal.
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unions were frequently closed down and their leaders jailed
whenever they were suspected of putting the economic interests
of the workers above the national interest. Despite these
restrictions the unions constituted another group rooted in
197
society after 1950.
Social groups also developed on ideological sentiments in
Turkey after 1950. The ideological discussions in Turkey after
1950, especially after 1960, fall into two distinctive
categories: the nationalism and socialism. The new nationalism
realized a significant break from the secular nationalist
philosophy of the early Republic, which was importantly alien
198
to its folk culture. Through nationalism after 1950, the
superiority of the nation, the territory and the state over
the individual was emphasized. It also drew considerable
strength from the glories of Turkish history and collaborated
199
some religious sentiments into these notions. However, the
leftist grovxps took the place of early modernizing elite
through similar discourses, values and symbols. The Turkish
left between 1950-1980 by emphasizing secularism created a new
Version of the state ideology known to reach the level of
200
contemporary civilization.
Despite all these developments, social group politics 
Were generally characterized by regulation from above. If 
mentioned with Heper's term, "the state in Turkey has placed 
emphasis on rule from above; keeping civil societal elements at
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bay has not been a major issue; no need has been felt to let
civil societal elements participate in government; the state
has not felt itself obliged to be responsive to civil
201society.·’ Indeed, the public needs were not created directly
through the balancing and aggregation of the interests of
social groups. When the rulers, governmental leaders and public
officials claimed to act as the re-formulators or carriers of
the public norms and values, they were taken as constituting
the locus of the state. Thus social groups in Turkey between
1950-1980, remained in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the
state elite. Their vertical ties with the state did not allow
them to develop wider universal values, which would substitute
for the state ideology rather they became satellites of
202
political parties.
In short, after 1950 one can see an obvious increase in 
social groups, on the one hand and the maintenance of the 
traditional state elite, on the other hand. Between the two 
pillars were the political parties, which represented the 
interests of the former against the latter group. The 
distinctive characteristics of the period from 1950 until 1980 
Was that of the political parties' grasping the center of power 
in Turkish politics.
3.5.2. The Condition of Women in Post-1950 Turkey
With the beginning of the Republic women received a place
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in every field of social life, in particular a wider place in
the economic and cultural life. One can see Turkish women in
banking, in the universities, in parliament, in schools and in
private business. With the enactment of the Unification of
Education Act of 1924, female students began to gain education203
together with male students. This brought a drastic change
in the education of women. In 1927 only 4.7 percent of Turkish204
women were literate, while men were 17.4%. When coming to
1985 this percentage increased tremendously to 68% for women
205and 86% for men. During the 1986-1987 educational term the
percentage of female students in primary schools was 47%, in
secondary schools 35% and in high schools 43%, while that of
206male students were successively 53%, 65% and 57%. Besides,
in the 1987-1988 term the percentage of female students in
207
university was 32% and in graduate programs was 35%. These
data, in fact, indicate a radical change in the condition of 
Women in education.
Turkish women have succeeded a substantial shift also in
the labor force participation during the Republic. In 1985 the
percentage of women in agriculture was 53%, in industry 23% and
in services was 8%. The percentage of men was successively
208
46%, 87% and 92%. 32 percent of women aged 12 and over,
are economically active, against 68 percent of the male
population. But, about 85% of women are still employed in 
209agriculture. These numbers seem relatively less when
compared with the number of men, but one should remember that 
it is a great success for Turkish women when their old status
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is taken into consideration.
It is clear that Turkish women have gained success in
economy and education, but one needs to admit that there are
other areas that the modernization process did not bring a
considerable change in their traditional status. Two faces of
modernization seen in Turkey are that a small number of women
(as a symbol of the Republic) entered freely to education and
labor, while the rest of the women maintained their traditional
roles and still are unconscious of their rights. It is truly
argued by Deniz Kandiyoti that Turkish women with the reforms
applied during the Republican period have been emancipated but
have not been liberated. Despite the secular reforms of the
Turkish Republic, women in Turkish society, she maintains, have
been under the control of cultural habits, therefore they
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could not be liberated. Further, Carol Delaney has
thoroughly observed that woman in the Turkish culture
represents the values and sentiments close to nature while man
is taken as the symbol of culture. This, according to Delaney,
211
leads man's values to surround and control that of woman.
Perhaps this is the reason why Turkish women at work 
occupy mostly those jobs that are the extension of the 
housewife and mothering in the public life. Oya Ciftci has 
perceptively observed that in 1976, 70% of women in public life 
^ere employed in only three sectors: health, education and 
communication. About 39% of women were employed in education,
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but 75% of these were primary school teachers. Moreover,
Mubeccel Kiray has recorded that 80% of employed women in
Turkey work because of their economic needs, otherwise, they213
wish to leave their jobs.
The Republican women have gained the appearance of
"asexual" or "men-like" woman in public life. Since "...the
honor of man, in Turkish culture, is associated to the behavior
of woman, only by being eroded from their sexuality could214
women succeed to enter public life." In short, despite the
fact that women entered public life during the Republican 
period they never realized a fundamental break from the values 
culturally attributed to women.
Turkish women have indeed been faced with several
problems under the influence of the modernization of Turkey.
Rapid migration to cities after 1950 created a new female
identity, which Tekeli calls the Gecekondu kadini (Slum Woman).
Hence the difficulty of life conditions in urban life they have
to work, but not enough position in industry caused them to
work in the houses of the middle class working women. This
brings, according to Tekeli, the "exploitation of woman by 
215
Woman." Moreover, in urban life the working women have been
employed mainly in unorganized jobs. Their absence in the
Membership of organizations, particularly the unions has
216
brought women's labor to be exploited by businessmen. 
Furthermore, Cigdem Kagitcibasi has observed that deeply
remaining social tradition in the unconscious mind of women in
212
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the urban context creates a forin of identity and value crises.
Incompatibility with modernity results, in the urban context,
217in a negative notion of their being autonomous.
A further negative impact of modernization during the
Republican period was experienced in the lifestyle of the
rural women. The attempts of the Turkish governments to claim
the Turkish language as the unique official language has led a
large number of non Turkish speaking rural women to dissociate
themselves from the modern institutions. Therefore, most of
these women maintained their traditional roles, which, at the
218
last analysis, brought about their dependency on men. In
addition, the modernization of agriculture in the post-1950
Turkey caused women to leave their land because of the
presence of a large number of tractors. This caused women to
return to their home where their traditional roles are
219strengthened.
Besides, modernization has also created a negative impact 
on Turkish women through the media, which has caused women to 
be perceived as a commodity. First of all, women as the basic 
element of the family have become the basic element of
consumption and this has been seen to be the basic subject of
advertisement. In particular, the fashion and the cosmetic 
sectors use women's sexuality as an instrument to reach the 
consumer as well as to make women the basic purchasers of their 
products. Furthermore, women's being seen as the central figure
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of sexuality brought about the einercfence of a large number of 
220prostitutes. As can be seen, women's being removed from
their traditional roles results in happiness, but not for all 
women. Instead, modernization has created a more vigorous face 
of male control over the life of some Turkish women.
Still another tension coming with modernization is felt by
veiled women. Feride Acar has observed that the contradiction
of the patriarchal family life with the role imposed upon women
in the public life, has caused some women to turn back to
Islam and to the veil. According to Acar the virtue of
secularism and of the republic reached only a limited number
of women. The rest of the women stayed between two different
roles: the domestic and public roles. The upshot is that women
have turned to Islam since they cannot overcome the problems
221
they face in public life. In terms of our analysis it is 
important to pay attention to the exclusion of veiled religious 
women from the public life by the exponents of the official 
ideology. The exclusion process of the short-dressed women of 
the Ottoman women now turned against the veiled women. Women 
previously were prohibited from public life since they was 
thought as blessed, however, veiled women, are now dismissed 
from public life since they are thought as ideological. It is 
evident that there is a considerable tendency among educated 
Turkish women toward veil, if it remains so and if they are not 
permitted officially to articulate into the public life, then 
it comes to the mind whether or not modernization efforts of 
the Turkish Republic truly serves for all women?
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Turkish women have been successively given less importance 
in politics and they have gradually lost their significance in 
being a symbol of the republican regime. As soon as Turkey 
became a multi-party democracy, after 1950, the previous 
symbolic role played by women deputies lost its significance. 
Tekeli argues that the evolution of the regime into a multi­
party system meant two things for women: first the woman
candidates lost the privilege of being elected quasi- 
automatically, which they enjoyed under one party rule,
second, the competition between parties for more seats in the
222
parliament tended to be a disadvantage for women. In the
last election of 1991 only 6 v/omen deputies entered the
parliament, in fact, very little comparing with the 1935223
election when women gained 18 seats. Another reason why
women have been far from politics is hidden in the fact that 
the Turkish parliament in the last decades has shifted towards 
a more vigorous figure. That is, women having the values of 
kindness, love and emotion could not adapt to a parliament 
which figured as an area of strong conflicts among the 
deputies of different parties.
From 1950 to 1980, Turkish women have devoted their energy 
mainly for two ideologies: Kemalism and the Turkish left.
After 1950 a variety of associations were founded by Turkish 
women mainly to preserve the rights given them by Atatürk as 
well as to struggle for Kemalist principles. One of the first
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associations founded with that purpose was the Union of Turkish
Women (which struggled for the vote two decades ago) but this
time was re-established by Kemalist women in 1949 with the
purpose under question. The Union struggled against
traditional dress of women and motivated women towards a modern
dress. It even distributed various fashioned clothes to women
in poor districts of major cities in order to remove the
224traditional dress. Another association with the similar aim 
was founded in the name of the "Meslek Kadinlari Derneği" 
(Association of Professional VJomen) , in Istanbul in 1948 and
later organized in other c.ities. It also tried to preserve the225rights given to women by Atatürk. When coming to thel970s
there existed 27 such associations aiming to advance women in 
different areas parallel to the principle to develop the 
country. Almost all these were very strong in loyalty to the 
Kemalist principles whose basic aim was to bring the country to 
the level of a contemporary civilization. The following passage 
denounced by Türkan Aksu, one of the leaders of the 
"Association of Turkish Mothers", is a most prominent example:
All of our successes are realized through the rights
given by our beloved Atatürk under a democratic and
republican regime. Our basic aim is to reach our
nation to the level of a contemporary civilization
under the light of his principles and introduce a
226
more happy and powerful Turkey to the world.
These associations came to organize under the "Federation
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of Women Associations" in 1976 after the denouncement of the 
Women's Decade including the time between 1975-1985 as
announced by the United Nations. This Federation organized the
227studies of all associations founded with the above purpose. 
Indeed, they have devoted women's energy to the defense of 
Kemalist principles rather than to develop interests particular 
to women.
The proclamation of the Women's Decade by the United 
Nations motivated also the leftist groups to pay more attention 
to woman issue in Turkey. Particularly working women were 
taken at stake by leftist groups in order to take their support 
in creating a socialist revolution. It was written in a leftist 
magazine that "what falls to the working women is to organize
not as women but as proletarian, not as female competitors of
228
their laborer husbands but as their struggling fellow."
Fatmagul Berktay argues that during the 1970s the leftist
groups wanted to control women since they thought that women
were naturally more closer to the capitalist's aims which were
known to mobilize women to be extreme consumers. Therefore,
she maintains, a sexless image of woman was formulated by the
leftist through the discourse of the "sisterhood". Sisterhood,
in the last analysis, meant, according to Berktay male control
229
over the working women.
Leftist groups organized women in different women's 
associations. Turkish communist party founded the "ilerici 
Kadinlar Derneği" (Progressive Women's Society) in 1975 to
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mobilize women, in particular v/orking women, towards their aim
which was hidden in the guise of establishing a socialist
society. The Society, for the first time in Turkish history,
celebrated the "International Women's Day" on March 8, 1976. It
was the most significant association during the 1970s which
mobilized a large number of Turkish women. In 1976, the Society
began a campaign throughout the country to force government,
businessmen and local governments to open nurseries for
working women. Its campaign was followed by various actions and
230about 50,000 petitions in the country. It published a
magazine the "Kadinlarin Sesi" (Voice of Women) which was
circulated (about 30 thousands) up to the 1980 military
intervention. The ilerici Kadinlar Derneği had 33 branches and
35 representative agents in different cities of Turkey with231
around 20,000 members. The basic slogan of the Society was
"equality, social progress and peace" was emphasized regularly
in its magazine. The Society organized a large number of
meetings, demonstrations and campaigns particularly against
fascism until 1979, the date at which it was closed down by the 
232government. Another leftist association of the 1970s was
the Ankara Association of Women, it later became the Federation
of Revolutionist Women's Associations. It also began a series
of campaigns and demonstrations against fascism. This
association concentrated, in particular, on the women of slum
areas and opened courses to make women literate and thus find
233
supporters for their conflict. In short, the leftist groups 
saw women as a component of their struggle and combined woman
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issue in the struggle for the socialist revolution. Women, too, 
accepted that role, and had no issue particular to themselves 
and therefore, perceived themselves as proletarian rather than 
women; being women in fact came later for them.
In conclusion, women constituted the first genuine civil 
societal element from the second half of the nineteenth century 
onwards until 1935. During that period they both struggled for 
the rights particular only to their conditions and created a 
different set of values, as alternatives to the ones developed 
by the existing government. Particularly beginning from 1908 
onwards women had occupied the central focus of Turkish 
political context and organized politically until they were 
given the right of enfranchisement. But once they were given 
this right the government succeeded immediately to direct 
women's energy to the defense of Kemalist principles. Beginning 
from 1935 to 1980 the women devoted their energy either to the 
official ideology or to the aims operated by the left, but 
never stressed on rights particular to their own interest. 
This period, therefore, is the time that Turkish women lost 
their potentiality of being an element of the civil society and 
of being smothered by the state elite. Beginning from 1980 
onwards a new phase has been opened in Turkish politics. Civil 
societal elements once come to play a role in political 
context. Women in particular again started to occupy the 
central focus of the Turkish political context. This argument 
is the central focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND FEMINISM IN POST-1980 
TURKISH POLITICS
The chief aim of this chapter is to analyze the condition 
of the civil society in post-1980 Turkey together with the 
special role of feminism as a central element of the Turkish 
civil society. It questions how a shift has been accomplished 
in Turkish politics after 1980 and brings to light the 
contributions feminism, as a social as well as a political 
movement embracing issues against the official ideology, has 
provided for this shift. The point of departure is that Turkish 
politics has undergone a substantial change since 1980 and 
feminism has a special role in this change on the basis of the 
values it produced as opposed to the cultural norms provided 
through the official institutions. The discourses raised 
through feminist women's actions have diversified the 
universal norms of Turkish political culture. Such issues in 
particular as being different and autonomous in the public 
life function to make a contribution to the development of a 
particular voice which constitutes a crucial element of civil 
society. This argument will be analyzed in detail in the 
following parts.
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4.1. A NEW PACE PROMISING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN TURKISH POLITICS
The 1980s promised to be a turning point for civil society 
in Turkey. After 1980 the release of the civil societal 
elements from the grip of the center became more pronounced. 
Their autonomization was based first, on new trends emerging 
in the Turkish politics; and second, on the emergence of more 
autonomous social groups proclaiming values different from 
those formulated by the state elites. This part will analyze 
this bifurcational development in Turkey.
4.1.1. New Trends in Turkish Politics After the 1980s
In Turkey of the 1980s the traditional structure of the
state was transformed. The most striking aspect of this change
was reflected in the change and attitudes to the paternal state
(the father state). The state "lost some of its respectful
image and was now being seen as the instrument of different and
1competing interests." This resulted with the fact that the 
concepts along the state and societal relations came to gain 
definite meaning and the role on the part of the state elite or 
the political elite is defined once, more clearly. Security 
issues, in general, were carried out by the state elite while 
the economic issues were under the control of political elite.
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The post 1980 state elite (now represented mainly by the
president and the military hierarchy) came up with a narrow
definition of responsibility, which based on the
responsibility for the internal as well as the external
2
security of the country. The 1982 Constitution gave the
President's office the role as the formal representative of
the state. After 1980 the presidents, however, came to play
the role of an intermediary between the state and civil
society. With this in mind. President Kenan Evren used to
travel around the country to foster national unity and social
solidarity. In his speeches he emphasized the traditional
symbols in mobilizing people, such as the Koran. President
Turgut Ozal, the first genuine civil president, went further by
3
giving priority to social initiative against the state. This 
new picture was the complete reverse of the attitude of the 
state elite in the 1930s, who left the traditional symbols to 
one side and strongly emphasized the creation of a new 
mentality. The appeal by the state elite to traditional 
symbols in the 1980s represented a fresh attempt to close the 
gap between the state and society.
Furthermore, the official ideology of the state gained a
new dimension. As Metin Heper has pointed out the most
important development is the fact that Ataturkism is no longer
4
taken as a political manifesto. There has been a softening of 
attitudes towards Ataturkian principles (republicanism, 
secularism, nationalism, populism, reformism and etatism).
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Indeed, etatism was completely dropped when populism and5
nationalism came under attack, Ataturkian thought is no longer
regarded as the source for all public policies; rather, it
serves as a justification for rejecting radical ideologies of
both the left and the right. An additional shift, after 1980,
could be observed in the role of the state elite (the military,
bureaucrats and the intelligentsia). Each has taken a position
fundamentally different from their roles during the Ottoman
empire or the early years of the Republican Turkey. The
military, the chief actor of the 1980 intervention, stayed in
6
its barracks. Its frequent interventions into Turkish
politics had been strongly criticized by social groups,
particularly the press, and by . the end of the decade the
military seemed to have decided to leave the political issues
completely to the political elite. The bureaucrats also came to
depend on the government and to realize the government's
projects, which were mostly on behalf of the society itself.
Finally, one can clearly see a fundamental transformation in
the traditional role of the Turkish intelligentsia. Many
Turkish intellectuals, particularly those who were and are
employed in the press becam.e strong supporters of the civil
society. The present intellectuals, in contrast to the
immediate post-Ataturkian bureaucratic-intellectuals, do not
presume that they are an inherently superior group in sole
7
possession of the truth.
Two new issues coming under discussion in Turkey after 1980
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are the civil society and liberalism. Both were raised first by
the political elite. The prime minister, Turgut Ozal (1983-
1989), was one of the pioneers in raising these issues. The
programs of the Motherland party governments (between 1983-
1991) created a strong impetus towards shifting the attention
from the state to society. The privatisation of the state's
economic enterprises, the devolution of authority, the
transference of funds to the municipalities and the increasing
emphasis placed on market forces, are crucial in this regard.
It is clear that privatisation and the stress on market forces
had the potential of strengthening the hands of civil societal 
8
elements. Prime Minister Ozal advocated the principle that the
state should exist to serve the people and not the people for
the state. Moreover, he denounced the view that the state is
responsible for providing an economic infrastructure and a
political framework for protecting the rights and freedoms of
the individual and ensuring public security. The state
envisioned by Ozal had a role only in fields such as education,
public health and national defense; outside these areas it
9should not impose itself as an interventionist power. Ozal 
strongly emphasized basic freedoms, of thought, conscience and 
beliefs as well as freedom of free enterprise. Such an attitude 
by a prime minister was, indeed, the first in Turkish politics.
A new aspect of post-1980 Turkey is the development of 
arguments around liberalism, either in the economic sense or 
the cultural, implying freedom of thought. Liberal thought, in 
fact, is strongly rooted in modern Turkish history. It was one
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of the arguments raised to save the state in the last decades
of the Ottoman empire. However, it v/as smothered by the
success of a centralist ideology during the Republican period.
Although some arguments over liberalism came into the picture
between 1950-1980 they were not freely developed. In the last
decade, however, it was rediscovered gaining strong support
among intellectuals, political parties of the left and right
10
and in society generally. As an extension of the liberal
arguments pluralism gained pace, generating various discourses.
As a result, as Nilufer Gole has observed, political and
cultural pluralism has been furthered: in addition civil
societal elements have freed themselves from state
11domination. In conclusion, as put by Gole, "in Turkey of the
1980s, first, the political dynamics shifted from ideological
confrontation to a pursuit for pluralism, and, secondly the
political discourses were 'liberated' from the 'system
questioning' political doctrines, and tended to be
12
characterized by a 'policy questioning' stance." This trend 
in Turkish politics led to the emergence of some autonomous 
social groups after 1980, particularly feminism in our
analysis, which constitute an intermediate component of civil 
society.
4.1.2. The Development of Autonomous Social Groups
After 1980 the conflict around such grand issues as 
modernization, national identity, secularism and national 
solidarity tended to be replaced by debates on more immediate
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problems (pollution, public health, tourism, environment, human
rights, woman's rights, etc.)· These issues were dealt with
on the social agenda by different groups operating
independently of the state or political parties. This
development has enabled social groups to challenge as well as
to control state policies. Moreover, to a certain extent, they
also came about to share the functions of the state. Social
groups such as feminists, environmentalists, religious
activists as well as homosexuals and transsexuals were of the
same nature and further contributed to the emergence of a
plurality of identities at the civil societal level. These
groups, with their different values and norms, represented the13autonomization of social forces from the grip of the center.
Islam as a significant dimension of the Turkish civil
society also began to be rediscovered by the elite and to
occupy a significant focus of politics. It contributed to the
pluralization of sources for public policy-making and provided
additional themes for political participation and political 
14
protests. An outstanding example of social protests on the 
part of the religious groups was the campaign by veiled girls 
for the right to attend school wearing 'Islamic' dress. Their 
activities were extended to different parts of the country in 
the last years of the decade and finally they gained this 
right to a certain extent.
Another element of civil society coming to prominence in
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the 1980s was the ethnic Kurdish movement in the south east
part of Turkey. Arguments on the Kurdish issue were raised on
the basis of human rights, and advanced by the PKK (Kurdish
Labor Party) through terrorism. The issue brought the political
elite to the point of accepting that the Kurdish language be
accepted as legal and that Kurds be given their own 
15
identity.
Still another component of civil society is the press
which has gained an important place in the democratization of
the country. It has become the symbol of liberty, the catalyst
for trouble, and the watchdog of government policies. As the
intermediary between govex'nment, organized groups and citizens,
journalists and intellectuals writing for the press regarded
themselves as the chief guardians of democracy and civil 
16
society. Some columnists devote all their energy to the 
complaints of citizens against the government and occasionally 
disclose the party under question in their columns.
The Turkish environmental groups brought a definite 
relativization into the state policy in regard to
environmental issues. The environmentalist groups in Turkey 
mainly act in two ways: in voluntarily established
organizations and under the banner of the Green party. The 
first performs the function of an auxiliary unit of the state, 
through scientific projects and studies underlying the
essential environmental problems. Reference to the environment 
in the 1982 Constitution and the Environmental Act were
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other hand, the members of the Green party have initiated a
series of campaigns against the government policies which they
regard as having a negative effect on the environment. These
campaigns have mostly succeeded in replacing outdated policies
with new ones. This process clearly indicates a certain17
relativization in state policy.
The most significant element of the civil society in 
post-1980 Turkey has a risen in the form of feminist groups. 
These groups have opened a fundamentally new chapter in
Turkish politics, constituting a strong challenge to the 
dominant institutions. Unlike all other social groups, 
feminists broke all compromising links with the state,
criticizing not only the present policies but also the
essential traditional institutions such as patriarchy and
family, which are two significant components of the Turkish 
national identity strengthened especially during the Republican 
period. As it is well known, the Republican ideology was based 
on Durkheiman sociology, taking the family as the essential 
unit of national solidarity. This version, of sociology was 
taken as the essence of official ideology of the Republic 
through Ziya Gokalp, the theoretician of the Young Ottomans and 
of Republican regime. Feminist criticism of the family then is 
identical with the criticism of the state or the nation itself. 
Feminist ideas have had a great impact at the grass-roots 
level, at the same time creating a challenge to the state
formulated by voluntary environmental associations. On the
166
institutions, and thus, constituting an element of the civil 
society. This argument is the central focus of the following 
part.
4.2. TURKISH FEMINISM
4.2.1. The Emergence of Feminism in Turkey
After a long break, feminism, revived in Turkey with
recent versions, immediately following the 1980 military
intervention, which temporarily suspended democracy and brought
political life to a complete halt. "Feminism soon became a
central issue, leading people to believe that it will occupy an
important position on the political agenda of the country18
during the 1980s." Immediately after the military
intervention of 1980 a spontaneously structured type of
feminist movement developed, independent of the state or the
political parties and involving a broad cross-section of women.
They included writers, artists, journalists, university
teachers, etc. At the beginning feminism involved professional
groups of women from the wealthy section of the society living
mostly in cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. But it later
soon prevailed among young girls mostly university students as
19well as in different sections in the Turkish society.
The development of feminism has followed four basic 
phases: the confidential preparation period, the revival 
period, the legacy seeking period and the period it converted
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to an action. In the first period, Sirin Tekeli, a leading
feminist, points to the translation of various books from
Western feminists into the Turkish language during the 1970s.
The writings of consistent feminist writers such as Simone de
Beauvoir, Kate Millet and Shulamit Firestone were incorporated
into the Turkish context during the time under question.
Furthermore, Tekeli points to the importance of native studies
on Turkish women, particularly the edited book »Türkiye^de
Kadin*' (Woman in Turkey) (1979), which embraced a sociological
21
point of view. One should bear in mind that there were
additional factors,in that period, contributing to the
development of feminism in Turkey. Among them were attempts by
leftist groups to encourage socialism among women. As
emphasized in the previous chapter, the Turkish left took its
cue from the declaration of the UN for the Decade of Women in
1975. Its attempts were successful, as most of the feminist
leaders of the 1980s were active participants in the leftist
22
groups of the 1970s. Still another factor behind the 
development of feminist ideas during the confidential 
preparation period was the publication of "Kadinca” (1978), a 
monthly magazine devoted completely to woman issues, the first 
in its kind. On the one hand it directed women toward the 
traditional roles in the family, but on the other hand it 
embraced a critical view of the present status of women. 
Kadinca gave special importance to the professions by which 
women could improve their status. Moreover, it raised various 
critiques of traditional values socially attributed to women, 
strongly criticizing the preservation of virginity as well as
20
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protesting against the ban on abortion. 23
Although there were feminist ideas, the Turkish context 
still was not ready in the 1970s for a movement like feminism 
to develop in a way that it could dissociate itself completely 
from the grip of the center as well as that of the mainstream 
groups. There were significant barriers standing in the way of 
this process. Tekeli stresses two of them as structural and 
ideological. She regards the first structural barrier as a 
less-developed capitalism, which could not employ sufficient 
numbers of women and left the family as the basic economic 
unit. The second structural barrier she concentrates on is the 
family. She argues that the extended family is still the most 
esteemed institution in the Turkish culture; however, feminism 
develops in countries having a type of nuclear family. She, 
finally, points to an educational system, in which there are 
fewer women than men as last of the structural barrier against 
the development feminism in Turkey of the 1970s. Turkey. In 
addition to the structural barriers Tekeli points to the three
ideological obstacles as Kemalism, Islam, and the Turkish
24left. In short, the 1970s was an important period in the 
sense that feminist views were able to take root, but the 
factors mentioned above carried it to the post-1980 period.
The early years of the 1980s were a turning point in the 
development of feminism in Turkey. In 1980 the military regime 
abolished post and abolished all links between the state and
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the trade associations and even the political parties were
banned from taking part in politics. The absence of these links
led women to seek a new alternative to participation in 25
politics. The Kemalists are traditionally sympathetic to
women in Turkey. This is the reason why the military rulers
(as the chief preserver of Kemalist principles) smothered other
groups after the intervention, but tolerated actions held by
women. As an extension of that women were allowed in May 1981
to organize a symposium on woman issue under the banner of the
*'YAZKO" (Cooperation of Writers and Translators) . A non-used
concern was given to that symposium then immediately a new one
26was organized by the same group. The central focus of these
symposia was to question the unequal status of women in Turkish
society despite the substantial improvements made during the27
Republican Turkey.
In addition to the political factors created by the mili­
tary intervention, sociological factors were also critical to 
the emergence of the feminist movement in the 1980s. Among 
others urbanization, which reached its peak in the 1980s, is 
important to mention. Urbanization in Turkey brought about an 
awareness among a variety of different social sections of 
their status and led them to demand special rights. This was
particularly true of liberal feminism, which takes the "right"
28as the cornerstone of its struggle. Based on the development
of the educational and communicational possibilities, women
29
were able to claim special rights. The most outstanding sort
society. The unions, the voluntarily established organizations,
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of this was profession. Women, who sought for prestige and
career under the banner of the ideological groups of the
1970s, shifted their attention to profession and success as
means for the realization of themselves. More than being an
instrument for surviving, indeed, profession has been taken by
Turkish women, in post-1980, as a means of constructing an 30identity.
The revival period of the feminist movement in Turkey was 
accomplished through the attempts of women who were strong par­
ticipants of the left in the 1970s. Tekeli says she left
university in 1981 under the enforcement of the military regime 
and was employed by YAZKO, She constructed a nuclear cadre of 
approximately 50 women who devoted their full energy to
research into woman issue,including a series of translations
from Western feminists writings into Turkish. The revival of 
feminism in the hands of these women made it necessary for them 
to question their past. Tekeli mentions out how they pondered 
Marxism and succeeded in breaking with that tradition:
During that time [the early years of the 1980s] we 
radically questioned our past, particularly, the 
Marxism which was the basic tenet for most of us, 
and reanalyzed our daily experience in a more de­
tailed and sophisticated manner. We reached a true 
definition of those concepts, which are important 
parts of the Turkish culture, such as the 
patriarchy, gender and male domination over women
171
and we, thus, gradually, became feminists.
Tekeli points out that they publicized their views after
1982, immediately following a symposium held by the French
feminist writer Giselle Halimi in Istanbul. Halimi encouraged
them to publicize their ideas as feminists without feeling a32
fear and restriction upon themselves. This brought the 
revival period to an end and led feminists to seek a legacy in 
society.
The legacy-seeking period for feminist women began with
the attempts to publicize their ideas. At the end of 1982,
feminist women decided to present their ideology before the
public opinion in an orderly way. Efforts to obtain a page in
different daily papers resulted in a page in Somut, a weekly
magazine, published by YAZKO. The first feminist page was
prepared according to assertively feminist principles, that is
every women (famous or not) had the right to appear in print.
Articles covered such issues as abortion, women's day, women
and advertising and ideas inimical to women in folk proverbs, 
33
etc. Beside these issues a variety of translations from
Western feminists particularly Simone de Beauvoir were
34
published on this page. These writings attracted many women 
but at the same time made others angry. Kemalist, socialist 
and religious women reacted against these feminist women and 
after four months they were forced to leave the magazine. Sule 
Torun, the editor of the page, explains how feminists had the 
opportunity for the first time to discuss the ethical rules 
imposed upon women from their childhood onward and to set new
31
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definitions of their own. Tcrim describes that they went beyond
the traditional roles attributed to v;omen such as "good wife",
"good mother" and "ideal sexual object" and raised among women
3 5
a self-consciousness. Another prominent feminist writer, 
Stella Ovadia, describes how Somut, was used to developed an 
intellectual base for solidarity among women. She maintains
that Somut took women not as the "other" but as "we women", the36
subject of their own discourses. Since this page was greatly 
attractive to women it continued to stress woman issue even
after the feminists left the magazine in the hands of new37
writers (mostly men).
The Somut experience brought feminist groups to agree on
the need to create an autonomous political force, independent
of the state, the political parties, or other social movements.
Thus, from 1983 onwards, a new strategy appeared among
feminists. The main initiative of this period was the
foundation of the Kadin Çevresi (Woman's Circle), which was a
publishing venture as v;ell as a service and consultation
company whose aim was to "evaluate the work of women, paid or
38
unpaid, outside or within the home." The Woman's Circle was
founded when national politics made it impossible to establish
any sort of formal association or foundation. However, it was
clearly tolerated by the military regime. It concentrated on
publishing activities aiming at creating self-awareness among
women as well as constituting a consultative body for their
39legal problems. With the participation of female students.
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feminism gained further ground throughout the country. Thus,
during the 1980s, publications about and by women ranked
among the best-selling books. Duygu Asena's novel "Kadinin Adi
Yok” (Woman Has No Name) went into its 26th edition a year40
after its publication in March 1987. Moreover, close
attention was paid on to woman's films which ranked among the
most attractive to the public. Indeed, the 1980s is accepted
in the Turkish cinema literature as the period of woman's
films. Through these films a new image of the "independent
woman", aware of her sexuality and determined to struggle
against society's sexist norms and rules developed. The
central message of these films was to create an independent
woman whose basic stance was based on individualistic volition41
contesting for the problems of herself. A variety of films 
have been created as an extension of this attempt under the 
impact of feminist movement. Atif Yilmaz, the chief director of 
several of these films points to the feminist impact on the 
emergence of these films in the following manner:
A feminist movement has culminated recently in
Turkey, which has led women to become more conscious
of themselves as compared to the past. Turkish women
began to question, in recent years, matters such as
the place she occupies in society, her relationships
with man and her status at work. Since these concern
42me, I produce such films.
One might see a reciprocal relationship between woman's 
films and feminism in Turkey. The central figure created
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through these films directs women to criticize their present
status and, thus, to concern themselves with feminism. On the
other hand, feminism, drawing attention to woman issue directed
the attention of the society generally to films dealing with
women's problems. Turkish television also began to pay
attention to this issue. In 1985, for the first time in Turkey,
television prepared a program for women ”Hanimlar Sizin Icin”
(Fot You Ladies), emphasizing the problems women faced in their
daily lives. This was followed by many others throughout the
decade. With the addition of the private channels after 1989,
woman issue took the central focus of the television programs
in Turkey. This led feminist ideas to be publicized further43
around the country.
Although feminism was rooted in metropolitan cities at the 
beginning of the decade, toward the end it extended along the 
country from Adana to Antep and from Edirne to Denizli; in 
fact, to all corners of the country. Concern with feminism has 
been maintained through a large variety of panels, symposia, 
and conferences. Feminists, for the first time in Turkey, 
celebrated the International Women's Day on March 8, 1985. In 
the same year the feminist movement crystallized into three 
distinct streams, liberal, socialist and radical feminists, 
each attempting to create different institutions and 
developing different discourses in their own magazines. 
Feminists devoted their energy to various actions in the 
streets of different cities from 1986 onwards. The '•legacy­
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seeking" attempt of feminist women was, thus, replaced by a 
new chapter unfolding the way for feminist actions.
4.2.2. Feminist Versions and Discourses
From 1985 onwards feminism developed through different 
versions advocating completely different discourses in Turkey. 
The mainstream version of feminism in Turkey is liberal 
feminism, embracing specifically the liberation of woman and 
her equality with man. The liberal version of feminism was 
represented in Turkey after 1984 mostly by writings in 
Kadinca. By contrast socialist and radical feminists went 
beyond equality and took the emancipation of women as the 
center of their struggle. These two groups of feminists 
engaged in a joint struggle against the oppression of women up 
to 1987, but later parted company. Socialist feminists 
published the Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus magazine, while 
radicals published the Feminist. The following analysis of 
feminist versions and discourses is based on a detailed study 
of these three magazines.
4.2.2.1. Liberal Feminism and the Claim on Equality
Liberal issues concerning woman began to be emphasized in 
Turkey mainly by Kadinca, from 1984 onwards. However, before 
that time Kadinca had obviously demonstrated a "Kemalist"
attitude toward woman issue, idealizing Westernization and 
modernization as the basic aim. This changing trend could be
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easily observed in the discourses handled by Kadinca after that 
44
time.
Liberal feminists take the equality of women with men and
liberty for women as the center of their struggle. The equality
they demand can be summed up in three basic points: equality in
professional life, equality in marriage life, and equality in 
45social life. Business life is seen by liberal feminists as
the means by which a woman gains her liberty. Gaining work is
regarded as being synonymous with being successful. Liberal
feminists insist that the profession life brings freedom and
happiness not only to woman but also to her family and her 
46country. The meaning given to work by liberal feminists is 
the mainstream of the following passage:
Getting work through the approval of legal princi­
ples is the natural right of women. Having an occu­
pation is the most essential requirement not only 
for the welfare of a woman but also for her family. 
It is the time that women should gain their economic 
independence and stand on their feet without any
help from men. Economic independence inevitably
47
brings to women freedom of action and expression.
Liberal feminists strongly stress the need for legal 
principles to be adjusted in such a way that women can have 
equal treatment at work. As an extension of this they point to 
"equal payment for equal work" as a basic principle in business
177
life. Moreover, they demand public a nursery in every business
employing women as well as insurance for women employed in48
agriculture or doing work at home. Liberal feminists point
out the lack of work and the traditional division of labor
within the family as the basic barriers standing in the way of
Turkish women obtaining an occupation. Therefore, they favor a
more developed capitalism in Turkey. The most prominent Turkish
liberal feminist, Tekeli, argues that they should struggle
against a less-developed capitalism as it lacks the chance for49
women to be properly employed.
Turkish liberal feminists also advocate equality in
marriage life. They defend a marriage that does not restrict
woman's freedom; otherwise, they say, women should dissolve
their marriage bonds. The basic principle, they argue, is an
equal division of labor in the family and the same freedom50
for woman as for men. Kadinca's editor, Duygu Asena,
strongly emphasizes freedom of woman in married life, arguing
that "it is impossible to react against marriage since it is
the basic principle of social life, a form of solidarity which
51
makes life easier and more comfortable." But she maintains
that women should not devote their full energy to serve their
husbands. Asena frequently advises her readers to preserve
their liberty in their domestic life and never lose the
52principal elements of their personality. Free choice in 
married life, for her, clearly means woman's emancipation. The 
following argument that she raises against radical feminists 
who seek a radical transformation of the entire social
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relations toward the end of woman's emancipation is interesting 
with regard to our argument:
Emancipation... Yes there is such a concept but only
when young girls are able to reject any marriage
compulsorily imposed upon them by their parents
will women be emancipated in Turkey. When parents
stop forcing their daughters to marry those whom
only they approved will women be emancipated. When
a woman feels herself so strong that she might
dissolve her marriage bonds if she does not enjoy
life with her husband any more or is suppressed and
battered in the home solely, then she will be truly 53emancipated.
Woman, to liberal feminists, should not be perceived from
the gender point of view anymore but rather as the female part
of humanity. Therefore, they demand a legal arrangement of the
family in a way that no woman is conceived of as being the
servant of her husband. Liberal feminists regard spouses as
egual partners, and realize marriage on the basis of mutual
love and respect. Otherwise, marriage, they argue, turns into
a consistent barrier to woman's participation in the public 
54
life. Liberal feminists also reguire that the government
introduce laws granting divorce on demand. As it is well known 
the Turkish Civil Code does not allow the dissolution of the
marriage bonds unless five seriousi actions are accomplished
55
during the marriage. This process is criticized strongly by
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the liberal feminists, as they think it forces women to prolong
56an unenjoyable marriage. They criticize also the payment of
alimony to a woman by her husband after divorce. They argue
that this action ignores a woman's honor, and that the state
should pay an allowance as well as provide insurance to the
57
divorced woman.
The Liberal feminists give a special meaning to equality
in the social life for women. Equality as such means to be able
to act socially without restriction. It is argued, through the
issues developed in the writings of the liberal feminists, that
woman in the Turkish society has always been treated as the
"other*· of man. To transform this definition they say that
woman must realize herself on the basis of her own personality58and individuality. By articulating this view, it is clear
that the Turkish liberal feminists are influenced by the
feminist point of view developed by the French existentialist
feminists, particularly Simone de Beauvoir. The Turkish
liberal feminists identify a woman's existence with being
dissociated from her traditional roles and thus being able to
make her own choices. This point of view is defended by Asena,
who advises women to liberate their behavior without fear of
the consequences that might follow. She pronounces this as
follows: "Not to be afraid do whatever you want; touch whom
you never touched; love whom you never loved; say what you
never said; defend what you never defended; do what you never
59
did; and try what you never attempted." As this clearly
indicates a very existential point of view is proposed for
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women by the liberal feminists. They have also accomplished a 
radical shift in view'from those women who served the country 
during the War of Independence and were later committed to the 
ideological mainstream like Kemalism or socialism before 1980. 
This attempt to seek a strong personality to women is the 
central message of the following passage:
Live for nobody but only yourself. It should not be
of interest what others think about that. Do not
delay any more in loving yourself. It is in your
hand to attain dignity and reach a higher status.
Find your true identity and make men appreciate 
60
that.
The strong insistence by liberal feminists on developing 
a strong personality clearly resembles the desire to 
articulate the interests of a special social category. More­
over, it accomplishes a substantial break from the traditional 
image of women indicating an existence for the service of 
others than their own. The basic notion behind this kind of 
existence put forward for women is implicitly hidden in the 
feminists' demand of equal status for women and in their 
refusal of the values formulating women as the "other" of men.
In addition to equality, liberal feminists stress the 
concept of "liberty" as the central focus of their struggle. 
The term liberty is mainly used in reference to sexual freedom. 
Liberal feminists emphasize sexual freedom mainly in two 
phases: outside marriage and within married life. Un-limited
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sexual freedom is posited for any unmarried woman, beginning
with dating which may include sexual relationship with a man.
Zuleyha Guvener, a writer for Kadınca, argues that those who
have no experience in dating in their daily lives are
potentially close to deviance bearing elements of corruption61
for the society. Another writer, Oya Ozdilek, points to a
future in which the Turkish women would be able to break the
destiny formerly shaped by their sexuality. She argues that in
the near future a woman v/ill be able to call a man whom she
enjoys and offer to have sexual intercourse with him. Ozdilek
persists that this is the basic right of a free woman, and that
62
every free woman should experience this action. This is, in
fact, why Turkish liberal feminists strongly criticize the
value in Turkish culture attributing a sacred meaning to the
virginity of women. The Liberal feminists conceive this as a
strong social and cultural barrier to a woman's liberty as
well as to the key indigenous factor behind the serial problems
of Turkish women. Tulin Kolukisa announces this in the
following terms: "The history of all restrictions on women are
based on the wall of virginity. This impediment is likely
63
responsible from all other walls persisting for women." In
short, the liberal feminists demand unrestricted sexual 
freedom for unmarried women.
However, they are ambivalent on this concept when it 
comes to married woman. Some articulate the view that a married 
woman should be limited to the sexual relationship of married
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life. Yet others argue that women should be free to go beyond
married life and experiencing other sexual relations. For the
former, marriage provides enough source for sexual pleasure.
Their argument might be summed up in the following manner:
"Marriage gives us every sort of possibility to enrich our
sexual life, enough to evaluate the opportunities offered in64
that good unity." But some feminist women assert that the
sexual life of a woman should not be restrained even if she is
married. The exponents of this view insist that "just as
sexual intercourse is not a matter for guilt before marriage it
should not be regarded as wrong for a woman to fall in love65
with someone else after getting marriage." The Turkish
feminist Stella Ovadia defines this as the most considerable 
right that could be gained by Turkish women. In support of her 
argument, she quotes a feminist woman living with someone else 
and forcing her husband to accept that relationship:
The alternative to this type of living is to return 
to the traditional way of life. I do not want to 
fall backward. This is a successful step in de­
stroying the structure of the traditional family. I 
have taken an encouraged step for our generation. 
This was not so easy at the beginning but I have 
succeeded and I want to perpetuate it as a symbol of
freedom, which is the most necessary stance for our 
66
generation.
This view, is not so broad among Turkish feminists. Yet 
by all feminists, sexuality, either within marriage or outside
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it, is regarded as being crucial to woman's liberty. This, 
indeed, separates feminist women from the "sexless" or "man­
like" women categorized in the mentality of the Kemalist 
woman's associations or from the women regarded as "sister" of 
the leftist and among the religious groups.
As an extension of the sexuality argument the liberal
feminists place a great significance on the preservation of
private life. A writer for Kadinca, Candan Aslanbay, defines
four areas which the state should leave women alone: marriage,
67reproduction, divorce and homelife. Moreover, Tekeli, as a 
part of preserving one's private life, defends the subsistence 
of the family as long as there is an equal division of labor 
between the partners. Her argument runs as follows: "The
demand to destroy the family is nonsense; it is meaningless to
destroy a family, in which man and woman are equal and free. We
68should transform rather than abolish the family." This point 
is particularly important when comparing liberal feminist 
discourses with the discourses of radical feminists calling for 
the abolition of the family.
Liberal feminists are also sympathetic to men. They argue
that feminism cannot be regarded as being synonymous with
hostility to men or with transcending woman's values. Men who
suppress women are victims of the general system and its 
69
education. Asena strongly accuses radical feminists of 
undermining feminism by setting up men as the central object
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of their struggle. She illustrates men as their close
associates as follows: "Our husbands, our lovers, our close
friends all are men; if so, why do we perceive men as our71
enemy?" One can obviously see here the impact of Western
egalitarian feminists, particularly Mary Wollstonecraft, on
Turkish liberal feminists. Reha Isvan, a passionate advocate
of this perspective, argues that the roles attributed to the
man in the Turkish culture develop his ability and provide hi m
to pursue a free personality. However, woman's personality in
this culture is being equated with her sexuality, which brings
about a passive personality. She goes on to urge that women
should struggle for liberty, democracy, and peace in
cooperation with men in order to extend the traditional values
burdened upon them. Isvan concludes that in a genuine
democratic type of society and education the present image of
man and woman would no longer be taken as the central figure of
72power relations. Furthermore, Tekeli formulates a discourse 
demanding democracy and political participation as the central 
focus of the feminist struggle. Her argument runs as follows:
What is expected from us [as feminists] is to stress 
the problems interesting all people and not just 
ourselves. It is also expected of us to direct our 
struggle towards democratic, egalitarian and partic­
ipatory institutions. Moreover, it is expected from
us to utilize the present political channels not73
distant from the center of our struggle.
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The concepts of diversity and plurality are the central 
issues in the struggle of the Turkish liberal feminists. As an 
extension of that view, most of their energy is spent in regu­
lating the state norms and legal principles on behalf of 
women's interests. All problems women face, liberal feminists 
say, can be solved through legal arrangements. This is why
feminists strongly stress the need to establish a woman's74
ministry in Turkey.
To conclude, liberal feminists in Turkey have formulated a 
liberal democratic society, in which men and women are equal 
and free in their actions. "Being like men" is the essential 
ideal put forward for women by liberal feminists, with the 
ultimate goal being pronounced as being "as good as man." 
Values such as competition and success in one's professional 
life, equal division of labor in family, freedom of action and 
expression in social life, and freedom in sexual behavior are 
formulated as the means by which women can articulate the 
public life. Integration of women into such a public world 
means, indeed, nothing more than masculinizing women.
4.2.2.2. Radical Feminism and the Politics of Rejection
and Difference
Radical feminists in Turkey displayed their voice through 
an irregularly published magazine the Feminist (published 
between 1987-1990), which stressed a completely rejective 
and reversal discourse. The usage of a non-used language in
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the writings of the magazine of a print type and colors means 
to separate radical feminists from the mainstream. A purple 
colored paper is commonly used in the magazine symbolizing 
femininity, and no writer of the magazine uses her surname 
because it symbolizes masculine domination of women.
Turkish radical feminists aim at emancipating women from 
men's domination in a way that goes beyond the liberal 
feminists who regard male values as the basic model. Radical 
feminists condemn male values which they say reside in 
conflict, competition and war. Unlike liberal feminists, 
radical feminists argue that women's emancipation can be 
accomplished only by the replacement of overall definitions of 
the male-oriented values with ones based mainly on the female-
oriented values, which are seen as peaceful behavior and the
75
like. They talk, about patriarchy and analyze woman issue
from this point of view. Handan, the most consistent exponent
of the radical feminist view and the editor of the Feminist,
argues that all aspects of social life, whether economic,
cultural, historical, artistic or scientific, are characterized
by male-oriented values. Man and his values, she urges, have
constructed the basic subject of history. Only men have
realized true revolutions, have achieved great transformations
and have brought about broad social changes. In short, it is
men who have created history. Women, Handan maintains, have
always been the subject of private life which allotted to them
76
the activities such as washing, cleaning and caring.
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Patriarchy, according to the radical feminists has
separated the private sphere of women (the realm of
reproduction) from the public domain of men (realm of
production). This division is, to radical feminists, based on a
patriarchal ideology rather than economic factors and has
77brought about the domination of men over women. A prominent
advocate of this view, Stella Ovadia, argues that patriarchal
ideology has put the phallus at the center of its cultural
norms. All values ordering society have been dispensed
78
according to the norms produced in the phallic system. This
system, she maintains, grants man, during his socialization,
such qualities as activity, strength, initiative, production,
rationality, etc. Women are socialized into a behavior
characterized by passivity, weakness, lack of initiative,
reproduction of the male children and irrational emotionalism.
The norms of the patriarchal culture socialize a male in such a
way that it integrates him into public life, giving him
creativity and power; however, the phallic system socializes a
female in such a way that she is expected to follow up only the
various activities of domestic life such as child bearing and
79
rearing and household duties. Moreover, this culture develops
notions such as shame and honor as tactical instruments
separating women from the public and restricting them to
80
familial life. It is clear that radical feminists have come 
to create a strong challenge to the basic principles of the 
theory of civil society formulated specifically according to 
the division of man's and woman's realms by both the
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contractual theorists (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) and by the 
theorists who divided the civil society from the state on the 
basis of national state and production (Hegel, Marx and 
Gramsci). Radical feminists dispute the attempts of these 
thinkers to allot only household duties to women in a civil
society. They are producing a new definition of a civil society 
which gives women a full role.
Unlike the liberal feminists, the radical feminists
strongly reject the articulation of women with institutions of
public life as the way of women's emancipation. They argue
that the public institutions such as the state bureaucracy,
the military and the police are on the peak of man's values;
81therefore, no woman should participate in these spheres.
Moreover, they criticize the liberal feminist view that
women's emancipation can be achieved through equality in the
public and democratic institutions. To radical feminists
democracy is, in the final analysis, characterized by power
relations rooted in the state and is therefore is unacceptable
82
to genuine feminists. Furthermore, the radical feminists
utilize the concept of emancipation instead of equality and
liberty. S. Nur, a radical feminist, says that women have
already achieved equality in many societies but no woman has83
been emancipated from patriarchal oppression. Another
exponent of this view, Ayse, points to what is at stake in the 
following terms;
The struggle for liberty is significant, but it is
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equally important to denounce a struggle for eman­
cipation in order to overcome man's domination. 
Liberty, indeed, is necessary for us but it is not 
enough; we cannot be. satisfied with limiting man's 
domination over us, we should also abolish it. Men 
do not use only visible power institutions to 
suppress women in the public sphere such as the 
state, the law, and the military; they use also 
"innocent" concepts such as love, "shelter" such as 
family, and a "natural" drive such as sexuality. 
Women's emancipation aims at transpation also 
follows up the removal of the oppressive
institutions which provide man's authority such as
the state, the military and particularly the family
84
as well as class and nation.
Radical feminists are not satisfied with " special" rights 
as long as the patriarchal culture remains; rather they formu­
late an overall transformation of the male-based cultural sys­
tem. This view is very clearly enunciated as follows: " When 
women become aware of their subordination they can construct a 
concept of a radical upheaval affecting all the institutions of
history, of the world, of life and of subordination. This
85concept is feminism." More than stressing the present 
situation, they refer to the politics of the future, which they 
say will be characterized by a woman's values. This point is 
the central message of the following argument:
There are many reasons for women to oppose social
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conventions, the state, the family, capital, the
language, the dominant ethic, the history and the
process of the historical writings. If the future is
to be different it will probably be ours too; the
86woman will be the future.
These Radical feminists engage strongly in elevating
woman's values over the values of man. They even regard
feminism as being identical with women's consciousness of
their existence as well as their love of values which are
87
potentially rooted in femininity. They strongly reject being
similar to men whose values symbolize the hierarchal power and
domination of others. Nevertheless, these radical feminists
urge that women ponder other things than power or oppression.
Their arguments are as follows: ”As women we never involve
ourselves in negative actions. We are distant to violence and
88we signify other things than hierarchy in social life.” The 
Radical feminists object to the liberal feminists' attitude of 
masculinizing women in public life. They say that feminism 
undertakes the politics of "feminizing” women as well as men 
through genuine feminine values. The following argument, raised 
by Vildan, is interesting from the point of view under 
question:
It is necessary for us to invert all things men 
define as good, important and esteemed. To me it is 
better to direct men towards the realm occupied by 
women because men's realm is the place that confirms
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their domination over women. Therefore, it seems
better to invite men to the grounds providing that
the erosion of their domination over women in order
to be truly able to create a reversal transformation89process towards the female sphere.
Vildan insists that even under the existing conditions a
women's values are more worthwhile when compared to those of
men. She asks how it becomes possible to view fighting as good,
which is, from a woman's point of view, immoral and harmful to 
90
humanity.
Turkish radical feminists also draw attention to a
woman's writing, which constructed totally from the daily
experience of women. Like their French counterpart they view
writing as the necessary tool for setting up a different
framework of values, otherwise women will unavoidably be
integrated with writings that essentially serve for men's 
91discourse. Women, radical feminists maintain, should "like”
themselves whether they are thin or fat, attractive or
unattractive. Women should develop new norms for their bodies
and take them at the center of their writings. Only in this
way, they insist, can women be able to transform man-based 
92values.
The Turkish radical feminists proclaim that solidarity 
among women as a political discourse implicitly carries the 
function of a means for women's emancipation. Solidarity among
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women, to them, should be m.aintained through the associations
such as women's businesses, women's unions, women's shelters, 
93
etc. Women would thus be able to create a feminine
revolution while abolishing men's domination over women.
Another point politicized by the radical feminists is the 
need for full liberty which rejects all kinds of barriers to 
women. Ayse points out that she wants no baby since it con­
structs a barrier to her liberty. She manifests the attitude of
94a "liberal stranger" , v/ho has no interest outside herself in
an article entitled "I'm Afraid, Baby", in Feminist. A baby,
she says, prevents a free woman from behaving in an irregular
way, that is, to go around the country from time to time and to
passionately go from one corner to another without any 
95restriction. Another prominent supporter of this view, Minu,
pronounces that she "wants to be a sweet daughter, wife or
96mother of nobody." In short, radical feminist women in Turkey 
create a politics completely particular to women. Their 
politics no longer includes women in other social categories 
but rather directs them towards developing a quite develop a 
quite autonomous identity.
In conclusion, the Turkish radical feminists take their 
struggle against a history whose basic dynamics are formulated 
by men as the central focus of their struggle. This point of 
departure brings feminists to question not only the patriarchal 
culture but also the male-oriented definition of civil society.
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The concept of a civil society formulated by Hegel, as a 
transitory moment ending in a strong state, comes to be 
fundamentally inverted by the feminists. They demand a new 
state and society with relationships that take into account 
women's interest. They reject all institutions, definitions, 
concepts and principles regarded as the male norms and are 
struggling for a different voice, setting up new values and 
definitions. This is clearly symbolized in "feminizing” men on 
the basis of different values, which, in the final analysis, 
opens a new door in the civil society. This difference, as 
such, obviously develops a contribution to the plurality of the 
society. The feminist alternative, thus, creates a significant 
basis for the development of the civil society in Turkey.
4.2.2.3. Socialist Feminism and the Politics of
Participation in the Public Life
The socialist feminists opened a further chapter in
Turkish feminism after 1987 through the irregularly published
magazine Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs. Socialist feminists have
been trying to synthesize radical versions of feminism and
socialism, aimed at making feminists socialist and socialist
males feminist. Nükhet Sirman rightly points out that the
efforts of the socialist feminists in Turkey come, in the last
analysis, to legalizing feminism in the eyes of Turkish 
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socialists.
At the very core of the socialist feminists is a struggle
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which are equated with production and reproduction. They raise
arguments against the radical feminists v/ho assume that the
patriarchal culture is the only ideological factor behind
women's subordination. However, the socialist feminists insist
that the inferior status of women is a historical outcome of a
definite economic model, namely capitalism. This is why they
utilize the term "capitalism" as the key concept behind women's
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oppression instead of the term "patriarchy". The socialist
feminists argue that capitalism has historically placed women
at the center of private life and men at the center of public
life. The reproductive activities such child bearing, the
socialization of children, and housework are all left to
women in the capitalist system. Capitalism, they insist, has
transformed the family into a nuclear form, which is the best
unit for the reproduction of new generations serving
capitalists as labor force. Capitalism divides the sphere of
work from the household and leave this realm to men. Since the
production is dominant to the reproductive activities,
99capitalism leads to women's subordination.
Socialist feminist Gulnur Savran argues that the daily
rest of workers, as well as the reproduction and socialization
of new generations, are assured by the capitalists to maintain
cheapness in the household. Therefore, she underlines the
necessity of reaching a socialist mode of production if women
100
are to be emancipated. Savran says socialism is structured 
on the drive of "need" rather than of "gain", and regards the
against the division between the public and the private spheres
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equal division of labor as being superior to benefit.
Moreover, the socialist system socializes all activities of
the family and thus creates the possibility of women
converting the ongoing social dynamics on behalf of their own 
101interests.
The socialist feminists in Turkey draw a strong attention
to the slogan "personality is political", meaning that they
publicize the issues at the center of the private life, i.e.,
they attack the politics of privacy, of personality and of
sacredness. The attributes of privacy, they argue, bear the
potential elements of women's oppression. They define the
seclusion of women within the family and their need to partake
102in public life as the central focus of their struggle. The
socialist feminists insist that only with the politization of
these private issues such as the gender-based division of labor
within the family, sexuality, wife battering and motherhood can103
women be saved from men's oppression. Savran argues that
the family suppresses women by casting them in three basic
roles: the housewife, the wife and the motherhood. However,
she persists, there is no genuine reason why only women should
carry out these tasks, they might easily be carried out by men
as well. Therefore, Savran strongly insists on the abolition of
the family, which means to "give woman the initiative for
controlling her own identity and different aspects of this
identity such as her labor, her body, her sexuality and her
104
capacity for birth."
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socialist feminists concentrate heavily on the politics of
public life. They embrace a point of view fundamentally
different from that of the radical feminists who reject all
public institutions. The central point is to join the public
and the private spheres in such a way as to overcome women's
oppression. The Socialist feminist Yelda claims that the state
forces women to stay in the home through the socially defined
norms it develops for women. The concept of chastity, she
asserts, is one of these norms, dividing women between those
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who are delegated to the family life and those who are not.
The sanctified meaning attributed to the concept of chastity in
the Turkish culture is strongly opposed by Savran: "Some of us
are given the identification card while others are certified as
prostitutes. Both are the professional documents symbolizing
our divided identity. Actually neither is worthier than the 106
other. "
Another socialist feminist, Banu Paker, draws attention to
the roles ascribed to women in the public world as an extension
of the roles attributed to women in the family. The relations
between a nurse and a doctor in public Paker gives as the most
outstanding example. The doctor represents "science",
"rationalism" and "knowledge"; the nurse, however, symbolizes
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"emotion" and the "practical" knowledge of serving. In the 
present public life, the socialist feminists insist, women are 
employed according to their sexuality. Nursing, secretarial 
work and air hostesses are occupations dictated by women's
In addition to the politization of the private life the
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sexuality. Moreover, they go on to argue that modern towns
are designed on the principle of the distinction between the
public and the private spheres, explicitly making it difficult
for women to be assimilated into public life. Basic social and
economic activities such as education, commerce and production
are all left to certain areas of the modern towns which are
distant from homes. Therefore, socialist feminists conclude
that in addition to the norms developed for women in the family
the physical design of space in the urban areas according to
109male criteria, also forces women to stay at home.
Despite all these restrictions socialist feminists
strongly insist on the necessity of taking a correct part in
the public sphere. Their argument is articulated in the
following manner: "It is necessary to enter the public
institutions but only through questioning and criticizing their
present status and through forging a power implicitly allowing
110
us to transform them." Sedef Ozturk, in an extension of this
view, argues that there are two kinds of public institutions:
transformable and non-transformable. The transformable are
those of education, health and communication; the non-
transf ormable institutions are the parliament, the military and
the police. As feminists, she maintains, they live a dichotomy.
On the one hand they have to occupy proper public
institutions; on the other, they must struggle for the
111
conversion of these institutions on behalf of women. Savran
goes further, proposing that women participate even in the
108
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military, the center of man's domination, claiming that this
would help women to break the private chains as well as
112
grasping a part of man's realm. The socialist feminists also
point to the importance of public institutions for women.
These include shelters for battered women, female communes,
new social organizations, women's papers, coffeehouses for
women, women's libraries, research centers for woman issue,
113museums and a ministry devoted to woman issue.
One needs to bear in mind that liberal discourse is the 
central issue of the post-1980 Turkish politics. The three 
basic concepts of liberal thought are the freedom to action, 
individuality and privacy. Socialist feminist attacks on the 
politics of privacy, indeed, constructs a substantial challenge 
to liberalism as such. This refers to a great handicap on the 
Turkish socialist feminists. A social movement, like feminism, 
clearly needs liberal circumstances in order to develop into a 
particular interest; however, socialist feminists question 
basic the principles of liberalism. They also have a paradox 
with their proposal for women's participation in public realm. 
It is evident that proposing integration within the public life 
for women in a way that still does not give them enough power 
to transform public institutions means nothing more than 
masculinizing women as liberal feminists did.
Socialist feminists, like their radical counterparts, are 
strongly against equality. They conceive that equality is not 
enough for women having been oppressed for centuries; rather
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they should benefit from positive discrimination. Socialist 
feminist Nesrin Tura points to this demand in the following
terms:
Our perspective is not equality because equality is 
not a perspective but a deception. Our being invited 
into equal participation in the public life by 
those who have put their hands on our bodies, our 
labor and our identity for hundreds of centuries 
means nothing more than making fun of us. It 
strengthens our further oppression, weakens our 
power, assures our inadequacy and leads to feelings 
as if we are delinquent. We should not to talk 
about abstract principles. We, very clearly, demand
not equality but indemnity and positive 
114
discrimination for women in every respect.
Tura maintains that when they reverse the basic
definitions of the Turkish cultural norms, only then will women
be emancipated. In an extension of this argument she points to
the following: "Whenever we own the right of gaining a child
from whomever or from how many number of men we want, only then
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we will be truly emancipated." Criticizing the liberal
feminist demand for a participatory democracy, the socialist
feminists argue that "even the most feminist parliamentarian
bourgeois democracy will produce no ultimate solution to
women's problems, since the bases of women's oppression are the
116
unavoidable ingredients of that system." In short, the
socialist feminists conceive that women have seen that what men
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have is not v/orth getting. VJoinen's goals are already being
phrased in terms of a global rejection of established sexual
patterns, frustrating for males and degrading for females.
Indeed, this implies a revolutionary recognization of the
entire society, starting from its economic structure and ending117
with its grammar.
The socialist feminists criticize the attempts of their
radical counterparts to elevate women's values. These values,
argues Hacer Ansal, endowing women with being good-natured,
tender-hearted and compassionate, are actually chains tying
women to labor within the home. These have neither economic
meaning nor prestige. She then urges that "feminist politics
118must not be based on the elevation of women's value." Ansal 
goes on to insist that if they espouse different values women 
will never gain a proper part in public life. Women's emancipa­
tion, she concludes, is only possible in the abolition of all
definitions implying women's exclusion from the public 
119realm. Ayse Kokuoz extends this view by claiming that if
they, as feminists, support different values as of women they
will create a type of oppressive ideology. To her this means to
nothing more than losing their claim at the very beginning of
120
their struggle. The socialist feminists conclude that a
notion such as peace is not close to women because of their
nature, but rather women are against war since they rationally
think that fighting is not worth getting for humanity. In
short, instead of elevating women's values they propose to
121
minimize man-based values as a way to emancipate women.
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But it is a matter of question how it is possible to 
create a distinct identity for women in the public realm if 
they reject values originated from femininity. In fact, the 
refusal of women's particular values puts the socialist 
feminists in the same line with the liberal feminists who took 
man-based value as the basic criteria for women to be 
emancipated. In conclusion, concentrating on the politics of 
sharing public life on the basis of man-based values grants 
nothing original to women's emancipation.
4.2.3 Feminist actions
Beginning in 1986 the Turkish feminists have publicized
their views through a variety of actions in the country. The
feminist actions have brought together all groups of women
around specific issues. The petition became the first mass
action of the feminist groups in Turkey. In 1986 the feminists
organized a petition campaign to the president with the aim of
persuading the government to comply with the United Nations'
agreements, to which Turkey had been signatory, under whose
terms citizens would be accorded equal rights regardless of
sex. This campaign was expanded through a new petition
campaign, in March 1986, to the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. The petition was signed by 7000 women from different
sections of the society such as artists, parliamentarians,
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housewives, teachers and the like. Following this campaign
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the feminists established the "Women's Association Against
Discrimination" in order to organize other activities also
aimed at persuading the government to comply with the UN
agreements under question. This association strongly stressed
this issue as well as rejecting any discrimination against123
women at the social level. Following the activities of the 
feminist women, Turkey signed the agreement in 1987. This 
agreement subsequently was given the force of an article in 
the Constitution obliging the signatory country to end 
discrimination against women either in law or in daily life.
The presence of Turkish feminism in the streets was made 
visible through a campaign launched by feminist groups against 
the battering of women. The starting point of this campaign was 
the use of a Turkish proverb by a judge in court: "You should
not leave woman free without a stick on her back and a baby in
*
her womb." Feminists invited other v.'omen very passionately to
join against men's oppression, generating a solidarity among
women which was demonstrated by a march in Istanbul on May 17,
3.987. Around 3000 women marched through the streets of the city
and encapsulated the slogan "No I'm Formerly Woman" against the
124
phrase "I'm Formerly Human then Woman". This spirit was also
echoed in the words of the feminist song "Kadinlar Vardir"
(Women Are Here): "we arc here to stand up and raise our
125
voices against oppression." The feminists took their place
beside groups of homosexuals and transsexuals, however, they 
left the group of men behind. Ayce Atikoglu, analyzing this 
inarch, described that "these women never looked like Halide
2 03
Edip", the genuine woman leader and the symbol of women who
devoted their full energy to the nation during the War of 126Independence.
This meeting was Regarded as important by the feminists 
because it was a means of allowing them to break out of their 
traditional roles. According to Vildan "the feminist march of 
the 17th of May was an indication of the fact that Turkish
women, for the first time, did something just for127
themselves." The battering of women was equated by feminists 
with their being forced into the private sphere. Going beyond 
battering means, to feminists, to open the way of public life 
for women. Therefore, the dominant aim behind this march rested
in the demand of the feminist women to take a part in the
128
public life.
In an extension of this campaign, different individuals
and groups organized a festival at Kariye, Istanbul, on
October 4, 1987. At this festival, which brought together a
broader range of women and issues, it was decided to establish
a temporary women's museum, in which a variety of artifacts
129
indicative of a woman's daily life were exhibited. The
revenue from the exhibition was directed towards the
publication of a booklet entitled "Bagir Herkes Duysun" (Shout
130
and be Heard by Everybody). The booklet, basically a
collection of testimonies from women who had been battered, 
argues that violence against women in the home is endorsed by
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the state and is part and parcel of male domination. It
indicates that women in Turkey suffer from systematic physical
abuse primarily at the hands of fathers, brothers and
husbands, educated as well as uneducated men. The battering of
the wife is thus regarded as a product of patriarchal 131
culture.
In solidarity with the campaign against the battering of
women a group of feminists in Ankara raised a protest against
Mother's Day in one of the main squares of the city drawing
attention to the fact that women who are revered as mothers
were very often confronted with domestic violence as wives. In
June 1987 this group joined environmentalist groups to launch a
campaign against the Ankara municipality's plan to convert a
park in the center of town into a multi-story car-park. These
women aimed at raising the question of the quality of urban132
life and the way women were affected by it. They later
established the Association for the Solidarity of Women and
publicized activities held on International Women's Day on
the 8th of March of every year. As an extension of this
activity this group of women organized a large meeting in March
1988, in Ankara, to celebrate the day in question. A large
number of women (around 20v30) from different professions
participated in the meeting, which resembled an open forum.
Fatma Berktay, in her opening speech, pronounced that "the
future will be women because they are mostly women who demand
133
roses together with bread." All participant women were 
encapsulated in the following feminist song:
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We were silent and waited 
We only watched what was lived 
Said we enough at last 
Never will we keep silent again. 134
Another Ankara-based feminist group was involved in
running a woman's coffeehouse that served as a meeting place
for a small number of women. They regularly came together and
discussed various issues, particularly the reasons behind
135
women's oppression in the Turkish society. In February
1989, two Ankara-based feminist groups, the Group for the 
Solidarity of Women and the Thursday Group together with an 
Istanbul-based feminist group held the "First Feminist 
Weekend." in Ankara. After the meeting they issued a " 
Declaration for Women's Emancipation", which rejects all kinds 
of oppression originating from man's values. It proclaimed a 
very radical discourse equating all relations between man and 
woman with men's domination over women and rejecting this
strongly. A part of their argument ran as following:
We feminist women want to control our own bodies,
our identity, our labor, and our future by using the
right that we naturally have in order to shape our
fate. We invite all women to be aware of their
oppression, and call them to stand against that
oppression and to obtain solidarity with us in
136
struggling for our interest.
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The development of feminism in Turkey was strongly
resisted by the leftist groups since they thought that feminism
divided the forces of the left. The feminist women came face to
face with the women of the leftist groups in the First Feminist
Congress organized by a large varied group of women in Istanbul
on May 19-21, 1989. The participant groups reacted against each
other through two different slogans. While feminists shouted
"Women Are Here" the leftist women shouted "Cooperation With
Men for Free Days." The feminist women declared that if they
were truly to exist as women, equipped with their own interest,
they should leave the groups of men and organize differently.
However, the leftist women proclaimed that women's problems
were part of the problems faced by the proletarians in the
capitalist system; therefore, the solution is only hidden in a
socialist society coming into being through the joint struggle
of men and women against capitalism. Ultimately the feminists
rejected the demand for cooperation with men and left the 
137
Congress.
Despite this clear contradiction with the leftist women,
the feminists support the leftist groups when an action is
directed against the state. The feminist action entitled "Black
Protest" is an outstanding indicator of that. In protest
against a new regulation concerning prisoners, implemented by
the government on August 1, 1989, feminist women of
different groups launched a campaign proposing that women
wear black colored costumes and that the press use only black138
color in their print on August 12, 1989. Different women's
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groups pronounced this day as the "Black Day" and launched a
inarch in Istanbul against the regulation. They took the new
regulation as an extension of the violation women have
experienced for a long time; therefore, as an oppressed group,
139they felt themselves obliged to react against it. Indeed,
this action, among others, indicates the close contact of 
feminist groups with the left, which constitutes the background 
of many feminist women. Another fact is that one foot of the 
feminist movement is in the civil society itself. This is why 
the feminists actively support an action rooted in society 
against the state.
As an extension of the First Feminist Weekend in Ankara,
the feminist groups decided to launch a campaign against the
physical abuse of women under the name of "Our Body is Ours" in
October, 1989. They distributed rosettes on which feminist
slogans were written in different squares of the city and held
140
a variety of seminars and panels as part of the campaign.
This campaign was immediately shifted to Istanbul with the
cooperation of various feminist groups on November 2, 1989
under the name of "Our Body is Ours no More Sexual Trouble" on141a more extended base. The campaign was held particularly 
against the physical abuse of women in public life.
Feminist women announced that the sexual harassment of 
women in the public realm points clearly to the refusal of 
women in the public life. Molestation of a woman in the
208
streets, feminists argue, refers to the domination of men over
women in a patriarchal culture, which always reminds women that
they would be degraded if they were to attempt to participate142
in the public sphere. The most vivid side of the campaign 
was the distribution of pins to women tied with purple ribbon 
in order to protect themselves against men's attacks. For that 
reason the campaign was announced by the press as the "Purple 
Pin Campaign". These pins, indeed, symbolized the equipment by 
means of which women could be able to participate in public 
life. A part of the campaign's declaration was expressed in the 
following manner:
We women are always troubled in all areas of social
life, in the streets, in business, and at home. We
are abused in buses, on ships, in trains and in
cinemas through actions held with the eye and with
phrase. Let us not be silent any more: let us refuse
143
all together to be modest.
The Izmir-based feminist groups paid great attention to
the campaign. One feminist association, the "Cagdas Kadin
Derneği" (Association of the Contemporaneous Women),
established in 1987, undertook the campaign in Izmir and
involved a large variety of women in the issue. They also
distributed pins to women in order to protect themselves
against men's attacks. This association constructed the center
of feminist actions in Izmir with its monthly publication the
"Cagdas Kadin" (Contemporaneous Women) as well as of a large
144
variety of feminist actions.
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A further street demonstration was held by feminist groups
against Article 438 of the Turkish Penal Code, which allows a
two third sentence reduction to a man if it is proven that the
raped woman was a prostitute. A prostitute affected by this
article in Antalya led feminists (mostly from Istanbul) to
start a campaign against this article in January 1989. They
refused to accept the attributes of chaste or unchaste in a
way that divides women's identity. The concept of unchaste is
developed, feminists say, by men's power in order to hold some145women in the private sphere. This campaign, indeed, means 
the rejection of male-based meanings accorded to women and the 
deliberate usage of their bodies.
The feminist attempts to take part in the public realm is
most clearly revealed through the reversal action of a feminist
group employed in Kadinca. Almost every month two or more women
attempt actions traditionally accomplished by men in public. As
an example a woman wearing male clothes went into the streets
of Istanbul, later writing that looking like man meant freedom
146
in the public world. A further reversal action accomplished
by Kadinca was the organization of a competition for Miss-
Turkey among young boys. This was aimed at imposing women's147
roles on men and putting men under the observation of women. 
Moreover, feminist groups frequently went to the coffeehouses 
with the aim of encouraging women to develop attitudes 
perpetuated in the public by men. Turkish coffeehouses, one 
needs to bear in mind, are the only places that women do not
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maintain. Finally, feminist women either individually or in
groups are going to football matches and traveling around the
country to show to the women that they need not feel any fear149in attempting to partake of public life.
Feminist groups have also accomplished some critical
actions at the grass-roots level. For example feminists hold
visits frequently to the magazines which use women's bodies as150
a sexual object. Noreover, feminists protest against the
state regulations that they think are disadvantageous to women.
Such an action was held by 39 feminist women who applied to
court for the dissolution of their marriage bonds, pointing to
their resistance against the foundation of the Family Research
Institution under the Prime Ministry. This institution, giving
importance to the family, they argued, would smother women in
151the house-work and thus strengthen their traditional roles.
Finally, different articles of the Civil Code have been
frequently criticized as well as protested against by feminists152
through various actions. All these remind us that feminists 
constitute a critical potential element against what degrades 
women, demonstrating the civil-societal face of Turkish 
feminist groups.
These feminist actions have been followed up by the 
foundation of a variety of different associations either 
dependent or independent of official bodies. One such
foundation is the women's shelters for women physically abused
148
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within their families, which opened in cooperation with the
local governments. After strong feminist pressure the first
women's shelter was founded in Izmir in 1988 under the title
"Kadinlar Icin Barindirma Ünitesi” (Accommodation Unity for 
Î53Women). This was followed by another one in Istanbul in
cooperation with the Bakirkoy local government under the name
of the »Bakirkoy Kadin Siginma Evi” (Bakirkoy Shelter for
Women) in 1990. In a year it sheltered about 280 women and154
their 320 children. A further shelter built with the same
aim was Sisli Kadin Siginma Evi" (Sisli Shelter for Women)155
under the Sisli local government. Still another shelter
founded after feminist pressure was the "Kadin Evi" (Women's
156House) under the Kadikoy local government in 1992. These
shelters aimed basically at giving women the possibility of
gaihing their liberty from the degrading actions of men within
their families. The most important of these is the
independently founded "Mor Cati Kadin Siginaqi Vakfi" (Violet
Roof Foundation for Women's Shelter), in 1990, in Istanbul. It
serves to solve women's psychological and legal problems as
157
well as to set up new shelters for women.
Moreover, the feminist groups founded a library with the
name "Kadin Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi" (Library
of Women's Works and Information Center), which collects only
women's works or works related to the female issue. It
performs the function of a large archive of women's work as
158
well as a meeting center for women. Finally, feminist women 
established a department devoted to woman issue at Istanbul
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University under the title "Kadin Sorunlari Arastirma ve
Uygulama Merkezi” (Center for Research and Application of
Women's Problems). This center researches women's specific
159problems and organizes seminars and symposia. The Turkish
feminists also have close contact with their counterparts
abroad. They freguently go to Germany and Cyprus for
conferences or symposia on woman issue. A large group of the
readers of Turkish feminists are active in these countries.
They even founded a center for research into woman issue in 
160Cyprus. All these clearly indicate that feminism in Turkey
is not just an agency for a critical or rejective discourse but 
also has institutionalizing significance. Its emergence in 
Turkey began with protests but it is maintained now through 
institutions concerned with more specific issues. The existence 
of these institutions necessarily constructs a front for 
plurality in a democratic society.
In conclusion, the central message of the feminist actions 
is hidden in their demand to take part in the public life. 
Turkish women, beginning with the Republican regime, have 
gained a substantial place in the public life, but importantly 
on the basis of male-based values. However, feminist women 
after 1980 have tended to integrate with the public on the 
basis of their own values, in other words, they try to feminize 
women in the public life. This, in fact, creates a new type of 
identity in the public resembling the prevalence of a different 
category to be visible. The different identity as such brings
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about the plurality of the public, which is the most necessary 
element of a democratic society. Unification of the public, has 
increasingly become clearer that it creates an authoritarian 
type of political regime. Feminism, providing plural elements 
in the public sphere, constructs one of the crucial elements of 
a civil society. Feminism, therefore, can not be attributed 
only as a rejective discourse, on the contrary, it should be 
perceived as an important component of civil society 
representing the identity of plurality in the public sphere.
4.3. THE IMPLICATION OF FEMINIST GROUPS IN THE POST-1980
TURKISH POLITICS
The feminist movement in the 1980s in Turkey constituted
the first genuine opposition to the military regime by using
the advantage of being women that have officially been
161
tolerated in the mentality of the Republican cadre. Feminism
formed a new political outlook that attempted to sustain the
civil society in the shadow of a powerful Turkish state. As
such, it occurs essentially outside the corridors of the state,
outside the political organizations and within society 
162itself. Tekeli claims that with the development of the
feminist movement the "commitment to liberate women from a
patriarchal social structures carries with it an orientation
not only for change but to change within the recesses of civil 
163
society."
The basic characteristic of this movement is visible in
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its participatory, democratic and individualistic nature. The
individualistic aspect of the feminist movement, indeed,
carries with it a substantial contribution to the
institutionalization of liberal thought in Turkey. This
perspective in Turkey (particularly during the beginning years
of the Republican regime) was perceived by Republican leaders
as a sort of deviation that was then not tolerated. A
centralized type of society was accomplished, accompanied by a
ban on individualistic attempts. Feminism, paying attention to
sexual freedom and individuality of women, constituted the very
core of liberal discourse in Turkey as well as the discourse of
decentralization. A great number of issues such as abortion,
alternative living, consciousness-raising, the full liberation
of a sexual life etc. all created the voice of a plural 164society. The feminist women's orientation, developing not
under the banner of the state or political parties but within 
the recess of society, creates variety in civil society.
The most clear impact of the feminist movement is observed
in the mainstream social groups, particularly on the leftist
groups in Turkey. At the beginning of the 1980s a large number
of leftist magazines, obviously under the impact of feminism,165
published special copies about woman issue and feminism. A
variety of women's associations were also founded by leftist 
groups struggling for women's rights but within the framework 
of a socialist perspective. Three of these are the ^Democratic 
Kadin Derneği” (Association of Democratic Women), the 
”Demokratik Mücadelede Kadin Derneği”, (Association of women in
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Democratic Struggle), and the ’’Kadinlarin Kurtuluşu Grubu"
166
(Group for Women's Emancipation). The Association of
Democratic Women has its own publication, the "Sesimiz" (Our
Voice), which regards woman issue basically as a problem
arising from capitalism. Women who organized under the banner
of this association argue that they should struggle neither for
socialism nor for feminism separately but rather for women's167emancipation in cooperation with socialism. Moreover, the
members of the "Association of Women for Democratic Struggle" 
condemn feminists as not being aware of the social problems of 
the country. They maintain that the struggle for women's
problems should be accomplished according to the present158conditions of the country. Finally, the "Group for Emancipa­
tion of Women" published a bulletin entitled the "Kadinlarin 
Kurtuluşu" (Emancipation of Women). This group argued that 
there are mainly two kinds of feminisms: the bourgeois and
proletarian. The former, they insist, developed mainly in 
America and in many Western countries while the later developed 
genuinely in Russia. They strongly criticize Turkish feminism
as being a part of bourgeois feminism. However, a truly women's
169
movement, they maintain, should be proletarian. Both groups 
agree that women's problems are the part of the problems the 
proletarians face in a capitalist society. This is why they are 
against the feminists' celebration of the 8th of March as the 
"International Women's Day", these groups celebrate it as the 
"International Day of Proletarian Women".
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Mainly, two reactions among the Turkish leftist groups can
be observed in their reaction to feminism: the rejective and
the approving ones. Feminism is criticized by the rejective
groups for several reasons. First of all, it is argued by the
rejective leftist group that feminism has been fostered in
Turkey by the military in order to divide the forces of the
left. Fusun Ozturk, in advocating this view, argues that three
issues are defended by the feminists, each performing the
function of preventing socialism in Turkey. The feminists, she
urges, replace the concept of a class struggle with the
concept of the gender struggle; they also develop an
antagonistic attitude to men which only divides leftist groups
into men and women; and finally, Ozturk goes on to say, by
insisting on complete sexual freedom and liberty and
individualistic behavior, the feminists strike a blow against170the socialist insistence on the communal bonds.
Another leftist reaction against feminism is on the basis
of the argument that feminists have attempted to take the place
of the Turkish left which was banned by the military regime.
This criticism is mostly raised by the magazine Yarin during
the early years of the feminist development in Turkey. It
accuses feminists of being dishonest. The magazine says that at
a time when the leftist warriors needed the loyalty and
support of their sisters, some dishonest women from the left
betrayed them and turned their back on their male counterparts
171
by raising new issues.
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still another reaction against feminism, coming from the
leftist side is based on the insistence that feminism is not a
revolutionary movement against capitalism and is in fact an
artificial discourse. Based on this assertion Aytunc Altindal
urges that feminism cannot challenge the capitalist system for
four basic reasons: first, it is not a philosophical movement;
second, it is not scientific; third, it has no genuine
methodology; and finally, feminism is closed to class reality.
These reasons, he maintains, make feminism a superfluous
172movement dealing with artificial issues in Turkey.
The most severe critic of feminism, Sibel Ozbudun,
declares her views against feminism in a booklet entitled
”Neden Feminizm Değil?” (Why Not Feminism?), which accuses
feminists of dealing only with manifestations of the
capitalist system. She argues that since women's problems are
the product of capitalism there is no need to raise a
specifically female discourse; women she says should struggle
against capitalism in cooperation with their male friends: once
capitalism is abolished there will be no problems for women 
173
anymore.
Finally, feminism is criticized by the leftists on the 
basis that it puts all women in a unique category it ignores 
the variety among them. This group argues that the feminist 
recognition of society is fundamentally wrong. They ask whether 
it is possible to put a proletarian woman and a bourgeois one 
in the same category. However, they maintain, women are divided
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among themselves on the basis of wealth rather than ideological 174
standpoints. Therefore, Sehmus Guzel, an advocate of this
view, proposes that feminist women take a part in present
organizations such as labor unions, political parties and local
governments around more specific issues. Thus, Guzel urges,
175feminist women would be able to reach a higher status.
Nevertheless, some members of the leftist groups favor
feminism mainly for the reason that it constructs a functional
element for Turkish socialists. Two leaders of the Turkish
Labor Party, Mehmet A. Aybar and Dogu Perincek, pronounce that
feminism is not opposed to leftist groups in the struggle for
socialism. Feminism, by raising special rights will still176
serve their purpose. This argument is extended by Nedret
Sena who points to two common points between feminism and
socialism. Feminism's key concepts of equality and liberty, he
asserts, are the basic tenets of socialism as well. Sena
maintains that feminism might provide equality for women but
true independence is obtained only through socialism.
Therefore, feminism and socialism, he concludes, should join 
177their forces.
Furthermore, Feyza Zileli appreciates that they should
support feminism since it deals with consciousness-raising178
activities among women, which obviously serve socialism.
She goes on to claim that feminists are in a struggle with the 
regime on two bases: the basis of production and the basis of
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culture. With regard to the former feminists protest against
women's unequal status in production which is, at the same time
refused by the left. Moreover, the feminists' conflict with a
culture, which sees women as the center of sexuality, the same
culture is actually struggled with by socialists. Therefore,
Zileli concludes, they, as socialists, can easily take feminist
179groups beside them for the purpose under question.
One needs to remember that despite the socialist attempts 
to cooperate with feminism, feminist women strongly reject any 
collaboration with the socialist groups proclaiming their aims 
to be different from the emancipation of women. As such, they 
try to set up a quite "different" and "autonomous" discourse, 
which stresses the specific interests of women.
Beside the leftist reaction one also perceives a reaction 
by the religious groups to feminism. Two different reactions 
have been observed among the religious groups concerning the 
feminist movement. One is what is known as "turbaned" feminism, 
publicized themselves in the daily Zaman and then organized 
around a monthly Ayce. Turbaned feminists sketched what was 
at stake in articles published in Zaman in 1987. They 
basically portrayed the idea that the traditional roles of 
women did not originate from Islam but rather from a male 
culture. They criticized religious men's attempts that accorded 
the roles of housewife and of motherhood only to women. 
However, they argued, Islam does not bring such a division of 
labor based on gender definitions. Therefore, turbaned
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feminists insisted that their being in the struggle for
participating in the public life should be tolerated by the180
religious men. These women later published Ayce which
advocated a quite reactionary discourse to women's traditional
roles and stressed particularly the need for women to partici-181
pate in the public sphere.
The demands of these women were strongly reacted against
by a large number of religious intellectuals. They were
criticized as being unconscious of the Turkish context and for
182
talking from a different setting. Abdurrahman Dilipak
responded to these women by arguing that a Muslim woman cannot
be feminist. Above all, he argued that feminism, by using
concepts such as equality and liberty, serves to provide
cheaper labor for capitalists. Dilipak also says that a Muslim
woman should not be misled by capitalists if she really wants
183
to obtain her freedom.
The other reactions to feminism are based on the 
intellectual ideas of popular religious writers like Hüseyin 
Hatemi, Ali Bulac, Cihan Aktas, etc. The very focus of their 
idea is that God created man and woman with responsibilities 
placed divinely upon them. The difference of responsibility is 
not a sign of inequality but a difference based upon creation. 
Man and woman are created according to their fitrat (nature) to 
carry out social functions in a way bestowed upon them by God. 
The relationship between man and woman is based on natural 
need, best described in terms of complementary rather than
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equality. This issue still occupies the central focus of
religious books and magazines.
The clearest impact of the feminist movement is observed
in the Kemalist woman's associations. While these associations
were dealing, in previous decades, with social problems other
than those of women and were engaged actively to defend
Kemalist principles they came to stress woman issue after the
1980s. The local problems lived by Turkish women have been
taken up by these associations and they have paid attention to
such issues as articles in the Civil Code opposing women's
interest, the need for women's participation in politics and
the right of governance denied to women in districts and 
185
provinces. Moreover, these associations began, from 1986
onwards, to celebrate International Women's Day on the 8th of
March every year while they previously celebrated Women's Day
on the 5th of December, the day on which Turkish women first
186received the franchise.
An important implication is evident in the feminist 
impact on mainstream social groups. Feminism by incorporating 
woman issue into the literature of these groups, created an 
important common point among them. Their being concerned with 
similar issues has contributed to breaking the wall around 
social groups in Turkey. The social groups of the 1960s or of 
the 1970s were, indeed, distant from each other in a way that 
no group demonstrated a consideration to understand the message
184
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of others. However, after 1980 one has observed clearly a more 
"tolerated" and "softened" outlook in each group in perceiving 
the central message of others.
As an example of the contribution to the development of
the civil society, the feminist groups have created a great
impact on the state regulations concerning women after the year
1980. The first impact in this respect was observed by the
state approval of abortion. This was the central issue of
187Kadinca from the first date of its publication onwards.
Moreover, the first feminist page in Somut paid great
attention to the issue before the implementation of the
Abortion Law. Somut argued very passionately against the
official ban on abortion and insisted that it was for woman
188
only to decide whether she would give birth or not. These
demands were, indeed, influential on the Abortion Law, which 
was approved by the government in 1983.
The establishment of two official institutions in 1990 by 
the Motherland party government is noteworthy to mention as 
emerging from the impact of feminist groups' struggle for woman 
issue. The "Aile Arastirma Kurumu" (Family Research 
Institution) and the "Kadinin Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel 
Mudurlugu" (Directorate of the Women's Problems and Status) 
were established to deal with woman issue. The former is 
especially concerned with the question of how the Turkish 
family can be strengthened. For that purpose it has undertaken 
a large variety of researches in cooperation with various
223
deals with her problems within that perspective. The
Directorate of Woman's Problems and Status also cooperates
with other women's organizations to solve women's problems. It
mainly researches for grounds to obtain equality of189
opportunity for women. Indeed, both institutions came into 
being as outcomes of the 1980s context stressing woman issue 
as one of the most crucial discourses in Turkey.
Furthermore, feminist women in various platforms strug­
gled to gain the right for women to be appointed as governor to 
districts and provinces. In 1990 this right was given to women
and a woman governor was appointed, for the first time in
190
Turkish history, to Mugía province in 1991. This was, in 
fact, a revolution in Turkish politics, which was accomplished 
completely under the impact of women being aware of their 
special rights.
The most substantial feminist impact has been observed in
the decision of the newly established government in 1991 to
form a ministry devoted to woman issue, in line with the
program of the government which was constructed upon the
coalition of two central parties, the True Path party and the
191
Social Democratic Populist party.
The feminist groups influenced the government to amend 
the articles in the Civil Code and the Penal Code which
universities. It sees the woman as a member of the family and
224
degraded women. Two such amended articles were Article 155
(charging woman's right to work outside the home on her
husband's permission) and Article 134 (arranging the192
principles of divorce), From 1992 onwards spouses have been
193able to dissolve their marriage bonds on demand. Finally,
Article 438 of the Penal Code, which places prostitutes in a
separate category in the event of rape, was amended under the
194strong pressure of feminist groups.
The feminist impact on state regulations indicates, above 
all, the construction of an alternative voice against official 
policies. This refers further to the body of a political force 
adjusting state policies toward the direction of the interest 
of a special social group.
Political parties in Turkey came to arrange new principles
on behalf of women in their programs. First of all, the Social
Democrat parties began to set aside quota number for women
195candidates from 1986 onwards during the elections. The
impact of the feminist movement on this regulation is
appreciated by Perihan Ergun, the Istanbul chair of women
commission of SDPP, which is still in government. She pointed
out that they learned the term quota from the feminists and
196
then they espoused it as a principle in their program.
Moreover, the prime minister's wife Semra Ozal, as a part 
of the activities of the Motherland party, started to deal with 
woman issue through the "Turk Kadinini Güçlendirme Vakfi”
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(Foundation for the Elevation of the Turkish Women) throughout
the country. The foundation paid great attention to the daily
problems of Turkish women, particularly in the eastern part of
the country. An egalitarian framework was at stake in the
activities of the foundation, which aimed basically to elevate197
women to the level of men.
A quite new trend under the impact of feminist movement in
Turkey has been experienced in the role of Turkish men. Indeed,
the feminization of men has been perceived in the Turkish 
198
culture. Two new definitions gained currency among Turkish
men after the 1980s are the ”Kilibik” (Hen-Pecked) man and the
'* Kazak* (Severe) man. The former describes the man who
resembles a woman through house-works; the later refers to a
199severe man retaining his traditional role. Kadinca points to
this new development as the **glasnost* in the attitudes of 
200Turkish men. Those who are married to feminist women say
that they have been mentally changed and have come to the point
where there is such a thing as a woman's perspective. As such,
one man explains that he has gained a new perspective which
taught him to think differently when he now reads a book or
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watches a movie. Another describes how pleased he is when
he helps his wife with housework and looks after their baby.
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He maintains that feminism made him proud of doing this.
The changed role of Turkish men has been observed also in 
advertisements, which utilize mainly female sexuality. In 
recent years this image has been based not only on female
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new trend, as perceptively observed by Emre Kongar, has come
into the sphere under the impact of the feminist movement in 
203Turkey.
sexuality but also on the man's role within the family. This
A further aspect of this development can be observed in 
the attitudes of a large variety of Turkish men refusing to be
"man" The feminization of male is well observed in the
increasing number of transsexuals, transvestites and
homosexuals. Many of these do not transform to a new sexuality
to experience a new pleasure but do so rather as a sign of the
rejection of masculine ideology. This posture is clearly
pointed out by a transvestite who said he was not experiencing
a new way of sexuality but rejecting the masculinity, the204
ideology of oppression and of power.
This new trend, indeed, means nothing more than the aboli­
tion of the distinction between the public and the private 
spheres, which were defined by the theoreticians of civil 
society as drawing attention to the roles cast by man and woman 
in different spheres. The public sphere was accorded to men by 
a series of thinkers formulating civil society beginning with 
Hobbes and ending with Gramsci. However, they accorded the 
private sphere only to women. On the contrary, it increasingly 
became clear that the changing trend in the role of the male in 
the family and of the female in the public life brought about 
need to leave these definitions of civil society.
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In conclusion, feminism developed in Turkey after 1980 as 
an important component of the civil society through the 
discourses pronounced as equality, difference and autonomy. 
Moreover, the actions undertaken by feminists with the aim at 
participating in public life converted the definition of civil 
society attributing the public sphere as the realm of men. The 
feminist discourses and actions obviously have created an 
alternative ground for alternative perspectives and discourses 
to be operated against the ones undertaken mainly by the state. 
The state elite's goal, which is formulated as "raising the 
country to the level of contem.porary civilization", came to be 
rejected by feminists, who perceived this goal as being an 
extension of masculine ideology. This rejection brings about 
women's being dissociated from the roles bestowed upon them 
through the mainstream ideologies of Turkey such as Kemalism, 
Socialism and Islam. The energy devoted by women to these 
ideologies came to be organized around a more specific 
interest, which is quite new in the Turkish culture, thereby 
culminating the notion of a universal and a diversified public 
realm.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
I have analyzed in the previous chapters that the 
characteristics of the modern state make it no longer possible 
to accept the definition of civil society whose basic 
principles were laid down by such masters as Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. The institutional interface 
between the state and family, women's evolving profile of 
citizenship, their mobility and employment in the public have 
brought an end to the definition of a civil society, one based 
on the distinction of the public realm from the private sphere. 
Therefore, civil society should be understood as a milieu of 
the alternatives through which alternative discourses, 
meanings, actions and structures coming into being. This is 
possible only with the existence of economically, culturally 
and organizationally powerful social groups as the carrier of 
alternative institutions.
Feminism as a paramount social group has contributed to 
the development of civil society in the West on the bases of at 
least three principles: the principle of equality, the 
principle of difference, and the principle of autonomy. 
Feminists' insistence on equality functions in a way that 
men's values are restricted to be the only source of virtue as
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well as one which adjusts the mis-ordered norms of the male- 
centered culture. Moreover, it functions in a way that women 
are getting a full profile of citizenship and the rights 
accompanied with that citizenship. However, the feminist 
politics of difference is a substantial critique to the demand 
on equality. Postmodern feminists, particularly in the example 
of the French case, are seeking the possibility of creating a 
different discourse or culture based on women's particular 
experiences. They object to all transcendental claims of the 
"Enlightenment” reflecting and reifying the experience of 
Western males and resulting in women's subordination. French 
feminists promise a great revolt against the institutions of 
patriarchy which they think are reconstructed in the language. 
Then, difference in French feminist writers has gained a 
revolutionary meaning implying and not achieving a 
socioeconomic equality with men but disrupting and subverting 
Western patriarchal language and thought itself.
Finally, Western feminists have committed to an autonomy 
in the public life. Feminist emphasis on the politics of the 
"personal is political" commits to a strong desire for breaking 
women's links from their private domains and taking a part in 
the public life. The general politics as a means of partaking 
in the public life is represented, in the West, by the 
politics of lesbianism. It is used particularly by American 
radical feminists to dissociate women from men's world and what 
ever values and meanings associated with the masculinity.
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Unlike a long tradition of women's struggle for particular 
political rights in Western societies, Turkish women were seen 
by the government as a link to the Western civilization. First, 
during the second half of the nineteenth century; later, during 
the Republican period. Women's being educated, their being 
articulated into the social life and thus being visible in the 
streets were accepted by the Ottoman intellectuals as a 
symbolic link to used to make contact with Western civilization 
and to overcome the cultural problems of the empire. The 
attempts to educate women and to change their traditional 
status were important means for the state elites to save the 
state, beside the adoption of new institutions to bureaucracy 
and military. These attempts resulted with Abdulhamid II's 
great reforms pertaining to women's education throughout the 
country.
Intellectual emphasis on women issue later resulted with 
the emergence of an "indigenous" feminism rooted particularly 
in the big cities like Istanbul, Salónica and Izmir. Women in 
that wave created the first woman's associations and published 
a large number of magazines. They created an alternative ground 
to the official discourses which were represented mainly by the 
government that had never previously been experienced. 
Moreover, Women during the earlier years of the twentieth 
century constructed the most important potential element of 
civil society in Turkey. They constructed the central discourse 
of opposition against the authority whose cultural values were 
rooted in traditional Islamic principles. The first wave of
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feminisin in the Ottoman society emphasized strongly two issues 
which were closely related with the Ottoman women's particular 
status: to take part in the public life through education and 
work and to have equal rights with men in domestic life through 
regulation of marriage and divorce. These characteristics of 
the indigenous feminism was maintained at least until the early 
years of the republic. This is the reality behind the fact why 
women established the first political party during the 
Republican period.
With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish women once 
more were seen as being a symbol of a link to reach Western 
institutions. Woman issue was seen by the state elite as a 
means to create a fundamental break from the Ottoman-Islamic 
background and to lead the nation toward the aim displayed as 
to reach the level of contemporary civilization. New 
regulations concerning woman's rights were taken as a symbol of 
being Westernized and of indicating a break from the 
traditional society. Two reforms that held with that respect 
were the adoption of the Civil Code and the right of 
enfranchisement to women. The struggle of feminist women to 
obtain the right to vote was mainly ignored by the analysts of 
that time. However, feminist women gave a strong struggle for 
the vote as well as for the commitment undertaken by the 
Western feminists. The abolishment of the Union of the Turkish 
Women ended the indigenous feminism in Turkey, and women, from 
then onwards, served for aims other than those of themselves.
Turkish women until 1970 served for the
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institutiona].izati.on of the Kemalist principles. However, in 
the 1970s the concern on women issue in the platform of the 
United Nations led socialist groups also to pay attention to 
this issue. Thus, throughout the decade a large part of the 
Turkish women served the aim of the leftist groups which were 
displayed as realizing a socialist revolution. This decade is 
important also in the sense that Turkish women were confronted 
with feminist ideas which were raised mainly in the Western 
societies.
The post-1980 period is, indeed, a turning point for 
Turkish women. After 1980 woman issue was re-observed once 
again in the Turkish context but this time with a different 
outlook. Women, after a long break (from 1935 until 1980) once 
again began to develop political issues particular to their own 
interest. Developing discourses different from those which are 
officially formulated, paying attention to specific rights and 
enacting a variety of campaigns for new institutions serving 
for women, refer to the development of a feminist movement 
which we term "civil" feminism. Unlike the earlier indigenous 
feminism, the civil feminism in Turkey after 1980 not only 
stresses women's problems in local forms but also the struggles 
against the grand issues such as "patriarchy", "science", 
the notion of "self", "progress", "universalism", the 
"family" in any form and the like. Civil feminism in Turkey 
attacks the basic institutions which the Turkish state 
undertook during the Republican period known as progress and 
development. It criticizes these projects as being male-point
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and male values ending with the subordination of women. Turkish 
civil feminism has specific characteristics as well as common 
points with its Western counterpart. In the sense of its 
specific characteristics, feminism serves for the aim of 
modernization in Turkey. However, with respect to the common 
characteristics it shares with Western feminisms, Turkish femi­
nism constitutes a substantial element of civil society. It is 
this bifurcating function of the Turkish feminism that will be 
discussed below.
5.1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH FEMINISM
The main particular characteristics of Turkish feminism is 
visible in its vigorous attempt to represent itself as an 
element of the public life. Either liberal, radical or
socialist, Turkish feminist groups strongly reject being a part 
of the private life, the privacy which they urge has created a 
place of assault and battery, marital rape and woman's 
exploited domestic labor. With that respect Turkish feminists 
have abolished the boundaries of the public and private worlds 
whose basic principles v;ere laid down by liberal thinkers 
mainly on the basis of the idea that it attributes to women 
only a domestic life. They briefly argue that what is known as 
the "private" is the locus of power for every man and the locus 
of patriarchy, which is a crude form of biological determinism.
As an extension of the politics of partaking in the public
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life the Turkish feminists imposed a greater credit over the 
equality of women with men in the public realm. Participating 
into the public life means mainly two things for Turkish 
feminists: preserving their liberty and achieving an equal 
status with men. They attempt mainly to develop a democratic 
theory based on civil equality that undermines the differences 
between the sexes so that full citizenship for women can be 
secured. The realization of its aim means the transformation of 
the sexual division of labor and norms of femininity and 
masculinity. Although this seems a unique characteristics of 
liberal feminists both radical and socialist feminists 
articulate this view as the base of "rights" for women.
A further particular feature of Turkish feminism is its
1
being strongly against political lesbianism. Turkish feminists 
project emancipation not through institutions separating women 
from men but through strengthening the links between men and 
women on the basis of sexual relations. As previously analyzed, 
the radical feminists in the West took lesbian sexuality as a 
way to challenge the ideological, political and economic bases 
of male supremacy. Lesbianism, for them was the symbol of 
patriarchal rejection. However, Turkish feminists formulate the 
rejection of a patriarchal culture through sexual liberty. 
Sexual liberty for the Turkish feminists means mainly to have 
enough opportunity in deciding whatever they want to do with 
their own bodies. In other words, they demand to have full
control of their bodies in giving or not giving birth and in 
entering sexual relations with men. Indeed, emancipation for
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almost all Turkish feminist groups means sexual liberty, the 
sexuality which is experienced mainly with men.
Still another distinctive characteristics of Turkish 
feminism is its being in favor of secularism. In being against 
Islamic domination in the Turkish context, feminist women de­
nounced that they should remain against Islamic-religious 
groups and preserve a secular type of government in Turkey. 
They feel themselves indebted to the virtue of a republican- 
secular society whose basic principles were laid down by the 
Kemalists on behalf of women. A feminist woman denounced that
even though one manifests herself as a feminist she "can not
2share the same political struggle with a religious woman." 
Turkish feminists, briefly, see Islam as a strong challenge to 
women and they prefer a secular society in which women would 
easily achieve their aims.
Emphasizing either equality in the public life, sexual 
liberty, or secularism, Turkish feminists' most vigorous goal 
is to gain a prevalence in the public life. One can easily 
observe two interrelated factors (both rooted in the Turkish 
cultural background) behind the particular characteristics of 
the Turkish feminist groups.
Firstly, it is originated in the sharp contradiction 
between the public and private spheres in the Ottoman-Turkish 
culture. This culture was clearly based on the viewpoint of the 
public sphere as the world of universalism, independence, 
equality, reason, rationality and impartiality which were
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attributable only to men. However, the privacy was, in that 
culture, restructured on the basis of the world of 
particularism, natural emotions, love and partiality, which 
were best known by the natural characteristics of women. In 
short, there was a strong separation between the two spheres 
and no woman could be able to attempt to enter the boundaries 
of the public life.
The modernization process during the nineteenth century of 
Ottoman society restrengthened this distinction more 
extensively on the basis of a more disadvantageous position to 
women. As previously mentioned beginning from the proclamation 
of the Tanziroat (1839) until the earlier years of the 
Republican Turkey, a large number of new Acts were amended in 
the legal, bureaucratic, administrative, economic and 
educational systems resulting in radical changes in the 
techniques of the military, economy and politics. The most 
outstanding prevalence of this new restructuring was the 
emergence of a constitutional government in the Ottoman empire 
in 1877. These internal developments created a drastic change 
in the traditional role of the household in the Ottoman 
society, which was under the domination of the privacy, 
culturally known as the secret life.
With the beginning of the attempts for the modernization 
of the country and for the adoption of modern institutions a 
new understanding of man, political society, public life, 
education, development and so forth were institutionalized. In
237
politics a large series of ordinary men were given the right to 
vote and thus the right of citizenship. On the other hand, 
women were appropriated as being identical with a private 
household, which was no longer a safe place for Turkish women. 
The newly increased industry began to draw the female labor 
force out of the private home and into the public workplace. 
This process, indicated its first impact on women living in 
large cities. Although they had to participate the public life 
under the economic conditions and under the heavy impact of 
modern institutions degenerating the previous boundaries 
between the public and private spheres, the legal arrangements 
were still not appropriate for that transition. Turkish 
feminism, thus, first emerged on the dynamics of the internal 
conditions rather than an imitation of Western feminism. The 
first feminist women demanded to take part in the new society 
on the basis of an equal status with men. The importance of 
equality and of taking part in public life in this special 
condition of the Ottoman-Turkish context developed as being 
contradictory to women. This is, indeed, one of the plausible 
reasons behind the fact why Turkish feminists are still 
vigorously demanding participation into the public life on the 
basis of an equal treatment with men.
Secondly, and most importantly, women were culturally se­
cluded from the public on the basis of the norms of their 
sexuality. As it is well known, the Islamic interpretation in 
the Ottoman society divided society basically into two sub­
IIS
universes: the universe of men and the universe of women. The 
social division according to sex resulted in the Ottoman 
society in the division between those who hold authority and 
those who do not, and those who hold spiritual power and those 
who do not. This division after the sixteenth century of the 
Ottoman empire resulted in the emergence of the harem life 
which secluded women from social life and leading them to live 
among themselves, coming to contact only with the male members 
of their family. Further, upon the attempts of the Ulema 
justifying women's exclusion from the public sphere women were 
completely segregated from social and economic life. This 
special condition is, indeed, another factor behind the 
emergence of the Turkish feminism stressing the importance of 
the public life particularly in the large cities. Since peasant 
women did not live this particular experience, feminism still 
has not reached to the women living in rural areas. This 
particular experience of the Turkish women is the most 
plausible reason behind the fact why Turkish feminist groups 
are against political lesbianism and are formulating sexual 
liberty as the means of their emancipation. Political 
lesbianism they thought would turn Turkish women back to the 
harem life. Even the "Turbaned” feminists (religious women 
emphasizing feminist issues) are against this kind of division 
in society and demand to take a proper part in the public 
domain.
Now, the question is what sense the peculiar characteris­
tics of the Turkish feminism makes for us. My thesis is that
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the distinctive feature of the Turkish feminism serves clearly
for the modernization project of the Turkish state, the project
displayed in the aim at reaching the level of contemporary
civilization in particular, under the hand of the republican
leaders. The main project of the Republican leaders was to
create an equal status for women with men in Turkish society,
as well as to obtain a full participation of women into the
public life so that Turkey might be Westernized. By objecting
to the traditional roles imposed upon women and by emphasizing
their articulation into the public life, in fact, Turkish
feminists serve for the modernization of Turkey, which was at
the same time the main project of the state elites. Moreover,
their special emphasis on the sexual liberty serves for the
institutionalization of the liberal behaviors in Turkey. The
Turkish case clearly indicates that gaining the right to public
life does not result with the emancipation of women but rather
with the process in which women serve for things other than3
their emancipation. However, Turkish feminists have another 
feature, which bears the notion of a strong rejection of 
universal categories and creates a contribution to the 
development of the civil society in Turkey. This argument is 
the central point of the following part.
5.2. FEMINIST POLITICS IN TURKEY
Feminists, as a paramount social group, have created a new 
set of politics in Turkey through the success of changing many 
women's and men's way of thinking about women in post-1980
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period. Through the focus on conscious-raising, on non- 
oppressive relations between man and woman in the family and in 
social life, on creating a counter-culture and on alternative 
institutions, Turkish feminists have developed new way of doing 
politics. Feminism, in Turkey, has raised important questions 
about the distributions and legitimacy of macro power relations 
and has challenged the deep-rooted codes of social 
interactions. In the collective action of feminist women in the 
post-1980 period, the issues such as gender, right, inequality, 
seclusion and liberation have constituted a large part of 
arguments in Turkish context. What they have briefly achieved 
is the meaning and definition of identity, which contradicts 
with the "man-like" Republican women.
Turkish feminist politics have been seen at least in three 
different and interrelated areas. First, it brings some 
important issues from the back streets into the open and raises 
them to public discussion. Issues such as abortion, wife 
battering, marital rape and molestation are examples of this 
kind. Second, Turkish feminism redefines the deep-rooted codes 
of social institutions as in the case of gender analysis, 
women's sexuality, etc, and replaces them with new meanings. In 
fact, one can clearly observe an increasing shift in the 
sexist norms of the Turkisli culture after 1980. If one factor 
behind this is the liberal context emerged in the post-1980 
another factor is clearly the feminist women's political 
struggle against the traditional sexual norms. The feminists' 
greatest impact is, in that respect, observed on the grass-root
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structures or on socio-cultural fields. As argued in the 
previous chapter the increasing tendency in the emergence of 
"feminine men" and "masculine women" is the general outcome of 
this politics prevailed in grass-roots in the post-1980. 
Finally, Turkish feminists have put pressure on political 
parties and the government to stand in emphasizing woman issue 
and in creating new institutions with that respect. The last 
attempts to found a woman ministry is one of the conclusion of 
that politics.
Turkish feminists like their French counterparts 
articulate the politics of "difference". However, the Turkish 
feminists, unlike their French counterpart, engage the meaning 
of difference as a terrain of political struggle, rather than a 
justification of dissociation of women from men. This feature 
of Turkish radical feminists is again closely related with the 
particular experience of the harem life Turkish women lived in 
the past. Radical feminists insist upon the need for the 
development of a "women's perspective" whose aim is to research 
the political, ontological and epistemological commitment 
underlying patriarchal discourses. They argue that there is a 
different kind of existence and reality which is represented 
only by women. Through elevating women's values and norms 
feminists create a great reaction to the patriarchal 
characteristics of the Turkish state articulating the 
Enlightenment view of development and progress. Since women are 
different in capacity, socialization, values, and cognitive and 
cultural styles only the recognition of such differences can
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enable the full inclusion and participation of women in 
political and economic institutions. This politics clearly 
bears a potential challenge to the universal category of the 
Turkish state.
In Turkish politics the importance is always given to the
need for "homogeneity” of citizens, fearing that group
differences would tend to undermine commitment to the general
interest. Therefore, the existence of leftist, religious,
sexist and ethnic groups are always taken as a threat to the
common interest and then the politics of assimilation has been
asserted by the Turkish state. The recognization of these
groups in public with their own cultures, values and norms has
4never been an option. With the period witnessed, particularly 
the gradual development of republican political system, the 
leading Turkish state has created a political voice stressing a 
"unified" public toward the direction that was projected to 
reach the level of the contemporary civilization. Indeed, in 
reaching such a goal it was not the society that was being 
emphasized but the country which at the same time reflects the 
inclusion of the society.
This picture in the politics of the Turkish state has 
actually been reversed by women in the post-1980 period. Two 
groups of women are important to mention briefly in that re­
spect. The veiled women and the feminist groups. The veiled 
women either deserving strong religious notions or articulating 
feminist views reversed the attempts of the Turkish state to
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create a unified public. They, in reverse have attempted to
take part in a public world with values of their own. Value
put here as the instrument of their identity is their veil
symbolizing the prevalence of the religious elements in the 5
public life. Moreover, feminist women have contributed to 
that attempt by articulating in post-modern discourses 
developed mainly against universal categories of the 
Enlightenment. They reacted to the basic institutions that the 
state elite appropriated as worth getting for their purposes. 
The feminists' critique to the family, to the state, to the 
authority, to science, and to the male-history all serve to 
that aim. Moreover, like the religious women they insist on the 
public life, which is blind to the specificities they represent 
in their life. As a part of their struggle feminists supported 
social groups prevailing the visibility of a difference in the 
public realm. The feminists' support to female religious 
students in struggling to attend their school with their dress 
wearing, to the leftist prisoners struggling against the
state's arbitrary treatment, to the prisoners and to homosex­
uals and transsexual groups in gaining a publ.ic prevalence with 
their own identity are of the same kind. These are clearly 
serving the creation of a "heterogeneous" public. Unlike the 
Enlightenment assertion of a universal public this 
heterogeneous public asserts that the only way to ensure that 
political life will not exclude persons or groups which it has 
excluded in the past but is hidden in recognization of specific 
histories in the public life. In such a public the 
recognization and the appreciation of differences in the
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context of configuration with power become the ultimate goal.
The feminist women's emphasis on difference creates an 
area of heterogeneity and multiplicity enhanced by women's 
special experience and value. Feminism in that way develops a 
notion of "separation” which implies that to separate women 
from men and from institutions, roles and activities which are 
male-defined and operating for male privilege. We can easily 
claim that feminism by appealing to the notion of multiplicity, 
is creating an increasingly different epoch in civil society 
which at the same time makes a challenge to the "unified" 
characteristics of the Turkish state. Moreover, it creates, by 
embracing the concept of difference, the need for a justice 
sensitive to variations of gender, race, class, religion and 
other sociological categories. Such a justice will clearly 
foster a public excluding no person, no aspect of person's 
lives or issue for discussion. This feature of the Turkish 
feminism is important for the purpose under question since it 
leads also to the representation of other social groups having 
different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and 
discourses in public life. Feminists' contributions to the 
development of a richness in the public life is, indeed, its 
most sensitive contribution to the development of civil 
society.
In conclusion, Turkish feminist groups are serving mainly 
for two purposes. They, by attempting to take part in the
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public life on the basis of an equal status, serve the aim of 
the Turkish state. On the other hand, their being vigorous on 
utilizing the international concepts puts feminist groups in 
front of the Turkish state and prevails them as a 
representative of an alternative discourse. In both respects 
feminism contributes to the development of civil society in 
Turkey.
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For the reaction of the Turkish feminists against the 
political lesbianism see Sirin Tekeli, "Feminism Nedir Ne 
Değildir?", Interview by Kadinca, (April 1984). See also 
Filiz Kocali, "Feministler ne istiyorlar?", Kadinca, 
(February 1988).
For a thorough analysis of the secular aspect of the 
Turkish feminists See Gul, "Hem Mümine Hem Feminist", 
Feminist, 4 (March 1988). See also Sedef Ozturk, "Elesti 
riye Bir Yanit", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktüs, 4 (November
1988). The factors behind the reason why Turkish feminists 
make a preference on behalf of secularism can briefly be 
observed in Idem., "Fransa'da Komandolar Hastanelerin 
Kürtaj Bölümlerini Basiyor", Kim, (April 1992).
However Deniz Kandiyoti argues that Turkish women have 
emancipated through the secular reforms of the Republican 
government in Turkey but unliberated. The distinctive 
characteristics of Islam still maintains alive in 
Turkish culture with its vigorous control over the defini 
tion of the sexuality bring under discussion the unliber 
ated aspect of Turkish women. For a detailed analysis of 
Kandiyoti's argument see "Emancipated But Unliberated? 
Reflections on the Turkish Case", Feminist Studies, 13
2 (Summer 1987). Contrary to this argument, indeed, it is 
evident in the example of the Turkish case that the sexual 
norms of the Turkish culture have come under question by 
feminist groups, the attacks by means of which the 
liberation of women are the matter. Needles to say it is in 
no way correct to ascribe emancipation to women only by
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their inclusion into public life. This maintains still as a 
question if we are to identify the emancipation of women 
with total revolution of the male-based institutions. In 
fact the feature of the Turkish women in public life is a 
respond also to the severe critic of liberal theory Carole 
Pateman who argued that once women abolish the boundaries of 
the public and private spheres they would be emancipated. 
For a detailed analysis of her critique of the domestic 
sphere as an obstacle to women's emancipation see "The
Fraternal Social Contract", in Civil Society and the State, 
John Keane, ed. (London, New York: Verso, 1988).
4. Indeed, the attempts of the female religious students are in 
the direction of the aim of the Turkish state to penetrate 
women with the public sphere. Their attempts to take part in 
the public domain reminds one cleax-ly that they are an 
element of the m.odernization project of the Turkish state. 
However, religious women come to conflict with the state 
over the symbol of their representation. This contradiction 
brings female religious students to challenge the state
norms. Since secular-oriented Kemalist rulers and
intellectuals are in no way in tolerant to the Islamic 
values they do not subdue the prevalence of the "veil" in 
the public realm. In its very essence religious women
are serving to the modernization aim of the Turkish state 
even though they are rejected by the state elite to the 
public realm.
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